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Editors

Streletsov D.V. Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor,
Head of Department of Afro-Asian Studies,
MGIMO-University,
Chairman of the Association of Japanologists of Russia

Grishachev S.V. Ph.D. (History), Associate professor,
Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH),
Executive secretary of Association of Japanologists of Russia

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Association of Japanologists
Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences
12, Rozhdestvenka street, Moscow, 107031

Telephone: +7 (495) 628-9780
E-mail: japanstudiesinrussia@gmail.com
Web sites: www.japanstudies.ru
www.japanreview.ru

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CONTENT

<i>Leksyutina Ya. V.</i>	The Challenge of Rising China for Japan in the Context of Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations in 2014–2018.....5
<i>Lebedeva I. P.</i>	The Ideology of Lifetime Employment and Its Influence on Contemporary Japanese Society.....28
<i>Toropygina M. V.</i>	On Recording <i>Waka</i> Poems on <i>Kaishi</i> Sheets of Paper. The Example of the <i>Shokukokinshū</i> <i>kyōen waka</i> Collection.....50
<i>Trubnikova N. N.</i>	Once again about the “Miraculous Power of <i>Waka</i> ”. <i>Setsuwa</i> Tales about Poets in the <i>Jikkinshō</i>66
<i>Grishachev S. V.</i>	Japan’s Karafuto Governorate (1905–1945): History and Social Memory.....92
<i>Magera Yu. A.</i>	Origins of the <i>Shōnen-ai</i> and <i>Yaoi</i> Manga Genres.....103

The Challenge of Rising China for Japan in the Context of Normalization of Sino-Japanese Relations in 2014–2018¹

Ya.V. LEKSYUTINA

Abstract. Since 2014, both China and Japan have been pursuing a policy of normalization of their bilateral relations, which worsened after the Japanese government's decision in 2012 to nationalize three out of the five disputed Senkaku islands. There are a number of factors, at times contradicting each other, that shape Japan's contemporary policy towards China: from deep interest in intensification of trade and economic cooperation with China and in ensuring regional security, concerns over US President Donald Trump's actions and hence over the sustainability of US-Japan close partnership and alliance, to the challenge of rising China. A specific feature of Japan's policy towards China is that, due to deep contradictions between the two countries, Tokyo views the rise of China not as bringing opportunities, but instead as a serious challenge or a potential threat. The strengthening of China's economic and especially military power – along with North Korea's missile and nuclear program – is seen in Tokyo as the deepest security concern. As China's comprehensive national power strengthens, China's foreign policy behavior becomes more assertive, foreign policy and foreign trade activities intensify, Japan's challenge of rising China attains new dimensions. During the past several years, Tokyo has been facing a need to find an appropriate response to China's Belt and Road Initiative, to the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and to China's intensified economic and military activities in the East China and South China Seas. This article demonstrates how the Abe Shinzō Cabinet meets the challenge of rising China under the conditions of Japan's policy to normalize relations with its strong neighbor. Specifically, the article identifies and characterizes the Abe Cabinet's measures to hedge the risks connected to China's Belt and Road Initiative and China's assertiveness in the East China and South China Seas.

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Keywords: rise of China, Japan, Sino-Japanese relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), “quality infrastructure”, Senkaku, East China Sea.

Introduction

Among the most serious external challenges facing Japan, of particular importance is that of rising China – a country, which is close geographically, but distant in the context of the political and economic values it upholds. The challenge of China’s rise for Japan is the need to adapt to the new China – China which has significantly augmented its economic, financial and military power; China, the relations with which have a complicated historical and political content; China, which, relying on its increased financial capabilities, pursues active foreign and trade and economic policies, which often run counter to Japan’s interests; China, which is assertive in achieving its territorial aspirations that extend to the Japan-controlled Senkaku islands; but also China, whose enormous domestic market and the growing middle class open up ample economic opportunities for Japan.

In the first two decades of the 21st century, Sino-Japanese relations have been through periods of relatively conflict-free coexistence of the two great powers and their close trade and economic cooperation, as well as periods of crisis in bilateral relations accompanied not only by mutual claims but also by prolonged suspension of contacts at the top level (as it was during the premiership of Koizumi Jun’ichirō in 2001–2006, or under the second cabinet of Abe Shinzō in 2012–2014). As a rule, crises in bilateral relations are caused by Sino-Japanese contradictions regarding the interpretation of the 1937–1945 historical events, visits by Japanese high-ranking officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, and ownership of the Senkaku islands.

To “take bilateral relations to a new era, from competition to cooperation,” promised Abe Shinzō during his first official visit to China on 25–27 October 2018 [Shigeta 2018], which was timed to coincide with the 40th anniversary of the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty between the two countries. Mutual interest in trade and economic cooperation and in a stable regional situation prevailed temporarily in relations between Japan and China, and since late 2014, the two sides have exerted efforts to normalize bilateral relations and to ensure comfortable coexistence.

Moreover, since 2018, the US factor has had a significant impact on the evolution of Sino-Japanese relations. Beijing, which regards the “trade war” launched by Donald Trump as a manifestation of the US policy to

contain China (and, in particular, to restrain the growth of its innovative technological power), got interested in developing close cooperation with Japan. Of great concern for Beijing is also the development of the Indo-Pacific region concept, as well as the threat of the USA, Japan, Australia, and India forming an anti-China block.

Tokyo, too, has certain concerns about the Trump administration's recent actions. The USA's sudden exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Washington's strong criticism of Tokyo over trade barriers in some sectors of the Japanese economy (in particular, in the automobile industry, agriculture, and services), which may be followed by Washington's introduction of higher import duties on Japanese goods, and Trump's protectionist measures, which undermine the foundation of the existing international trade system, create serious economic risks for Japan. Moreover, Trump's unpredictable leadership style and his criticisms of multilateral formats of cooperation (both in the economic and military-political spheres) bring into question the USA's reliability as an ally which, if need be, would come to help Tokyo (also in the case of a hypothetical confrontation with China). And, finally, the change in the Trump administration's policy towards North Korea, reflected in establishing a direct dialogue between the US and North Korean leaders in 2018, is perceived in Tokyo as easing off the pressure on the North Korean regime and as a serious challenge to Japan.

Such concerns serve as a stimulus for establishing Sino-Japanese relations, but they do not annul the contradictions inherent in these bilateral relations. Moreover, China's growing comprehensive national power, its increasing assertiveness in pursuing national interests and intensifying foreign policy and foreign economic activities in various regions create more and more challenges for Japan. An incomplete list of these challenges includes China's Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established by Beijing, and China's intensified economic and military activities in the East China and South China Seas. This article aims to demonstrate how cabinet of Abe Shinzō meets the challenges of rising China in the context of Japan's policy to normalize Sino-Japanese relations.

Japan's Response to China's Rise

The principal factor in Japanese contemporary policy towards China is the growth of China's economic, financial, and military power and

its increased assertiveness in regional and world affairs. In 2010, China replaced Japan as the second largest economy in the world. At present, China is the world's largest economy in terms of GDP by PPP, the largest trading power and exporter and the biggest holder of foreign exchange reserves. Japan's loss of the second (after the USA) leading position in the world in terms of macroeconomic indicators and the "erosion" of Japan's role in the global governance system exerts a certain psychological pressure on Tokyo. While Tokyo still keeps its position as the second largest shareholder of the World Bank and the IMF, yet, in the United Nations, Japan has moved down from the second position to the third in the list of the UN's major donors (both to the general budget and the budget for peacekeeping operations).

In addition, China's increased economic strength, accumulated financial assets, and the state-promoted Chinese "going out" strategy have made China a strong competitor for Japan in the financial and commodity markets of many developing countries. Intense economic rivalry between China and Japan can be seen in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Central Asia. Tokyo is also concerned about China's increased activity in the Arctic.

Currently, China is the biggest trade partner of more than 100 countries. There is a rapid growth in Chinese foreign investment and aid to developing countries. Its active economic policy is reflected in China's participation in the creation of the New Development Bank, in the decisive role of China in the AIIB, and in the implementation of the Belt and Road mega-initiative.

Against this background, Abe's cabinet, which came to power in Japan in 2012, launched a large-scale program aimed at the recovery of the Japanese economy, called "Abenomics". Under Abe, Japan intensified its trade and economic policies: after the USA withdrew from the TPP agreement, Tokyo, after some confusion caused by its ally's actions [Shvydko 2017], took charge of the process of setting up the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, concluded a free trade agreement with the European Union, and began to promote the "quality infrastructure" concept in the world community.

Another serious challenge for Tokyo is China's growing military power. In terms of defence expenditure, China has, for many years, been second only to the USA, while substantially surpassing its neighbours (including Japan). China's defense budget shows a continued and steady growth. Between 2008 and 2017, the annual increase in its official

defense budget averaged 8 per cent. According to Chinese official data, in 2018, it increased by 8.1 per cent as compared with the previous year and amounted to 175 billion dollars (approximately 1.3 per cent of GDP), and in 2019, defense spending grew by 7.5 per cent, reaching 178 billion dollars. In its estimates of the Chinese defense budget, Japan (the same criticism comes from the USA, SIPRI, and many military experts) assumes that the defense budget officially announced by Beijing does not reflect China's actual defense spending and does not include large items of expenditure such as spending on defence research and technology, purchases of foreign arms [China's Activities in East China Sea... 2018], strategic forces, etc. For instance, the US Department of Defense estimated China's 2017 real defense budget at 190 billion dollars (against 154 billion dollars officially announced by China) [Military and Security Development involving the PRC. 2018].

Concerns over China's continued rise, its stepped-up military modernization, China's systematic assertiveness in upholding its interests (including in the South China and East China Seas), and growing nationalist sentiments that can put pressure on the Chinese leadership in matters related to the shaping of foreign policy became ones of the key factors that predetermined change in Japan's defense strategy under Abe's second cabinet. Abe began to develop the concept of "proactive pacifism" and initiated various innovations in the national security sphere. Thus, in June 2013, the National Security Council was established to develop policies in the national security and diplomatic spheres [Streltsov 2014]. The changes in Japan's defense policy were reflected in the adoption by Abe's cabinet of a number of laws in 2015 that altered the interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and allowed to use the right to collective self-defense to protect an ally's forces even in the absence of an attack on Japan, but in the presence of a threat to the country's security, and also expanded the range of operations of the Self-Defense Forces (with logistical and technical support from the armed forces of the USA and of other countries in order to counter threats to peace and security) [Kireyeva 2019, p. 19].

The changes in Japan's defense policy were to a great extent determined by the intensified threat from China [Tōgō 2018]. Of significance is the shift of emphasis in one of Japan's key security policy documents, the National Defense Program Guidelines². In the 2013

² The National Defense Program Guidelines were originally adopted in 1976 and reviewed in 1995, 2004, 2010, 2013, and 2018.

edition of this document, Tokyo's concern over the emerging regional situation was primarily associated with the North Korean nuclear missile programme (and only after that with China's actions and then Russia), while in the 2018 version of the Guidelines, the primary concern is related to China's growing military power and unilateral actions aimed at changing the status quo, including that in the East China Sea [National defense program guidelines for FY 2014 and beyond. 2013].

Tokyo's concern over the situation with regional security was reflected in the growth of defense spending. In 2013, for the first time in eleven years, Japan increased its defense expenditure, which grew by 0.8 per cent. In 2014, Japan's defense budget was 2.2 per cent up from the previous year, and then, up to and including 2018, it was increasing by 0.8 per cent annually³. A leap in the defense budget occurred when the budget for 2019 was planned – defense spending increased by 7.2 per cent compared to 2018, amounting to 5.3 trillion yen (or 47 billion dollars) [Japan's Defense Budget].

