The Challenge of Rising China for Japan in the Context of Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations in 2014-2018
Abstract
Since 2014, both China and Japan have been pursuing a policy of normalization of their bilateral relations, which worsened after the Japanese government’s decision in 2012 to nationalize three out of the five disputed Senkaku islands. There are a number of factors, at times contradicting each other, that shape Japan’s contemporary policy towards China: from deep interest in intensification of trade and economic cooperation with China and in ensuring regional security, concerns over US President Donald Trump’s actions and hence over the sustainability of US-Japan close partnership and alliance, to the challenge of rising China. A specific feature of Japan’s policy towards China is that, due to deep contradictions between the two countries, Tokyo views the rise of China not as bringing opportunities, but instead as a serious challenge or a potential threat. The strengthening of China’s economic and especially military power - along with North Korea’s missile and nuclear program - is seen in Tokyo as the deepest security concern. As China’s comprehensive national power strengthens, China’s foreign policy behavior becomes more assertive, foreign policy and foreign trade activities intensify, Japan’s challenge of rising China attains new dimensions. During the past several years, Tokyo has been facing a need to find an appropriate response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and to China’s intensified economic and military activities in the East China and South China Seas. This article demonstrates how the Abe Shinzo Cabinet meets the challenge of rising China under the conditions of Japan’s policy to normalize relations with its strong neighbor. Specifically, the article identifies and characterizes the Abe Cabinet’s measures to hedge the risks connected to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and China’s assertiveness in the East China and South China Seas.
References
1. Announcement of “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future”. 21 May 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page18_000076.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
2. Asia Africa growth corridor. Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development. A vision document. 22-26 May 2017. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. http://www.eria.org/Asia-Africa-Growth-Corridor-Document.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
3. “Asia’s Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia”. Speech by Prime Minister Abe Shinzō at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia. 5 June 2017. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
4. China’s Activities in East China Sea, Pacific Ocean, and Sea of Japan. October 2018. Japan Ministry of Defense. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/sec_env/pdf/ch_d-act_201810a_e.pdf (no longer accessible).
5. China’s Maritime Activities in the Asia-Pacific Region and Japan’s Reaction. Produced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5X1u4vnxXKc (accessed: 02 December 2019).
6. Defense of Japan 2018. Japan Ministry of Defense. https://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2018/DOJ2018_Digest_RU.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
7. Drifte, R. (2016). Japan’s Policy towards the South China Sea - Applying “Proactive Peace Diplomacy”? PRIF Report, № 140. http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif140.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
8. G7 Ise-Shima Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment. June 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000160272.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
9. Hutchens, G. (2018). Australia joins US-Japanese Pacific investment plan but offers no budget details. The Guardian. 31 July. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jul/31/australia-joins-us-japanesepacific-investment-plan-but-offers-no-budget-details (accessed: 02 December 2019).
10. Japan and China Conclude Memorandum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries. 10 May 2018. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2018/0510_003.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
11. Japan-India Joint Statement. 11 November 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000202950.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
12. Japan protests over Chinese radar in disputed East China Sea drilling rig. 7 August 2016. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/07/japan-protests-over-chinese-radar-in-disputed-eastchina-sea-drilling-rig (accessed: 02 December 2019).
13. Japan’s Defense Budget. Japan Ministry of Defense. http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_budget/ (accessed: 02 December 2019).
14. Japan’s National Security Strategy. 17 December 2013. Cabinet Secretariat. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
15. Japan’s White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000406631.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
16. Japan to offer aid for Indian ocean ports. 26 May 2018. The Jakarta Post. https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/05/25/japan-to-offeraid-for-indian-ocean-ports.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
17. Japan to propose G-20 aid rules to check China’s Belt and Road. 18 March 2019. Nikkei Asian Review. https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Japan-to-propose-G-20-aid-rules-to-check-China-s-Belt-and-Road (accessed: 02 December 2019).
18. JBIC Signs MOU with China Development Bank Corporation. 25 October 2018. Japan Bank for International Cooperation. https://www.jbic.go.jp/en/information/press/press-2018/1026-011525.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
19. Joint Statement on the U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Meeting. 5 April 2018. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/04/280254.htm (accessed: 02 December 2019).
20. Kawashima Shin. (2018). “Odin poyas, odin put’: kak sozdat’ mnogostoronniye mekhanizmy partnyorstva, sopernichestva i sderzhivaniya mezhdu Yaponiyey i Kitayem? [“One Belt, One Roas”: how to create multilateral mechanisms of partnership, competition, and containment between Japan and China?]. Nippon.com. https://www.nippon.com/ru/in-depth/a05801/ (accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian).