China's assertiveness in achieving its territorial claims and promoting its economic agenda in the region and in the world was the reason for Abe putting forward the strategy of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region” at the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development, held in Kenya in August 2016⁴ [Kistanov 2018, p. 34]. Replacing the geographical concept of the “Asia-Pacific region”, well established in the global discourse, with the construct of the “Indo-Pacific Region”, Tokyo showed its interest in a more significant regional role of India, which adheres to liberal and democratic values, as an important counterbalance to growing China. The idea of an “alliance of democracies”, put forward by Abe a decade ago, is on the agenda again and is recalled in the concept of the “security diamond”, proposed by Abe in 2012 as comprising Japan, the USA, India, and Australia, and aiming to protect the maritime spaces of the Pacific and Indian oceans.

Tokyo sets forth three areas of implementing the strategy of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”: promotion and consolidation of principles

³ The calculations are based on official data from Japan's Ministry of Defense, which do not include the costs of implementing the projects of the US-Japan Special Committee on Okinawa, regrouping the US forces in Japan, and the commissioning of a new government aircraft in the defense budget [Defense of Japan 2018].

⁴ Abe's strategy of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region” dates back to his speech at the Indian parliament in August 2007, which was titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” [Kistanov 2018, p. 34; Streltsov 2018].

of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade; promotion of economic prosperity through enhanced connectivity, including the development of “quality infrastructure” in accordance with international standards; putting forward initiatives to secure peace and stability, including assistance (to countries of the world. –Ya.L.) in enhancing the capacities to exercise maritime law, combat piracy, and reduce the risks of natural disasters [Japan’s White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017, p. 2]. Thus, the Japanese concept aims to prevent China from violating the principles of international law and of the rights of the regional countries, as China is realizing its territorial ambitions, and also to promote an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative – the concept of “quality infrastructure”, based on the best international standards. Meanwhile, it would be wrong to regard the Japanese strategy as an attempt to restrain the growth and strengthening of China. A more accurate interpretation could be that it focuses on restraining China’s assertiveness in territorial disputes, prompting China to use the best practices in its foreign investment and foreign infrastructure construction.

Beijing, however, regards the Japanese strategy of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region”, as well as the changes in Japan’s defense policy and the steady growth of Japan’s defense budget, as measures to contain China, corroborating China’s view of Japan as a revisionist state that has not abandoned its military past and has not fully admitted its war crimes committed during World War II.

Issues of the East China and South China Seas in Japan-China Interaction

China’s assertiveness in achieving its territorial ambitions in the East China Sea and the imprudent actions of the Japanese government in 2012 (nationalization by Japan of three out of the five disputed islands) caused a serious crisis in Sino-Japanese relations. In 2012–2014, Beijing severed political contacts with Japan at the ministerial level and above, introduced a number of measures restricting trade and economic ties and people exchanges (including tourism), created an ADI zone in the East China Sea (in November 2013), and started to regularly send ships, the number of which was at times 28 vessels a month, to the disputed waters.

Since 2014, the situation in the East China Sea has somewhat settled down. The sides have so far been able to avoid the escalation of the

territorial contradictions into critical situations (as was the case in 2010 and 2012). Nevertheless, Japan is worried by the ongoing practice (since September 2012)⁵ of Chinese ships intruding into the 12-mile zone of Japan's territorial waters near the disputed Senkaku islands. According to the Japanese Coast Guard, in 2018, six Chinese ships on average intruded monthly into Japan's territorial waters, and in January and February 2019, a total of 24 ships intruded Japan's territorial waters [The number of Chinese Government and other vessels... 2019]. China also continues to violate Japan's air space over the 12-mile zone of the territorial waters.

An alarming sign for Tokyo was the entry of Chinese warships into Japan's coastal zone near the disputed islands. In June 2016, Japan's coastal waters near the disputed islands were for the first time violated by a PLA warship, and in January 2018, by a submerged Chinese nuclear submarine.

In order to strengthen its position in the East China Sea, Japan began to develop military infrastructure near the Senkaku islands. In 2016, Japan deployed a radiolocation station on the Yonaguni island. In the autumn of 2018, Tokyo outlined plans for building a military garrison for 500 to 600 personnel on the island of Ishigaki located in close proximity to the Senkaku islands and deploying a missile battery there. The Japanese government intends to build similar infrastructure on the neighbouring Miyako island in the spring of 2019 [Kryachkina 2018].

Tokyo is strongly dissatisfied with the ongoing development (since June 2013) of oil and gas fields by China near the midline in the East China Sea. Japan notes China's intensified activities in this area and makes a point that there are 16 drilling rigs in the East China Sea [The Current Status of China's Unilateral Development... 2018].

Though these rigs are on the Chinese side from the midline in the East China Sea, Tokyo insists on the need to refrain from developing natural deposits in the East China Sea until the official demarcation of the special economic zone in the East China Sea between the two states. For its part, Japan does not develop deposits in the waters of the East China Sea which are claimed by China. Beijing lays claim that its special economic zone stretches to the Okinawa Trough, which is a lot more to the east of the midline.

Tokyo's concern is also caused by the fact that 3 out of the 16 rigs are in close proximity to the midline, which makes it possible to assume that China may "pump out" natural gas from the fields located on the Japanese side from the midline. Moreover, there are concerns over the possibility

⁵ The fact of a Chinese ship intruding into Japan's territorial waters near the Senkaku islands was for the first time recorded by Japan in December 2008 [China's Maritime Activities...].

of transforming the drilling rigs into a kind of military stations. Thus, in the summer of 2016, Japan repeatedly protested over the installation of a radar by China at the one of the drilling rigs [Japan protests over Chinese radar... 2016].

Earlier, the sides tried to work out a mechanism for joint development of the oil and gas fields in the East China Sea – in 2008, they even reached an agreement on joint development of natural resources in the East China Sea. However, since then, China has not shown its interest in implementing the agreement, preferring to unilaterally develop the oil and gas fields in the East China Sea. The installation of the Chinese drilling rigs in the East China Sea is regarded by Tokyo as a violation of the spirit of the 2008 agreement. Another protest over China's resumption of the development of the gas fields in the East China Sea was made by Japan in December 2018.

China also takes other measures to indirectly assert its right to the disputed waters and islands in the East China Sea. For example, in October 2018, China, without obtaining an appropriate permission from Japan, installed a buoy, supposedly for collecting weather data and possibly intelligence data, in the Japanese special economic zone near the Senkaku island. Such symbolic measures provoke official protests from Tokyo, though do not lead to a crisis in bilateral relations.

On the whole, the two sides have so far demonstrated restraint in promoting their sovereign rights in the disputed waters (China, for instance, does not install drilling rigs on the Japanese side of the midline, and Japan refrains completely from developing oil and gas fields even on its side of the midline), preferring to avoid serious crises. An important achievement was the creation in May 2018 (in pursuance of the plans voiced by the two sides back in 2007) of a bilateral crisis communication mechanism to avoid unintentional collisions in the air and on the water in the East China Sea. A "hotline" between the two nations' defense departments was badly needed, since there had been repeated situations of dangerous approaches of China's and Japan's aircraft and ships in the air and sea space in the East China Sea.

Meanwhile, tensions in the bilateral relations are created by Tokyo's activities in the South China Sea, where China claims 90 per cent of the sea area and has territorial disputes with several ASEAN countries and Taiwan. Japan does not have territorial claims in the South China Sea, but is nevertheless interested in maintaining the freedom of navigation regime there, as Japan's important trade routes pass through this area. About 85–90 per cent

of Japan's oil imports and 33 per cent of imported LNG [Drifte 2016, p. 4] pass through the South China Sea. Moreover, the ongoing stepped-up construction of military facilities on the China-controlled islands is regarded by Tokyo as enhancing the ability of the Chinese Navy and Air Force to project power and also to control sea lines of communication. Japan is highly interested in maintaining stability in the region and, consequently, preventing a serious crisis in the South China Sea. And, finally, counteraction to China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, which has much in common with China's assertiveness in the East China Sea, is now viewed by Tokyo as a measure to protect its interests in the East China Sea. Currently, in Japan's strategic plans, there is already a close liaison between the issues of the East China Sea and of the South China Sea. Concerted efforts with ASEAN countries and the USA to counter China's unilateral activity in the waters of the South China and East China Seas have become an important area of Tokyo's policies.

The course to enhance Tokyo's participation in the issues of the South China Sea began to take shape after the incident in September 2010, when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese Coast Guard ship near the Senkaku islands, and Tokyo came to realize China's assertiveness in matters of sovereignty and the right to sea areas. Concern over the situation in the South China Sea began to appear regularly in Japanese official rhetoric. Mentions of the South China Sea and criticisms of China in this regard were expressed in Japan's National Security Strategy published in December 2013 [Japan's National Security Strategy 2013]. Over time, the rhetoric began to be supported by concrete actions. The Japanese Self-Defense Forces began to regularly take part in joint military exercises in the South China Sea held together with the USA and several Asia Pacific countries. In September 2018, Japan for the first time openly announced that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force sent a submarine to participate in a military exercise in the South China Sea⁶.

When Abe came to power in Japan in December 2012, Tokyo became more active in establishing defense cooperation with the ASEAN countries [Tomotaka 2014, p. 136]. More specifically, Japan assists countries in South East Asia that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea in strengthening their defense capacity in view of the growing threat from China. For instance, in 2014, Japan agreed to hand

⁶ Interestingly, some Japanese experts point out that Japanese submarines had long been appearing in the South China Sea, and China was well aware of that, but chose to express its surprise after Tokyo's official statement in September 2018.

over to Vietnam seven used marine vessels for surveillance and in June 2017 announced its decision to sell six new patrol ships to the Philippines. Tokyo passed to the Philippines 10 coast guard ships, 2 large patrol ships, small high-speed boats, and maritime safety equipment. Indonesia received 3 patrol ships. Japan also dispatched experts to Indonesia and Malaysia and assisted these countries in implementing institutional improvements in the military training and education [Japan's White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017, p. 6].

On the whole, Sino-Japanese relations are characterized by vehement mutual suspicions about the stepped-up military construction and militarization of their counterpart, as well as by suspicions about intentions towards each other. Japan accuses China of assertiveness in the South China and East China Seas, militarization of the South China Sea, lack of transparency in military spending, and an increase in the military budget. China lays claims for the Japan-controlled Senkaku islands and accuses Tokyo of reviving militarist aspirations, increasing the defense budget, and interfering in the problems of the South China Sea.

Japan's Response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative

Over several decades, Japan has been one of the world's major investors in developing countries, including infrastructure construction among other things. Joining as a financial assistance donor the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1964, Japan has since accumulated enormous experience in this area. Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) is provided on a bilateral basis by the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, as well as through the Asian Development Bank, one of the world's most influential financial institutions, with Japan as a principal shareholder.

China as a major investor to developing countries is a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging back in 2004–2005, when China accumulated substantial economic and financial power and began implementing its “going out” strategy. Earlier, during the three decades beginning from 1979, China was one of the biggest recipients of Japanese yen loans provided as ODA.

What became the culmination of the transformation of China's role in the world finance and economic system – from a large borrower to a large lender, from an ordinary participant to the initiator and founder of new multilateral development banks under its auspices – was the

public presentation by the PRC President Xi Jinping of the Belt and Road Initiative (then presented as the “Economic Belt of the Silk Road”) in September 2013, which provided for large-scale Chinese investments in the infrastructure of developing countries, as well as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank initiated by Beijing in 2013. And during the first three years after the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, Japan, along with several Western developed countries, was keeping its distance from this Chinese initiative. There were discussions in the country regarding the possibility and necessity of Japan’s participation in Chinese mega-initiatives – the Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB, which at its inception was erroneously regarded as a financial instrument to implement the Belt and Road Initiative.

In 2013–2016, the general background for Japan’s involvement in the Chinese initiatives was for the most part unfavourable: starting from 2012, when contradictions over the ownership of the Senkaku islands heated up, the bilateral relations reached the bottom in their development since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1972. Moreover, in assessing its possible participation in the Chinese initiatives, Japan could not ignore the fact that Beijing’s success in implementing these initiatives substantially strengthened China’s positions in the competition for regional leadership. In a sense, the establishment of the AIIB challenged the multilateral development bank which had long been functioning with the decisive role of Japan, namely the Asian Development Bank. The advisability of creating a new structure that duplicated the activity of the Asian Development Bank was called into question.

The criticism of China’s Belt and Road Initiative focused on the following points:

1. The determining role of the state, not the private sector, in the Chinese initiative. Most of the financial assets are provided by the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank (also through the Silk Road Fund) to Chinese state-owned enterprises that, in turn, invest into the construction of infrastructure abroad. Japanese foreign infrastructure projects, on the contrary, are financed mostly by the private sector – for example, by major companies such as Mitsubishi, Toyota, Nintendo, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial [Zhao Hong 2018]. Assistance provided by the Japan Foreign Cooperation Agency, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and also through the Asian Development Bank is not dominant, but is only intended to serve as catalyst to mobilize infrastructure financing from the private sector.

2. The terms on which China provides loan funds to recipient countries do not correspond to the standards developed by the OECD Development Assistance Commission and may lead to financial crises in recipient countries [Kawashima 2018]. Critics of the Belt and Road Initiative point out that, in some cases, China, aware of the inability of certain countries to repay borrowed funds, gives them large loans, expecting to receive various privileges afterwards, for example, control over natural resources or the infrastructure created with the finance from China.

3. China provides economically conditioned loans. The loan conditionality may consist not only in the fact that contracts are carried out by Chinese contractors with the use of Chinese construction materials and equipment and Chinese labour, but also in the requirements for recipient countries to introduce China's Beidou navigation system or products of the Chinese telecommunications companies (Huawei and ZTE).

4. The absence of the requirements traditionally issued by Western countries to borrowing countries (democratic transformations, introduction of a good governance system, compliance with the environmental and labour standards, etc.) undermines the effort of Western countries to stimulate democratic processes and to disseminate best practices.

In order to hedge the risks associated with the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and to secure a niche in infrastructure construction, Tokyo developed the "quality infrastructure" concept. In fact, Japan adopted a strategy of contrasting the Chinese and Japanese models of foreign infrastructure construction: the Chinese model is characterized by the rapid implementation of infrastructure projects, their large number and an enormous total budget of infrastructure lending, while the Japanese model boasts of the high quality and characteristics of an infrastructure to be created and of the use of optimum technological solutions. Thus, in May 2015, Japan's Prime Minister Abe announced the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure initiative launched jointly with the Asian Development Bank, which made provision for allocating about 110 billion dollars in 2016–2020 for "quality" infrastructure construction in Asia [Announcement of "Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia's Future" 2015]. A year later, in May 2016, Abe announced a broader version of this initiative, called Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure. What was different in the new version was increased funding (from 110 billion to 200 billion dollars), and that funding was provided for the period from 2017 to 2021 to implement

infrastructure projects around the world (not just in Asia as was the case with the earlier version). The new version also expanded the range of areas for infrastructure investment (investments in the energy sector and natural resource development) and the list of funding sources (in addition to the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, other investors could be Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI), Japan Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport and Urban Development (JOIN), Fund Corporation for the Overseas Development of Japan's ICT and Postal Services (JICT) and Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)) [The G7 Ise-Shima Summit... 2016].

Tokyo started to actively internationalize the “quality infrastructure” concept. In May 2016, the G7 summit in Ise-Shima adopted Principles for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment proposed by Japan. The adopted five principles are based on the idea that quality infrastructure investment should: 1) ensure effective governance, reliable operation, and economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost, as well as safety and resilience against natural disaster, terrorism, and cyber-attack risks; 2) ensure job creation, capacity building, and transfer of expertise and know-how for local communities; 3) address social and environmental impacts; 4) ensure alignment with economic and development strategies, including aspects of climate change and environment at the national and regional levels; 5) enhance effective resource mobilization including through Public-Private Partnerships [G7 Ise-Shima Principles... 2016]. In pursuance of its effort to disseminate the “quality infrastructure” concept in the world, Japan was also the co-organizer of the OECD's First International Economic Forum on Asia held in April 2017 under the title “Enhancing Regional Integration and Development Through Quality Infrastructure and Resilience”, and of a high-level event in the framework of the UN General Assembly, Promotion of Quality Infrastructure Investment, held in September 2018. In the UN, Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Kōno Tarō even announced Japan's intention to become the leader in the creation of “quality infrastructure” in the Indo-Pacific region [Kistanov 2018, p. 38]. In September 2018, Tokyo hosted a joint seminar organized by the OECD and the Ministry of Finance of Japan on the theme of “Financing Quality Infrastructure for Long-Term Investment and Mobilizing Private Sector Capital”. Tokyo plans to continue to work actively with international organizations (such as the OECD)

and interested countries in order to stimulate quality growth through the development of “quality infrastructure” [Japan’s White Paper on Development Cooperation 2017].

As the host of the G20 summit in June 2019, Tokyo proposed guidelines for infrastructure investment. According to the Japanese idea, the guidelines are designed to encourage large donors of infrastructure aid to comply with international standards when implementing infrastructure projects [Japan to propose G-20... 2019].

In addition to consolidating global support for the concept of “quality infrastructure”, Tokyo took practical steps to create and participate in multilateral initiatives on “quality” infrastructure investment in developing countries. In November 2016, during the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tokyo, the two sides indicated their intention to seek synergy between the Indian “Act East” policy and the Japanese initiative of “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” in order to improve regional integration and connectivity between Asia and Africa [Japan-India Joint Statement 2016]. As a follow-up to this idea, in May 2017, the 52nd annual meeting of the African Development Bank announced the establishment of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGR), consisting of four main components: development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure and institutional interconnection, human capacity building, and partnership of nations [Asia-Africa growth corridor 2017].

Trilateral forms of cooperation in infrastructure investment have begun to take shape. For instance, in 2018, the USA, Japan, and India set up a special Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group [Joint Statement on the U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Meeting 2018] intended to promote enhanced cooperation in infrastructure development and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region. In May 2018, the US-India and US-Japan Business Councils initiated the establishment of the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral Forum aimed to improve coordination between the private sectors when implementing infrastructure projects abroad [Smith 2018]. In July 2018, a trilateral infrastructure investment partnership was set up between the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, and the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade [Hutchens 2018].

In 2018, Tokyo announced its intention to expand infrastructure investment in developing countries. In May 2018, during the meeting with the leaders of sixteen South Pacific states, Abe promised to provide assistance in creating “quality infrastructure”, including port infrastructure

and renewable energy. Also in May 2018, the Japanese government announced its plans to grant yen loans for the development of ports in three countries of the Indian Ocean (Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) [Japan to offer aid for Indian ocean ports 2018]. In November 2018, during the visit of the US Vice President Michael Pence to Tokyo, the sides announced the establishment of a US-Japan Infrastructure Development Fund amounting to 70 billion dollars, the priority area of which is the implementation of infrastructure projects in the Indo-Pacific region.

Meanwhile, the year 2017 saw the first signs of Tokyo's departure from its initial detached position with regard to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. A possible change in Tokyo's attitude towards the Chinese initiative was signaled by the participation of the Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic Party of Japan, Nikai Toshihiro, in a high-level Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held in Beijing on 14–15 May 2017. A few weeks later, in June 2017, at the International Conference for the Future of Asia, Abe Shinzō gave a cautious assessment of the Belt and Road Initiative, expressing willingness to join its implementation on the condition that the infrastructure under construction is available to all and that, during its construction, the purchases are transparent, the projects are economically viable, and the repayment of borrowed funds is possible for the recipient country with no damage to the stability of its public finances [Asia's Dream... 2017].

At the meeting with the PRC President Xi Jinping held on 8 July 2017 in Hamburg in the framework of the G20 summit, Abe Shinzō indicated Japan's desire to expand cooperation with China in trade, finance, tourism, and the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative [Xi, Abe meet on ties... 2017]. The change in Tokyo's position can be explained by a number of circumstances. Firstly, the acceptance of the Belt and Road Initiative opened ample opportunities for normalizing relations with China, which is an important foreign policy objective both *per se* and against the background of the unpredictable policies of President Trump's administration. Secondly, the rivalry of the two countries in infrastructure development in third countries was causing more damage than what their cooperation could bring. The two countries' experience showed (the most illustrative example being the competition between the two states for the contract for the construction of a high-speed railway in Indonesia in 2015) that their rivalry over infrastructure projects in third countries made it necessary to substantially decrease the cost of projects, which, in the long run, was beneficial only for the recipient countries.

Thirdly, Tokyo could not any longer ignore the growing support for the Belt and Road Initiative in the world community.

In early May 2018, during the visit of China's State Council Premier Li Keqiang to Japan, the parties agreed on setting up a joint committee for the promotion of business cooperation in third countries (Committee for the Promotion of Japan-China Business Cooperation in Third Countries) [Japan and China Conclude Memorandum... 2018]. In September 2018, the Committee held its first session [The First Session of China-Japan... 2018]. This actually initiated a China-Japan dialogue which was characterized as "cooperation in third countries".

During Abe's visit to Beijing in late October 2018, the first Sino-Japanese Forum on Business Cooperation in Third Countries was held. The Forum resulted in signing 52 memoranda of cooperation in infrastructure, logistics, IT, health, and finance. In particular, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation and the China Development Bank signed a Memorandum of Understanding providing for financial support to Chinese and Japanese companies in their business cooperation in third countries subject to observation of international standards such as openness, transparency, economic efficiency, and compliance with laws and rules [JBIC Signs MOU... 2018].

Among the joint projects under discussion are plans for the construction of a high-speed railway network in east Thailand (a part of Thailand's Eastern Economic Corridor), "smart cities" in South East Asia, an oil refinery in Kazakhstan, and solar energy generation facilities in the United Arab Emirates [Yoshida 2018].

Conclusion

In developing its policy towards China, today's Japanese policy-makers face the need to take into account a great number of divergent factors. On the one hand, stable close relations with China are in the interests of Japan's economic development and of regional security. Moreover, in the context of the unpredictable actions of the US President Trump's administration and, accordingly, the unstable support provided by Washington to Japan, avoidance of crises in Sino-Japanese interaction is of special importance. On the other hand, there is a number of serious obstacles standing in the way of harmonious relations with China: bilateral contradictions related to the interpretation of the 1937–1945 historical

events, visits by high-ranking Japanese officials to the Yasukuni Shrine, ownership of the Senkaku islands, as well as the different political systems in the two countries and their different political and economic values, the two countries' different approaches to global and regional security, intensified competition in various regions and spheres, and mutual suspicions about each other's intentions. Amid such a large number of deep bilateral contradictions, the rise of China is seen in Tokyo not as fraught with opportunities, but as a serious challenge or even a potential threat to Japan.

Within this context, Abe Shinzō's cabinet is to accomplish a difficult task of normalizing Japan's relations with China while hedging the risks associated with the rise of China. To this end, Abe's cabinet makes efforts to expand Japan's activity in regional and world affairs, to strengthen Japan's independent role in regional and world arenas, to enhance Japan's role in solving global and regional problems (in particular, this is seen in the changes in Japan's defense policy). Against the rapid rise of China, of great importance is the strengthening of Japan's economic and military potential. Thus, Abe initiated a program to revitalize the Japanese economy, stepped up the trade and economic policy (in particular, he led the reformatting of the TPP and concluded a free trade agreement with the EU), strengthens Japan's Self-Defense Forces (since 2013, defense spending has been increasing consistently). In response to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative and the AIIB and to China's growing assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, Japan put forward the "quality infrastructure" strategy and the strategy of the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Region". Abe also takes measures to enhance partnerships with different countries, including those with which Japan has common liberal democratic values and those that have territorial disputes with China. The China factor, incidentally, has been one of the defining reasons for Japan's current activity in its relations with Russia. Preventing close rapprochement between Russia and China and especially the formation of a Russia-China quasi-alliance is an important objective of today's Japanese policy-makers.