21. Kireyeva, A.A. (2019). Pozitsii Rossii i Yaponii po klyuchevym problemam regional’noy bezopasnosti i vzaimodeystviya [Russia and Japan’s Positions on Key Problems of Regional Security and Cooperation]. In I.S. Ivanov (ed.), Perspektivy razvitiya rossiysko-yaponskikh otnosheniy na novom etape: rabochaya tetrad’ 50/2019 [Russia-Japan relations: new stage of development: working paper 50/2019]. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/Russia-Japan-WP50-Ru.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian)
22. Kistanov, V.O. (2018). Indo-Tikhookeanskaya strategiya Yaponii kak sredstvo sderzhivaniya Kitaya [Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy as a Deterrent to China]. Far Eastern Affairs № 2. Pp. 32-43. (In Russian).
23. Kryachkina, Yu.A. (2018). “Novaya era” yapono-kitayskikh otnosheniy [“New era” in Japan-China relations?]. Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. https://riss.ru/analitycs/55088/ (accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian)
24. Military and Security Development involving the PRC 2018. U.S. Department of Defense. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Aug/16/2001955282/-1/-1/1/2018-CHINA-MILITARY-POWERREPORT.PDF (accessed: 02 December 2019).
25. National defense program guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond. 17 December 2013. Japan Ministry of Defense. https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2014/ pdf/20131217_e2.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
26. Shvydko, V.G. (2017). Otkaz SShA ot TTP: znacheniye dlya Yaponii [US withdrew from TTP: Significance for Japan]. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 1 February. http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/otkaz-ssha-ot-ttp-znachenie-dlya-yaponii/(accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian).
27. Shigeta Shunsuke. (2018). Xi and Abe pledge ‘new era’ of cooperation. Nikkei Asian Review. 27 October. https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Xi-and-Abe-pledge-new-era-of-cooperation (accessed: 02 December 2019).
28. Smith, J. (2018). Another First: U.S. and India to Hold 2+2 Dialogue in Delhi. The Heritage Foundation. Issue Brief. № 4897. 24 August. https:// www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/IB4897.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
29. Streltsov, D.V. (2018). Indo-Tikhookeanskiy region kak novaya real’nost’ global’noy sistemy mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [The Indo-Pacific region as a new reality of the global system of international relations]. International Affairs. № 9. Рр. 65-74. https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/2076 (accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian).
30. Streltsov, D. (2014). Yaponiya: novaya politika natsional’noy bezopasnosti [Japan: new national security policy]. Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 5 February 2014. http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/yaponiya-novaya-politika-natsionalnoy-bezopasnosti/(accessed: 02 December 2019). (In Russian).
31. The Current Status of China’s Unilateral Development of Natural Resources in the East China Sea. 27 September 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/page3e_000356.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
32. The First Session of China-Japan Third-Party Market Cooperation Working Mechanism Held in Beijing. 26 September 2018. Ministry of Commerce People’s Republic of China. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantnews/201809/20180902790806.shtml (accessed: 02 December 2019).
33. The G7 Ise-Shima Summit “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure”. May 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000241007.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
34. The number of Chinese Government and other vessels that entered Japan’s contiguous zone or intruded into territorial sea surrounding the Senkaku islands. 28 February 2019. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000170838.pdf (no longer accessible).
35. Tōgō Kazuhiko. (2018). Japan’s Relations with Russia and China and the Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance. The National Bureau of Asian Research. 16 May. https://www.nbr.org/publication/japans-relations-with-russia-and-china-and-the-implications-for-the-u-s-japan-alliance/(accessed: 02 December 2019).
36. Tomotaka Shōji. (2014). The South China Sea: A View from Japan. NIDS Journal of Defense and Security. 15 December. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/2014/bulletin_e2014_7.pdf (accessed: 02 December 2019).
37. Xi, Abe meet on ties, reaffirm readiness to strengthen partnership. 08 July 2017. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017xivisitgermany/2017-07/08/content_30042755_2.htm (accessed: 02 December 2019).
38. Yoshida Reiji. (2018). China nudges Japan on joining up in “Belt and Road” initiative at 14th Annual Tokyo-Beijing Forum. The Japan Times. 14 October. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/10/14/national/politics-diplomacy/china-nudges-japan-joining-belt-road-initiative-14thannual-tokyo-beijing-forum/ (accessed: 02 December 2019).
39. Zhao Hong. (2018). Chinese and Japanese infrastructure investment in Southeast Asia: from rivalry to cooperation? Institute of Developing Economies - Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-JETRO). № 689 February. https://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/689.html (accessed: 02 December 2019).
Review
For citations:
Leksyutina Y.V. The Challenge of Rising China for Japan in the Context of Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations in 2014-2018. Russian Japanology Review. 2019;2(2):5-27. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.24411/2658-6789-2019-10007
Views: 72
Email this article 