At the same time, driven by the task of maintaining normal bilateral relations and preserving conditions for conflict-free coexistence with China, Tokyo demonstrates restraint and makes it a policy not to provoke China without crossing the "red line". For instance, since 2013, Abe Shinzō has not officially visited the Yasukuni Shrine. Japan also refrains from prospecting in the disputed waters of the East China Sea. Of significance is the change in Tokyo's position with regard to the Chinese

Belt and Road Initiative towards its intention to join infrastructure cooperation with China in third countries. For all this, an important circumstance that makes it possible and easier to implement the Abe cabinet's dual policy vis-a-vis China, simultaneously combining elements of counteraction to Beijing and cooperation with it, is Xi Jinping's course to normalize relations with Japan against the background of heavy pressure from Washington and the aggravated international situation.

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LEKSYUTINA Yana Valeryevna – Doctor of Sciences (Political Sciences). Professor of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Professor of the American Studies Department of Saint-Petersburg State University.

ORCID: 0000-0001-6766-1792;

E-mail: lexyana@ya.ru

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The Ideology of Lifetime Employment and Its Influence on Contemporary Japanese Society

I.P. LEBEDEVA

Abstract. The article discusses the main directions of influence of the system of lifetime employment on contemporary Japanese society. This system evolved over several decades and became a major form of labor management in large Japanese companies in the late 1960s. However, the real scope of its impact was much broader, as not only middle, but also small companies tried to use to a certain extent its basic elements in order to increase the work motivation of their employees. Due to the fact that the system of lifetime employment was based on the fundamental characteristics of the nation's culture and psychology, it is not only perceived by workers as reasonable, fair, and corresponding to their ideas of what a company is and how it should be managed, but it also became the foundation on which and around which the system of values and the way of life of several post-war generations of the Japanese were formed. In the early 1990s, the economy and society began to change, calling into question the very existence of the lifetime employment system. However, it has proved to be quite flexible and, thanks to a series of measures taken by Japanese companies, has been able to adapt to the changes that have taken place in the economy and society over the past quarter of a century. These measures include the reduction of employment of regular workers, a change in the wage system designed to make it more adequate to the new conditions, relaxation of the rigid conditions of lifetime employment by introducing a "restricted regular employee" status and a number of others. However, the norms and stereotypes generated by the system are much less mobile and flexible, and it became the cause of a number of painful phenomena in Japanese society. These include the "second-rate" position of non-regular workers (in terms of remuneration, the scope of social security, access to the system of in-house training, and social status), the preservation of gender inequality in employment and in family, the polarization of the Japanese youth by income levels and lifestyle, the fall in the marriage and

birth rates, etc. Since shifts in public opinion occur rather slowly, Japan is likely to take quite a long time to resolve the contradictions between the entrenched stereotypes and the requirements of the time.

Keywords: lifetime employment, society, norms and stereotypes, regular and non-regular employees, social status, education, family, youth.

The management system of Japanese companies, widely known as lifetime employment, was evolving over several decades (starting probably from the Meiji period), through trial and error, in the course of sometimes quite tough confrontation between employees and management, and in the late 1960s it became the main form of labor management in Japanese companies.

This system was based on the use of the basic elements of national culture and psychology (such as paternalism, groupism, egalitarian consciousness, striving for consensus and *wa* (harmony), preference for long-term relationships, the principle of seniority, etc.). Thanks to this, it was not only perceived by employees as reasonable, fair, and corresponding to their ideas of what a company is and how it should be managed, but also provided the foundation on which and around which the system of values and the way of life for several post-war generations of the Japanese were formed.

This suggests that lifetime employment is not only the system of labor management in Japanese companies, but also a kind of ideology based on the society's traditional values.

In a concise form this system can be characterized as follows.

1. Lifetime employment actually means that employees are hired for a long term, namely until *teinen*, the age limit for staying in a company (in the first post-war decades it was 55 years old, and in 1998 it was legislatively set at 60). Along with long-term employment, workers were guaranteed access to the system of in-house training and skill improvement and, consequently, career progress and an increase in wages with increasing work experience (as part of the so-called age-specific wages).

2. Until the adoption of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law in 1985, lifetime employment was applied almost exclusively to male workers. Also, the companies preferred to hire only "fresh" (not "spoiled" by experience of work in another company) graduates of schools and universities. In the course of in-house training and periodic rotations they acquired the skills necessary for a given company, and their lifetime employment served as a guarantee that the training costs would be fully compensated.

3. Giving workers long-term employment guarantees implied that in return they agreed to work long hours and overtime, to participate in

various rationalization groups during off-hours and pro bono, to have shorter vacations, to be transferred to another city in the course of rotation, etc.

4. In its fullest form the lifetime employment system was applied in large private companies and state-owned institutions, but, in fact, its influence spread far beyond that. Even small enterprises, not to mention medium-sized firms, used some of its elements to retain the necessary workers and to increase their motivation [Matrusova 1996; Matrusova 2008].

We can point out at least five ways in which this system influenced the value orientations of Japanese society.

1. Since the lifetime employment system was for a long time applied almost exclusively to male workers, it helped to secure their role of breadwinners of the family, and, consequently, strengthen their dominant position in the family and society.

2. Since the guarantees of lifetime employment given to workers implied, in return, their willingness to subjugate their lives to the interests of the company, the lifetime employment system contributed to the gender-based division of roles in the family (according to the principle “the husband is at work and the wife is at home raising children and keeping the house”).

3. The lifetime employment system prompted a substantial rise in the prestige of education in Japanese society. The more prestigious an educational institution, the higher the chances for its graduate to be employed by a large well-known company or in a state-owned institution where this system was used in its fullest form.

4. The lifetime employment system had major impact on the formation of value orientations of Japanese young people, offering them the career of a *sararīman* (*salaryman*), a regular employee in a large company or in a state-owned institution, as a model of success in life. To become a *sararīman*, one had to graduate from a prestigious university and before that – to successfully pass through the “hell” of entrance exams, showing perseverance and diligence. The reward for this was entering a special world, a world of sustainable employment and a predictable life for many years to come.

5. The lifetime employment system played an important part in the formation of the “middle class society” in Japan. Its elements, such as giving high status to ordinary employees, the striving of management to smooth out the differences in the position of white and blue collar workers, emphasis on determining career growth by assessing the personal qualities of an employee (diligence, discipline, allegiance to the company, willingness to work in a team, etc.), helped erase the horizontal social partitions. And the rapid increase of workers’ incomes during the period of high growth rates (1955 to 1972) and their stable growth in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s provided the material basis for the emergence of the “middle-class society” [Lebedeva 2014].

As known, the past 25 years have brought about dramatic changes in the economy and society. More than two decades of depression which hit the Japanese economy in the early 1990s caused a sharp decline in economic growth rates and, consequently, a reduction in the financial ability of companies to maintain the seniority-oriented wage system without compromising their competitiveness. Moreover, the progressive aging of the population resulted in an absolute decrease in the number of young people, including high school and university graduates, i.e. the “clean slates” that Japanese companies annually and simultaneously (by April 1) hire as regular employees. Thus, between 1990 and 2017, the number of 18-year-old Japanese (i.e., those who graduated from high school and either went to work as blue collar workers or continued their studies at universities and colleges to get white-collar jobs after three or four years) shrank from 2 million 10 thousand to 1 million 200 thousand. [Komikawa 2017, p. 43]. This means that the workforce is aging, which, in the context of seniority-oriented wages, is fraught with an increase in production costs.

In addition, over the years, there has been a substantial diversification of life styles and life preferences of the Japanese, and today by no means all of them can be said to “live to work” as before. And although work and employment are still an undoubted value for the vast majority of the country’s population, the attitude towards work and some components of the concept of “work” is gradually changing, particularly among young people. Thus, unlike the previous generations that gave preference to their company’s interests and collective values, today’s Japanese young people, who grew up in a flourishing and wealthy society, are more focused on their personal interests when choosing a job – the opportunity to have a high and steady income, to fulfil one’s potential in a profession, to be promoted to a high position, to combine work and leisure, etc. [Tanabiki 2017].

It would seem that all these changes would have weakened the position of the lifetime employment system and its impact on Japanese society, but the real situation is different.

First of all, it should be noted that, contrary to all sorts of forecasts, the lifetime employment system as a whole has survived and continues to be the main form of employment in state-owned institutions and large companies and also “the example to follow” for smaller firms. This happened thanks to a great number of measures taken by Japanese companies which allowed them, without changing the basic principles of the system, to make it more flexible and more adequate to the new economic and social conditions.

First, in order to hold back rising labor costs, Japanese companies substantially enlarged employment of non-regular workers, replacing regular workers with them where possible. Thus, in the total workforce, the proportion of non-regular employees, which in 1990 was 20.2 per cent, increased to 37.2 per cent in 2017, and, in absolute terms, their number increased from 8 million 819 thousand to 20 million 360 thousand, i.e., more than doubled. The number of regular employees began to decline after 1997 and over the next ten years it dropped from 38 million 135 thousand to 34 million 320 thousand, or by 10 per cent, while their proportion decreased from 79.8 per cent in 1990 to 62.8 per cent in 2017 [Labor Situation in Japan... 2015/2016, p. 44; Labor Force Survey... 2018].

The economic gains of companies from replacing permanent personnel with temporary workers result from, first, the significant difference in wages between these two categories of employees and, second, from a reduced burden of payments to the social insurance system.

Although, back in 2007, Japan adopted a law obliging employers to pay equal wages for equal work irrespective of the form of employment, in practice there is still a substantial difference in wage levels for regular and non-regular employees. Thus, according to the 2016 data, non-permanent employees (working less than 35 hours a week) received on average about 65 per cent of the wages of permanent workers [Monthly Labor Survey 2016].

What helps employers to circumvent the requirements of the law is the fact that in Japan, when assessing work, not only and not so much specific results of work are taken into consideration, but the work process as such, including such components as the employee's discipline, his willingness to cooperate, initiative, etc. According to a survey conducted in 2016 by the Ministry of Labour and Welfare, the companies mentioned the following main reasons for lower hourly wages of non-regular employees: the opportunity for them to determine their worktime, a low degree of their participation in overtime work, a lower rotation frequency, less experience compared to regular employees and low expectations regarding their contribution to the company's growth [Chingin jijō 2017, p. 31].

Savings in labor costs by means of expanding the use of non-regular employees through social security payments are also quite noticeable. By law, contributions to the pension and social security systems at private enterprises are paid in equal shares by employees and employers. For example, according to the 2011 data, the expenses of the largest enterprises (employing more than 1 thousand people) on monthly payments to the medical insurance and social security system (per employee) amounted to 49.1 thousand yen, and 31.5 thousand yen to the pension system; at enterprises employing 30 to

999 people the expenses were 44 thousand yen and 22 thousand yen, and in companies with 100 to 299 employees, 43.3 thousand yen and 14.5 thousand yen respectively [Conrad 2016a, p. 187].

However, the coverage of non-regular employees with these systems is significantly narrower than that of regular workers. Thus, according to the 2014 data of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, unemployment insurance, pension insurance, and health insurance covered practically 100 per cent of regular workers, whereas for non-regular employees the figures were 67.7 per cent, 54.7 per cent, and 52.0 per cent respectively. It should be added that 80.6 per cent of regular workers receive severance benefits and 86.1 per cent of them get bonuses, while the percentage for non-regular workers was 9.6 per cent and 31 per cent respectively [Kanai 2016, p. 90; Labor Situation in Japan... 2015/2016, p. 94].

Although the wages of regular employees are substantially higher than those of non-regular workers, in the past two decades Japanese companies have taken a number of measures to hold back their growth. According to statistics, these measures have been very effective. After a slight rise in the late 1990s, the average monthly pay of regular workers entered a period of stagnation and even decreased in certain periods, and only in the last few years it began to rise slightly. However, reaching 412 thousand yen in 2016, it was below the 2001 figure (419 thousand yen) [Analysis of the Labour Economy 2017, p. 3, 9].

The meaning of the measures taken by Japanese companies was to ease the pressure put on labor costs by the progressive aging of the workforce, while at the same time preserving the seniority-oriented wage system, and to make the system more flexible, so that its seniority-oriented nature does not demotivate young employees. To this end, many companies introduced such an element as appraisal of labor results (*seiseikiyū*), which are usually a combination of individual employee performance and team performance. Let us recall that they do not mean quantitative results, but the labor process (*purosesu jūshigata seikashugi*). And today in most Japanese companies the basic pay of an employee is determined on the basis of three elements: the position or qualification (*shokunōkyū*), age, which is closely related to the former (*nenreikyū*), and performance (*seiseikiyū*). At the same time, when assessing qualification, companies increasingly take into consideration its “usefulness” for performing a specific job, rather than just the scope of knowledge and skills accumulated by an employee in the course of in-house training, since rapid technological advances may make them obsolete [Conrad 2016b, p. 177–180].

As a result, the “steepness” of the pay increase scale depending on the length of employment declined substantially compared to the 1990s. Thus,

in 1990, the salary of a 50-year-old worker in the category of “regular employees with higher education” was five times higher than the salary of a 22-year-old novice, whereas in 2015, it was just 2.4 times higher. In the category of “regular employees with secondary education”, the difference in the salary of a 50-year-old worker and that of an 18-year-old novice was 4.9 times in 1990, but by 2015 it shrank to 2.5 times [Tōkei de miru Nihon 2008, p.194–195; Basic Survey on Wage Structure 2015].

Finally, in order to make the lifetime employment system more adequate to the current needs of society and to ease the rigid conditions it imposes on workers, in recent years, a new category of regular employees has been introduced – restricted regular employees (*gentei seishain*). There are three types of restrictions: on the place of work, on the character of work, and on the time of work. In the first instance, an employee cannot be transferred to another city in the course of rotation. In the second instance, restrictions are specified in regard to the character of employment duties (for example, rotation can take place only within the framework of certain specialties). The third type of restrictions means that an employee is released from performing any work or other activities during off-hours, which is particularly attractive to women.

It is important to note that restricted regular employees have the same perpetual contracts and the same social guarantees as ordinary permanent employees. They are subject to the same rules of in-house training, promotion, and remuneration. However, since restrictions on their service conditions are specified at the time of hiring (or at the moment of changing status), it is obvious that it cannot but affect the management’s approaches to planning their career and all its components [Toda 2016, p. 72]. In recent years, approximately 50 per cent of the companies with more than 300 workers have introduced the status of “restricted regular employee”.

Thanks to these measures, the lifetime employment system has not only survived as a labor management system, but has also retained its attractiveness to the workers. This is shown by data on the degree of its support by employees of different age groups. According to the annual surveys of the Institute for Labor Policy, by the early 2000s, under the impact of the difficult economic situation, the degree of support for the “lifetime employment with a prospect of work in the same company until reaching the age limit” declined in all the age groups, and in 2001 it was 76.1 per cent on the average and 64 per cent in the youth group. However, in subsequent years it began to increase again to amount to 88.9 per cent in 2015; in the youth cohort, too, it increased practically to the same level [Yamashita 2017, p. 10–11].

In other words, the lifetime employment system, with its guarantee of steady long-term employment, with the prospect of career advancement

and gradually growing remuneration, and with all other privileges given by companies to their regular workers (from cheap housing to various additional payments), is still perceived by the Japanese society as an undoubted value. It should be added that, along with the guarantees of material well-being, it is associated with a decent social status, which is ensured by smoothing out differences in the position of blue- and white-collar workers and by a respectful and attentive attitude of managers towards ordinary workers.

As shown above, the lifetime employment system has proved to be flexible enough and, in general, capable of adapting to the changes that have occurred in Japan's economy and society over the past 25 years. Amazing vitality is demonstrated by the norms and perceptions formed under its impact. However, unlike the lifetime employment system, these norms and perceptions have appeared to be much less flexible and mobile, and the Japanese society pays a very high price for adherence to them in the form of the emergence or aggravation of various social problems.

For a long time, the Japanese society was considered nearly a model middle-class society, where the vast majority of families had approximately the same income level, the same lifestyle and the same system of values. Indeed, the democratization of the education system which provided broader access to good education for children from different social backgrounds, the removal of horizontal partitions, the socio-economic policy of the state – all this contributed to the formation of a "middle-class society".

Of course, today Japanese society is still like that and seems to be quite prosperous. However, the early 1990s, when the Japanese economy sank into a deep depression, saw the beginning of social stratification in the country. And its main line is the division of wage workers (about 55 million people) into regular and non-regular employees.

Growing irregular employment is typical for all highly developed countries. This is due to the increasing servicization of their economies (in particular, to the rapidly growing market of individual services), which objectively expands the need for various flexible forms of employment. Other factors include the appearance in different sectors of types of work which do not require high skills and can be performed just by following the instructions (for which temporary workers are quite suitable), more attention from governments and the public in industrialized countries to securing a balance of interests between work and family responsibilities of both men and women, etc. In Japan, as mentioned above, the depression also contributed to the growth of irregular employment.

Although growing irregular employment is typical for all highly advanced countries, in Japan, the situation in this area has particular characteristics. Firstly, the proportion of non-regular workers in the total number of employees in Japan is significantly higher than in other coun-

tries. Thus, in Japan it exceeds 37 per cent, whereas in most European countries the figure is 15 to 20 per cent. Secondly, in no other country there is such a deep split between the position of regular and non-regular workers as in Japan. This applies to remuneration, to the scope of social guarantees, and to opportunities for advanced training and, consequently, for career advancement, and to the social status of an employee in general. Evidently, these differences are a direct consequence of the lifetime employment system's impact.

Since the differences in remuneration and the amount of social guarantees were discussed above, we will dwell briefly on the issues of access to the career development system.

As is known, the amount of skills and knowledge that an employee acquires through in-house training determines the speed of his career advancement and the steepness of the growing wage scale. However, non-regular workers have limited access to this system because of their position in a company – unstable and temporary. Companies include them into this system only to the extent necessary for performing current work. Regular workers who have access to on-the-job and off-the-job training constitute 62.2 per cent and 74.2 per cent of the permanent workforce, while among non-regular employees the figures are only 31.1 per cent and 34 per cent [Labor Situation in Japan ... 2015/2016, p. 94].

However, the most painful watershed line between regular and non-regular workers in Japan is the difference in their social status. Thanks to the lifetime employment system, the status of a regular employee, with its guarantees of long-term employment, promotion, and wage raises, has acquired a particular value. Associated with it are perceptions of a prosperous, predictable life for employees and their families. On the contrary, the status of a non-regular employee, with unstable employment and low wages, is perceived as evidence of a lower, second-rate position of a person in the social hierarchy. Let us recall that currently over 20 million people in Japan work as temporary employees.

From the perspective of social consequences, of fundamental importance is not only and not so much the steep rise in the number of non-regular workers, but the qualitative change in the composition of this category. Previously, among non-regular workers were mostly high school seniors, university students and housewives, i.e., individuals for whom this kind of work was neither the main occupation, nor the main source of livelihood. But since the early 1990s, the composition of this category has been

gradually changing, and today its backbone is made up of young people who have completed their studies but have not found a permanent job, women who have brought up their children and want to go back to full-time work, individual businessmen and workers of family-owned firms that went bankrupt during the sustained depression, and laid-off older workers [Gordon 2017]. It should be added that, for many of these people, their work is the main occupation and the main source of income.

Japanese society is primarily alarmed by the position of the youth. According to the data from March 2018, among 15 to 34-year-olds, more than one-third (34.6 per cent), or 5 million 410 thousand people do not have permanent jobs. To make the picture more objective, it is necessary to exclude from this number those who combine work and study, i.e., university students and high school seniors working part-time as *arubai-to* (temporary employees) in cafes, bars, shops, etc. They number about 1 million 750 thousand people, while the other 3.7 million are mostly young people who have completed their study and entered the labor market [Labour Force Survey. January-March 2018].

Japanese experts are particularly concerned about the fact that recent years have seen a steep rise in the proportion of non-regular workers among 20 to 24-year-olds. According to the 2017 data, among young men, the proportion is about 40 per cent (39.5 per cent), and among girls, 44 per cent. But these are young people who have graduated from high schools, colleges, or universities. They are the “clean slates” that Japanese companies have always preferred to hire as regular employees so as to, in the course of in-house training, make them the needed workers. Some 10 or 12 years ago the situation was different: for instance, in 2006, among young men aged 20 to 24, non-regular workers constituted 22.2 per cent, and among girls, 16.5 per cent. Although, for men, the situation improves with age: in the age cohort of 25–34 about 85 per cent of them have permanent jobs. But for women the situation is only getting worse: at that age less than 40 per cent of them are regular employees [Annual Report on the Labour Force Survey 2018; Employment Status Survey 2017].

If we add to the 3.7 million young people who do not have permanent jobs (they are called *freeters* in Japan) about 600 thousand *NEETs* (those who neither work, nor study, nor retrain) and also about 260 thousand *hikikomori* (recluses who live in a virtual world and have practically no connections with the real world), it turns out that beyond the bounds of permanent employment, which is associated with a decent social status and a peaceful, prosperous life, there are over 4.5 million young Japanese [White Paper on Children and Young People 2012, figure 8; Genda 2013, p. 38].

It is often said that many young Japanese people deliberately choose irregular employment aiming not to burden their lives with all the limitations that a permanent job in Japan is associated with. But, as pointed out by the famous Japanese sociologist Yamada Masahiro, this motive was prevailing among *freeters* in the 1980s. Then, they were called “dreamers”, as many of them dreamt of fulfilling themselves in art, theatre, cinema, etc. But “dreams” do not fill one’s belly, and they earned their living by physical work as *arubaito* [Yamada 2016, p. 137]. Certainly, even today there are such “dreamers” among *freeters*, but many of them are those who wanted to have a permanent job but could not get it. Thus, according to the 2016 data, such *freeters* accounted for about 35 per cent of men aged 25–34 years [Goka 2017, p. 29]. One of the most recent surveys conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has also shown that about two-thirds of the Japanese aged 25 to 39 who do not have a permanent job would like to be regular workers in the future [Gordon 2017].

The changes that have occurred in the position of the Japanese youth in the labour market have directly entailed an increase in singlehood, a decline in the birth-rate, raising the age of marriage and the birth of the first child by Japanese women. These are highly undesirable phenomena, since the Japanese population is not only aging, but also declining.

Since the career of a *sararīman* is still considered the perfect career for a young man, it is obvious that the absolute and relative reduction in the number of young Japanese men who have permanent jobs leads to a decline in the number of those who can be called eligible bachelors. Neither the social status, nor the financial position of these young men corresponds to the public’s idea of a good match, particularly as today in Japan it is still the man who is the head of the family and the main breadwinner. For instance, according to Yamada Masahiro, nearly 3/4 of single Japanese women aged 20 to 39 believe that it is the husband who must be responsible for the financial well-being of the family. Most of them would like to have a husband with an income of at least 4 million yen per year, but only 25 per cent of the single young Japanese men earn so much, while about 40 per cent have an income of less than 2 million yen and another 36 per cent earn 2 to 4 million yen [Yamada 2015, p. 28, 30]. It is not surprising then that among regular workers the proportion of single men aged 25 to 39 is 42.5 per cent, whereas among non-regular workers it is 75.9 per cent [Morioka 2015, p. 197].

On the other hand, the education level of Japanese women is rising, as well as their desire to fulfill themselves and make a career as a permanent worker. This presents them with a difficult choice: either marriage and children, or

a career. The compromise option is delayed marriage and either deciding not to have children or deferring these events to as late a date as possible.

These two trends overlap, and despite the fact that, according to surveys, nearly 90 per cent of the Japanese of both sexes would like to get married, the singlehood level in the country has reached critically high rates, as shown by the data below.

Table 1.
The proportion of unmarried Japanese men and women
(2015, per cent)

	25 to 29-year-olds	30 to 34-year-olds	50-year-olds
Men	71.8	47.1	23.4
Women	60.3	34.5	14.1

Source: [Yamada 2017, p. 122–123].

The mean age of Japanese women at first marriage had increased to 29.4 years by 2016, while the age at the time of birth of their first child – to 30.7 years. The 2000s and 2010s saw a continued decline in the fertility rate, which had begun even earlier, and in 2016 it was just 1.44, i.e. one of the lowest in the group of highly developed countries [Shōshika shakai taisaku... 2017, p. 6, 13]. At the same time, there are two completely different lifestyles of married women. Those who do not work still have two or three children, and the mean fertility rate in this group is 2.2. But in the group of working women the rate is only 0.6 (i.e. one child per two women), and it is this group that is “responsible” for the decline in the country’s overall fertility rate [Goodman R., Imoto Yu., Toivonen T. (ed.) 2012, p. 162–163].

Should such sacrifices be made for the sake of a career as a permanent worker? Much has changed in Japan, but the gender division of functions in the workplace is still quite distinct. Even at the hiring stage, gender disparities are formed both in status and career. Young men are hired mainly for what is called *sōgōshoku* (complex work), which provides for career advancement, rotation and higher pay, whereas young women are employed to do *ippanshoku* (ordinary work), i.e. all sorts of office work which is paid for less and does not provide for any marked career development. Earlier, this used to be a general rule, but even now about 80 per cent of the women employed as permanent workers are engaged in *ippanshoku* [Kanai 2016, p. 103].

The problems that young Japanese women face both in the labor market and in the workplace have brought about another unexpected phe-

nomenon – a growing proportion of those who hold traditional views on the role of women and support the traditional family model (the husband works and the wife looks after the house).

Table 2.
The proportion of women supporting the traditional model
of the Japanese family (*per cent*)

	20 to 29-year-olds	30 to 39-year-olds	40 to 49-year-olds	50 to 59-year-olds	60 to 69-year-olds	70 to 79-year-olds
2002	33.2	32.9	37.5	40.6	50.8	63.8
2012	43.7	41.6	41.0	40.4	52.3	62.2

Source: [Yamada 2015, p. 58].

Of course, the lifetime employment ideology affects not only the position of young Japanese women. Being a *sengyōshufu* (professional housewife) either all life or during at least several years is the predestination of a large number of Japanese women, including those who were hired for regular jobs. Thus, although the practice of dismissing Japanese women right after they get married is a thing of the past, most of them leave work after the birth of their first child, since it is believed that it is the mother who must look after the children. And for many of them, going back to work after the children have grown up is possible only in the status of a non-regular employee. This is confirmed by Japanese statistical data. The vast majority of Japanese men (85 to 90 per cent) remain regular workers until they reach *teinen*, i.e. 60 years, whereas the proportion of regular workers among women, after reaching 60 per cent in the group of 25–29-year-olds, begins to steadily decline to less than 25 per cent in the age cohort of 55–59 years [Employment Status Survey 2017].

The deep-rooted perceptions about the role of women in the family and at work planted in public consciousness by lifetime employment are evidenced by the characteristics of the average Japanese family. According to the 2016 data, it consists of 3.17 people and has a monthly income of 543 thousand yen, the lion's share of which is the husband's earnings (460 thousand yen), and the wife's income is just an addition to the family budget [Nihon tōkei nenkan 2017, table 22–7].

This situation is perpetuated by the social security system. Being formed in a period of high growth rates, it was originally designed for a family model with a working husband and dependent wife.

Firstly, the head of the family pays contributions to the pension and health insurance system for his non-working wife. Secondly, he is entitled to

a deduction from the tax base if his wife works but earns less than 1 million 30 thousand yen a year (if the husband's income is less than 10 million yen, this bar is raised to 1 million 400 thousand yen). And, finally, if the wife's annual income is over 1 million 300 thousand yen, she is obliged to pay contributions to the pension and health insurance system herself [Yamada 2016, p. 54–55]. Japanese women call these norms “a wall of 1 million yen”, since it is obvious that the norms doom them to irregular employment. Professor Yamada mentions cases where women at certain enterprises had to return bonuses, because the financial losses of their families due to exceeding the established income limit outweighed the size of the bonuses.

The norms and perceptions that were formed under the impact of the ideology of lifetime employment continue to influence the general atmosphere prevailing in Japanese companies, especially in large ones. Their employees still come to work before the beginning of a working day, submissively stay for overtime work, use only a part of the vacation they are entitled to, move to another city in the course of rotation, etc. Since one of the main behavioral attitudes of the Japanese is *hitonami* (to be like everyone else), even young people, who are more self-oriented and far from the idea of self-sacrifice for the sake of their company, have to follow the general rules. Therefore, despite the eight-hour working day and the forty-hour working week established by the Labour Standards Act, a significant proportion of the employees in Japanese companies work much longer hours beyond these limits. For instance, according to a survey by RENGO (The Japanese Trade Union Confederation), the average duration of the working week of male regular workers is 50 hours, including 40 hours of regular time and 10 hours of overtime; 40 per cent of male employees work overtime on a constant basis. And about 10 per cent of male regular employees work 60 hours a week [North 2014, p. 9]. It is noteworthy that in the Japan Revitalization Strategy (2015) Prime Minister Abe Shinzō sets, among others, the following targets: by 2020, reduce the proportion of those working more than 60 hours a week to 5 per cent of the total number of regular employees and increase the degree of use of paid leave from the current 50–60 to 70 per cent [Labor Situation in Japan... 2015/2016, p. 18, 100].

Another element of the lifetime employment system that continues to exist and influence the state of affairs is *teinen*, the age limit for a worker to stay with the company (60 years). It is clear that with lifetime employment and seniority-oriented pay the age limit is in fact the only means for companies to hold back growing labor costs and to ensure career develop-

ment for employees in younger age groups. However, the problem is that, in all Japanese pension systems, pensions begin to be paid starting from the age of 65. Therefore, back in 2012, the government made it incumbent for the companies to choose one of three measures to resolve the problem: either to raise the age limit, or to abolish it, or to develop schemes for extending the employment of older workers.

As shown by statistics, the vast majority of Japanese companies of all sizes continue to use *teinen*. According to the 2015 data, such companies accounted for 93.3 per cent of the firms with over 1 thousand employees, 95.3 per cent of the companies with 300–999 employees, 97.4 per cent of the firms with 100–299 employees, and 98.7 per cent of the firms with 30–99 employees. At the same time, only a small part of the companies raised *teinen* to 65 years and above (6.0, 7.5, 10.6, 20.2 per cent respectively), while the vast majority of them keeps it at 60 years (91.1, 89.9, 86.1, 77.5 per cent respectively).

This means that companies found that the most appropriate measure was to extend the employment of older workers after reaching *teinen*. This measure takes two forms: about 80 per cent of the companies use the previously existing scheme with dismissal and re-employment, and 20 per cent extend employment without dismissal. From the economic point of view, this is quite a reasonable choice. Firstly, employment extension does not guarantee the same pay. Thus, according to the 2015 data, 42 per cent of the companies that use employment extension schemes (without dismissal) pay the workers the same wages, and another 20 per cent pay them 80 to 100 per cent of their previous wages. As for the companies that use reemployment of dismissed workers, only 13 per cent of them pay the same wages, and another 17 per cent pay 80 to 100 per cent of the previous wages. At the same time, 53 per cent of the companies employ workers for wages of 50 to 80 per cent of the previous level and 10 per cent – for 30 to 50 per cent [Japanese Working Life Profile 2016/2017, p. 28–32]. Secondly, with the current shortage of workforce, companies can use the labor of loyal and skilled workers at lower costs.

However, for most of the older workers, *teinen* is a kind of a psychological borderline beyond which another life begins. And it is not only financial losses that matter, but the change in the social status, since re-employment involves a transition from regular workers to non-regular ones. Thus, according to the data of March 2018, only 23 per cent of the working older people had the status of permanent employees [Labour Force Survey. January-March 2018]. What makes this issue particularly important is that, in recent years,

the older workers' cohort has been joined by millions of people born during the second post-war baby boom, who are well-educated, experienced, and highly skilled and, in addition, are in good physical condition.

In conclusion, we would like to point out one more "trace" of the lifetime employment ideology – its impact on the education and employment of the youth.

As mentioned above, the lifetime employment system prompted a substantial rise in the prestige of education in Japanese society. The more prestigious an educational institution was, the higher the chances for its graduates to get a job in a reputable company or in a state-owned institution were. In fact, the connection between the form of employment and the level of education still exists today, as shown by the data in Table 3; however it is no longer as evident as before. This is a result of the mismatch of the structure of demand for school and university graduates with the structure of their supply.

First of all, it should be noted that the situation for high school graduates is generally developing quite well: the ratio of effective job offers (i.e. the ratio of the number of vacancies to the number of applicants for them) is about 1 in this group. Of course, if we recall that, in the 1990s, it was over 3, it is obvious that the problem of employment for this category of graduates has noticeably grown worse. Also, recent years have brought about the following paradoxical phenomenon: it often happens that the most successful students get a job right after they leave school, while less successful students go to university. Professor of the Hōsei University Komikawa Kōichirō explains this in the following way. Successful students are more likely to get a permanent job in a reputable company than their less successful classmates. And, since a job in a large company on a lifetime basis is still the top priority for the vast majority of young people, this option is deemed more preferable than going to university with obscure prospects [Komikawa 2017, p. 42–43].

Demand for university graduates varies substantially by enterprise and by industry. Thus, in the largest companies (with over 1 thousand employees), where most of the graduates want to get a job, the ratio of effective job offers has invariably been below 1 over the past two decades, whereas at smaller enterprises, it has lately been within the range of 2–2.5, reaching 3–4 in some years. As for sectoral imbalances, in 2015, for example, in the sphere of distribution, demand exceeded supply more than fivefold, in construction and manufacturing – twofold, while in services, the financial, and information sectors, on the contrary, it was substantially lower than supply [Kobayashi 2015, p. 4–5].

Table 3.
Proportion of regular and non-regular employees among workers
with different education levels (*per cent, age cohort 25–30*)

Category of Workers		Regular	Non-regular
Men	Secondary school	78.0	22.0
	Vocational school, short-term university, college	80.0	20.0
	University, postgraduate study	90.3	9.7
Women	Secondary school	40.7	59.3
	Vocational school, short-term university, college	58.6	41.4
	University, postgraduate study	68.5	31.5

Source: [Iwakami 2016, p. 31].

The fact that these discrepancies have persisted for decades indicates the gaps between the real economy's needs for employees with higher education and the make-up of graduates from Japanese universities. There are several reasons for that, but we will focus only on the issues related to lifetime employment.

One of the principles of this system was companies' orientation not on the assessment of the academic knowledge of applicants for regular jobs, but on the rank of the university they graduated from. Firstly, it was believed that having passed through the "examination hell" entering a prestigious university, a person already proved that he has abilities and a strong character. Secondly, employees of the required specialization, which was often far from the specialty received at the university, were prepared by companies themselves in the course of in-house training and rotation. However, in recent years, in order to save on costs, Japanese companies have begun to reduce expenditure on in-house training. For instance, in 2007, expenses on off-the-job training per employee averaged 43.5 thousand yen, whereas in 2016, they dwindled to 37.2 thousand yen, i.e. by 14.5 per cent. In large companies, the reduction was even bigger – by 18.1 per cent (from 48 thousand yen to 39 thousand yen) [Chingin jijō 2017, p. 37]. At the same time, they started to pay more and more regard to the level of academic knowledge of graduates and their specialization, which, given the current state of affairs, makes the problem of their employment even more complicated. For example, according to survey data, during their job hunting, more than half of the students felt that they were studying a specialty that was difficult to associate with the job offered [Nakajima, Hori 2017, p. 67].

One of the manifestations of the influence of the lifetime employment ideology is the great importance attached to *shūshoku katsudō*, job hunting by students. Not so long ago Japanese students began their *shūshoku katsudō* from the second semester of the third year, i.e. eighteen months before graduation. However, since in recent years this activity began to take much more time and effort, and the damage that the existing practice inflicts on the educational process has become too obvious, some important changes were planned in this area. Namely, in 2013, the Japan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren), which unites the leading companies and banks, revised the Charter of Corporate Ethics for Recruitment and Employment and adopted new employment rules (the earlier rules were agreed upon back in the 1960s). Starting from 2016, companies should begin hiring graduates on March 1 (at the very end of the third year of study), and the actual selection process (interviews, etc.) should not begin before August 1 (in the middle of the fourth year). Moreover, while earlier this process spread out for six months, now it should last two months at most and end by October 1 [Labor Situation in Japan... 2015/2016, p. 82].

It is clear that these changes will have a positive effect on the training process, but they will hardly make life easier for students, because now they have to do the increased amount of work on getting a job in a shorter time. The extent to which the intensity of *shūshoku katsudō* increased between 2005 and 2016 can be seen from the data in Table 4.

Of course, at the macro level, the situation in the area of hiring and employment of the Japanese youth seems to be quite satisfactory, especially in comparison with the problems that exist in other developed countries. The unemployment level among 20 to 34-year-olds is about 4 per cent; almost all graduates find jobs. Thus, according to the data as of 1 April 2017, jobs were found by 97.6 per cent of university graduates, 97 per cent of short-term university graduates, 100 per cent of graduates from specialized colleges and 98 per cent of high school graduates [Daigaku nado sotsugyōsha... 2017, p. 50–51]. But, at the same time, the proportion of those who leave their jobs during the first three years after being hired is very big. A survey of 2014 graduates held in the autumn of 2017 showed that during the first three years after graduation 32.2 per cent of university graduates, 41.3 per cent of short-term university graduates, 40.8 per cent of high school graduates and 67.7 per cent of secondary school graduates quit their jobs [Chingin jijō 2017, p. 45]. Obviously, behind these figures is a gap between the expectations of the Japanese youth with regard to the form of employment and working conditions and what they are offered in the labor market. In particular, in 2016, the most important reason for leaving one's job was "too long working hours, including overtime", a legacy of lifetime employment.

Table 4
Amount of Work on Job Search
(per student at average, by area of specialization)

Area of specialization	Number of informational meetings attended		Number of CVs sent		Number of job interviews	
	2005	2016	2005	2016	2005	2016
Humanities	18.7	34.2	17.4	20.4	9.3	13.1
Natural sciences	11.6	19.4	10.4	10.5	5.7	7.6

Source: [Nakajima, Hori 2017, p. 63–65].

Thus, the norms and stereotypes generated by the ideology of lifetime employment still influence diverse aspects of Japanese society's life. Meanwhile, as shown in this article, many of them are at variance with the changes that have taken place in the country's economy and society over the last 25 years, which is evidenced by the emergence of a number of sensitive issues. Since shifts in public consciousness occur rather slowly, Japan is likely to take quite a while to remove these contradictions.

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LEBEDEVA IrinaPavlovna— Doctor of Sciences (Economics). Chief Researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
E-mail: lebedeva130250@mail.ru

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On Recording *Waka* Poems on *Kaishi* Sheets of Paper. The Example of the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* Collection

M.V. TOROPYGINA

Abstract. The article analyzes the rules for recording poems on *kaishi* sheets of paper by poets during or for the poetic events. The main source of the study is the recording of a poetic collection *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* (1266) composed of poems read during a banquet in honor of the completion of the work on the imperial anthology *Shokukokinshū*. The *Gunshō Ruijū* publication was used as a source for the investigation, as this publication preserves the principles of recording poems on *kaishi* sheets. The record of *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* is analyzed in context of the *karon* texts of the time – provisions regarding the recording of poems on sheets of *kaishi* by Fujiwara no Kiyosuke, Juntoku-in, Fujiwara no Teika.

Keywords: poetry, *karon*, *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka*, imperial anthology, *Gunshō Ruijū*, Fujiwara no Kiyosuke, Juntoku-in, Fujiwara no Teika.

The poetic collection *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* (続古今集竟宴和歌 “Japanese songs composed at the banquet in honor of the compilation of the *Shokukokinshū*”) ¹ celebrates the compilation of the *Shokukokinshū* (続古今集 “Continuation of the collection of old and new Japanese songs”)

¹ For the study, several publications and manuscript of the monument were used. The main source is the publication in the *Gunshō Ruijū*. The edition in open access at the National Diet Library digital database [Shokukokinshū kyōen waka (c)]; also [Shokukokinshū kyōen waka 1989]. The undated manuscript is published by the Waseda University [Shokukokinshū kyōen waka (a)]. The text is also available at the Waka database of Nichibunken [Shokukokinshū kyōen waka (b)].

imperial collection. The *waka* poems included in the collection were written at the banquet (*kyōen*) given by ex-emperor Gosaga-in (1220–1272, r. 1242–1246) on the 12th day of the 3rd moon of the 3rd year of Bun'ya (February 2, 1266). *Shokukokinshū* is the eleventh collection in the row of imperial collections. Gosaga-in was the initiator of the creation of the anthology. The previous, tenth anthology, the compilation of which was completed in 1251, was also compiled at the order of Gosaga-in. In 1259 he appointed Fujiwara no Tameie (1198–1275), the compiler of the previous anthology, to be the compiler of the new one, but in 1262, when work was already in full swing, a new decree was issued, according to which four more poets were appointed as co-compilers. They were Fujiwara no Motoie (1203–1280), Fujiwara no Ieyoshi (1192–1264), Fujiwara no Yukiie (1223–1275), and Fujiwara no Mitsutoshi (1203–1276). Political intrigues seems to be the reason for the expansion of the number of compilers. Thus, Konishi Jin'ichi points out that Fujiwara-no Mitsutoshi joined the compilers at the urgent request of the *bakufu* (Mitsutoshi was the poetic teacher of shogun Prince Munetaka, 1242–1274, reigned as shogun in 1252–1266) [Konishi 1991, p. 258]. Fujiwara no Yukiie, a representative of the Rokujō poetic school, won the right to be among the compilers of the imperial anthology after representatives of this poetic school for a long time could not make a worthy competition to representatives of the Mikohidari school. The *Shokukokinshū* anthology was compiled under difficult political conditions; moreover, a conflict arose in the Tameie's family, which, after Tameie's death, led to the division of the poetic house of Mikohidari into three branches – the Nijō, Kyōgoku, and Reizei schools. The work on the anthology was completed at the end of 1265. The anthology did not turn out to be outstanding, and it is not often recalled in the history of poetry. Yet, due to the presence of the words *kokin* (*inishie ima* 古今 old and new, past and present), it is a heir to the two most famous imperial anthologies, the first, *Kokinshū* (古今集 “Collection of old and new Japanese songs”, compiled in 905), and the eighth, *Shinkokinshū* (新古今集 “New collection of old and new Japanese songs”), compiled in 1205.

The custom of writing poems during banquets has a long history in Japan. A.N. Meshcheryakov writes: “The writing of poems regularly took place during the banquets arranged by the sovereign. In any society (and traditional society is not an exception here), a banquet is of paramount importance. It is hardly doubtful that the banquet tradition is represented in Japan even before the influence of Chinese culture became so visible. However, in the 8th century the Japanese banquets were undoubtedly un-

der strong Chinese influence – the Japanese of that time were undoubtedly familiar with that chapter of *Liji* which is devoted to banquets arranged by the emperor” [Meshcheryakov 2014, p. 80].

In *Man'yōshū*, an 8th century anthology, a large number of poems have prefaces indicating that the poems were composed during a banquet (not necessarily imperial). There are poems that were written at banquets held after the lectures on the *Nihon shōki* chronicle. From 812 to 965, such lectures were held six times, and there is a collection of poems called *Nihongi kyōen waka* (日本紀竟宴和歌 “Japanese songs composed at a banquet in honor of the end of [lectures on] Nihongi”).

A banquet in honor of the compilation of the *Shokukokinshū* was the second time in the history of Japanese poetry when a poetic collection was compiled from the poems written at the banquet in honor of the completion of the work on an imperial anthology. The first such banquet where poems that would make up a collection were composed took place after the work on the *Shinkokinshū* was completed in 1205. The publication of *Shinkokinshū kyōen waka* (新古今集竟宴和歌 “Japanese songs composed at the banquet in honor of the compilation of the *Shinkokinshū*”) in *Gunshō Ruijū* preserves the peculiarities of *kaishi* poetic sheets [Shinkokinshū kyōen waka].

The collection *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* includes 25 poems. Each author is represented by one poem. The poems are arranged in order of the social status of the authors. It follows from the colophon that the collection was recorded by Fujiwara no Tameuji (1222–1286), the son of Tameie. During the poetic event, Tameuji read the emperor’s composition (in the colophon stands 御製講師中納言爲氏, here 御製 is a usual designation of poems written by the emperor, and *kōji* 講師 is a person who reads poems during a poetic meeting). Other poems were read by Minamoto no Tomouji (1231/1232–1275, recording in the colophon: 講師具氏朝臣), and the duties of the editor-disposer (*dokushi* 読師) were performed by Fujiwara no (Saionji) Kinsuke (1223–1267) (in the colophon the record is 師前太政大臣, Kinsuke held the post of *daijō daijin* since 1262). From these notes, it is clear that the order of composing and reading poems during the banquet was the same as during a poetic meeting or contest.

The collection opens with a poem by Gosaga-in. The second and third poems are by female poets, and they are signed as the poems by Oomiyaingonchūnagon (大宮院権中納言) and Chūnagon (中納言).

In his article devoted to the peculiarities of women's writing of poems, Kanechiku Nobuyuki indicates that Oomiyaingonchūnagon is the daughter of Fujiwara no Masahira (Hosshōji Masahira, 1229–1278), and Chūnagon is the daughter of Fujiwara no Mitsutoshi (Hamuro Mitsutoshi, 1209–1276) [Kanechiku 1993, p. 22].

Next come the poems of the courtiers in the order of ranks and positions.

The authors of the junior first rank are: Fujiwara no (Ichijō) Sanetsune (1223–1284, holds the position of Kampaku), Fujiwara no (Saionji) Kinsuke (1223–1267), Fujiwara no (Tōin) Saneo (1219–1273).

Senior second rank: Fujiwara no (Shijō) Takachika (1202–1279), Fujiwara no Yoshinori (1224–1287), Fujiwara no Sukesue (1207–1289), Fujiwara no (Kazan'in) Morotsugu (1222–1281), Fujiwara no Michimasa (1233–1276), Minamoto no Masatada (1228–1272), Fujiwara (Ichijō) Ietsugu (1248–1294), Fujiwara no (Nijō) Tameuji, Fujiwara (Kazan'in) Nagamasa (1235/1236–1288).

Senior third rank: Fujiwara no (Kinugasa) Tsunehira (1236–1274), Fujiwara no Takasada (1233–1280), Minamoto no Sukehira (1223–1284), Fujiwara no Yukiie (1223–1275), Fujiwara no (Kyōgoku) Tamenori (1227–1279), Fujiwara no Kin'ō (years unknown).

Minamoto no Masatoki (1227–1300) and Minamoto no Tomouji had the fourth senior rank.

Two persons, Fujiwara no Tsunetō (1233–1297) and Fujiwara no Takahiro (?–1299) had the senior fifth rank.

Thus, the eighteen people who took part in the *waka* composition were dignitaries of the three highest ranks. Not all participants were recognized poets, so writing poems here is an etiquette rather than a purely poetic act.

It is assumed that during events such as an imperial banquet, excursion, or pilgrimage writing poems occurred impromptu. Poets composed poems, these poems were immediately written down, sheets with poems were collected, and poems read out. Similarly, an impromptu composition of poems took place at poetic meetings and contests where the topic was not given in advance, but was announced right during the action (such meetings and contests are called *tōza* 当座). If the topic was given in advance, the poets brought sheets of paper with recorded works. There was a certain scenario for conducting poetic events, so it is quite natural that poets had particular rules for recording poems as well.

There were three basic formats for recording Japanese poems.

Poets recorded their poems on large, horizontally oriented sheets of paper called *kaishi*. The word *kaishi* (*futokorogami* 懷紙) and its synonym *tatōgami* (*jōshi* 畳紙), as Haruna Yoshishige points out, could be homonymously written with *kanji* 会紙 “collection paper” and 帖紙 “recording paper” [Haruna 1971, p. 239]. For the time in question, the size of such a sheet is not precisely defined, but these are always horizontal sheets (width greater than height) of a rather large size (very approximately, the height of the sheet was 30–40 cm, and width 40–60 cm).

Two widely known early examples of poems written down on *kaishi* sheets of paper are *Ippongyō waka kaishi* (一品経和歌懷紙 “Poems on the chapters of the Lotus sutra”) and *Kumano kaishi* (熊野懷紙 “Kumano sheets of paper with poems”). Both poetic cycles are poems of a predominantly religious content, composed to be presented to a temple (*hōraku uta* 法樂歌). The poems of *Ippongyō waka kaishi* are written according to the chapters of the Lotus Sutra. Poems were created in 1180–1183. Fourteen sheets of *Ippongyō waka kaishi* are kept in the Kyoto National Museum. *Kumano kaishi* is a common name for poems written at the order of ex-emperor Gotoba (1180–1239, r. 1183–1198) as offerings to the temples of Kumano. Poems were composed during pilgrimages. 34 sheets of the poems, dated 1200–1201, are known.

A little later than the time when the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* collection was created (apparently, from the beginning of the 14th century), recording on narrow long sheets of *tanzaku* 短冊 became popular. Fujiwara no Kiyosuke (1104–1177), the author of the treatise *Fukuro sōshi* (袋草紙 “Book in a bag”), connects *tanzaku* with *saguridai* 探題, poetic meetings at which topics were distributed by lot. The opinion of the author of the book “Japanese Songs and the Shape of the Kana Signs: Content and Style of Medieval Records” Beppu Setsuko is that *tanzaku* became popular with the popularity of *tsugiuta* 次ぎ歌, a meeting where participants composed a poetic cycle with a certain number of poems (50, 100, 1000). One poem was composed for each topic, and the topics were worked out in advance and recorded on the *tanzaku*, after which poets recorded their poems on the same *tanzaku* sheet [Beppu 2014, p. 535–591].

Another recording format – *shikishigata* 色紙形 (*shikishi* 色紙) – square or close to square, vertically oriented sheets, were not used during poetic events, but were used for recording poems for screens *byōbu uta* (屏風歌).

Japanese authors began to write about the tradition and rules of recording poems on *kaishi* sheets from the 12th century. The first poetic

treatise in which a part is devoted to the recording of poems is found in the already mentioned text by Fujiwara no Kiyosuke *Fukuro sōshi*. The text was written between 1156 and 1159 and presented to Emperor Nijō (1143–1165, r. 1158–1165). The provisions given by Kiyosuke with respect to the recording of *waka* on *kaishi* expressed in this text denote the tradition that had been established by his time, and later on these provisions are repeated in other works.

The following texts, in which the question of the recording on the *kaishi* is raised, date from the 13th century. A poetic treatise *Yakumo mishō* (八雲御抄 “His Majesty’s Yakumo treatise”) was written by ex-emperor Juntoku (1197–1242, r. 1210–1221). The text, apparently, was being created for a long time, as it is known that Juntoku began to work on it even before he came out against the shogunate in 1221, and continued while in exile on Sado Island.

The tradition of *kaishi* recording is illuminated by Fujiwara no Teika (Sadaie, 1162–1241). Teika gives a large number of examples of recording *kaishi* in his essay *Wakakai shidai* (和歌会次第 “The Order of the *waka* poetry gatherings”). Since Teika was an indisputable authority for many poets of subsequent generations, his composition is an extremely important work among the essays devoted to this problem.

Chronologically, these texts precede the collection *Shokukokinshū kyōden waka*, and later the issue of recording poems was also covered in a number of texts. Among them are *Chikuenshō* (竹園抄 “Notes from the Bamboo Garden”) by Fujiwara no Tameaki (years unknown, one of Fujiwara no Tameie’s sons); *Guhishō* (愚秘抄 “Private sketchbook”) (the text was signed by the name of Teika, however, it was proven that the text does not belong to his brush, and, apparently, the time of creation of the work is the 14th century); *Seiashō* (井蛙抄 “Notes of a Frog in a Well”) by Ton’a (1289–1372), texts by Imagawa Ryōshun (1326–1420), Shōtetsu (1381–1459), and others. In the 13th century, significant changes took place in Japanese *waka* poetry, connected with the expansion of the social composition of the poets’ ranks as more representatives of the warrior class joined them. This influenced the conduct of poetry, and, in a number of details, influenced the rules for writing down poems on *kaishi* sheets, but this question remains outside the scope of this study.

The *kaishi* record of a poem consists of several elements: information about the circumstances of the composition of the poem/poems, the topic of the composition, the name of the author, the poem/poems.

The introductive part of the record is called *hashizukuri* 端作り. The topic of the poem is denoted by the word 題. In the *Fukuro sōshi*, the part of the record including information about the composition of the poem and the topic is designated as *daimoku* (題目).

In *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka*, with the exception of the first three poems (the imperial and two female ones), all other poems begin with a record of the circumstances of the composition of the poem.

The record before the fourth poem (it belongs to Ichijō Sanetsune) is as follows:

暮春續古今倭謠集竟宴應製和歌

(Japanese song, composed by order of the emperor on a spring day at a banquet in honor of the completion of work on *Shokukokinwakashū*).

With minor variations, all other entries provide the same information.

春日續古今和謠集竟宴應製倭歌 (entry to the poem by Saionji Kinsuke)

春日侍續古今倭謠集竟宴應太上皇製和歌 (before Tōin Saneo's poem)

春日陪續古今和歌集竟宴應太上皇製倭歌

(before Fujiwara no Yoshinori's poem), etc.

Only *kanji* characters are used in *hashizukuri* part of the record, *kana* characters are not used. In all cases, *hashizukuri* begins with a time stamp. In the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* collection, the most common variant is 春日 (spring day), the designation 暮春 (the end of spring) occurs three times.

Juntoku-in in *Yakumo mishō* writes in detail about this part of the *waka* record. He cites the following words that should be used as a designation of time: 八月十五夜 (the fifteenth night of the eighth moon, i.e. the autumn moon); 春日 (spring day), 夏日 (summer day), 秋日 (autumn day), 冬日 (winter day), 早春 (early spring), 暮春 (late spring), 首夏 (early summer), 初秋 (early autumn), 九月尽 (last day of autumn), 初冬 (beginning of winter), 歲暮 (end of the year). Juntoku-in cites a number of examples which, in his opinion, should not be written: 三月 三日・五月五日・九月九日 [Yakumo mishō 1964, p. 239].

In *Wakakai shidai* Teika gives a number of examples of writing *hashizukuri*, and the words 秋夜 (autumn night), 春日 (spring day), 秋日 (autumn day) are found in these examples.

Further on, all *hashizukuri* prefaces of *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* have the same information: “at the banquet in honor of the completion of work on *Shokukokin wakashū*”. Here all the entries are identical, the only difference encountered is the spelling of the word *waka*, as the word is written in

different characters, with the authors avoiding repeating the same spelling twice. The writing has the following variants: 和歌, 倭歌, 倭謠.

Next is an indication by whose command the poems were composed.

The question of the use of three different characters denoting who gave the order is discussed by Fujiwara no Kiyosuke. The options here are: 製 - 令 - 教.

In the case of the emperor or ex-emperor, the character 製 is chosen, i.e. “by the order” is written as 應製. In all cases of the collection, this combination of characters is used. Four times it is given without the words “ex-emperor”, in nineteen cases – 應太上皇 製 – “by order of the retired emperor”.

The preface to the song by Shijō Takachika is somewhat different from others:

春日陪續古今和歌集竟宴同永一首應太上皇製和歌

This recording includes the element 同永一首 “when everyone composed one song at a time”. The whole phrase is “A Japanese song composed by order of the retired emperor on a spring day at the banquet in honor of the completion of work on *Shokukokin wakashū*, when everyone composed one song”. The wording 同永一首 (同永二首・同永三首, etc.) is common for a *hashizukuri* record.

The next part of the record is the author’s name. Kiyosuke pays much attention to this part of the record.

The most complete information that the author can give about himself is given in the case when the emperor or ex-emperor issues the order about the composition. This information includes (according to Kiyosuke):

位 官 兼官 臣 姓 朝臣 名 上 (たてまつる)

Rank - position - additional position - *omi* (hereditary aristocratic title) - generic name - *ason* (court) - personal name - *tatematsuru* (“present”, written in a smaller character). According to Kiyosuke and Teika, the character 上 (read as *tatematsuru*) is written only when the poems are presented to the emperor, but later this custom spread more widely.

The *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* collection is a case of the most complete information about the authors.

関白從一位臣藤原朝臣實經上

(*Kampaku* junior first rank *omi* Fujiwara *ason* Sanetsune presents).

正三位中納言兼侍從臣藤原朝臣爲氏上

(Senior third rank middle advisor and chamberlain *omi* Fujiwara *ason* Tameuji presents).

Information becomes less complete when the order to write the poem is given not by the emperor, but by the empress, princes, or dignitaries. Both Kiyosuke and Teika pay attention to the recording of a generic name. They agree that if a poetic event takes place within the same family (i.e., everyone has the same surname), then it is not necessary to write the surname, a personal name is enough.

Teika, whose work *Wakakai shidai* is based on examples of his own recordings, demonstrates all the above-mentioned features of recording prefaces to poems and the name of the author.

Hashizukuri and Teika's name on the poetic event of 1218, which was arranged by Emperor Juntoku and took place on the 13th day of the 8th moon of 1218 in the Seiryōden palace, is written as follows:

秋夜侍 宴同詠池月久明

應 製和歌

参議正三位行民部卿兼伊豫權守臣藤原朝臣定家上

(A Japanese song composed at the emperor's command on the theme "eternal light of the moon over the pond" on an autumn evening at a banquet, when everyone composed songs, presented by *sangi* of the senior third rank and head of the Ministry of Public Affairs, ruler of Iyo *omi* Fujiwara *ason* Sadaie) [*Wakakai shidai o yomu* 2011, p. 435].

In this record, the combination 應製 is used. Since the event is imperial, the name is given with the indication of all the regalia, and, after the name, Teika uses the word *tatematsuru*.

The record relating to the poetic event in the palace of the wife of Emperor Gotoba, Fujiwara no (Kujō) Taeko (1173–1239), held in 1195, says:

秋夜同詠月契秋久广令和歌

左近衛權少将藤原定家

(Japanese song composed at the order of the Empress, when at an autumn evening all were composing songs on the theme "the eternal light of the autumn moon". Deputy junior commander of the left imperial guard Fujiwara no Sadaie) [*Wakakai shidai o yomu* 2011, p. 437–438].

Here, the character 令 is used to denote the command, the name is written with less details than in the case of the imperial order, and the character *tatematsuru* is not used.

The poetic event of 1187, to which the next entry relates, was "within the family", held at the home of the Minister of Home Affairs Fujiwara no (Kujō) Yoshimichi (1167–1188). Teika's record is:

春日同詠庭梅久芳應教和歌

侍從定家

(The song composed at the minister's order on a spring day, when everyone wrote on the theme "the long aroma of cherry in the garden." Chamberlain Sadaie) [Wakakai shidai o yomu 2011, p. 440].

In contrast to the examples from Teika's work, the *hashizukuri* in the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* records do not indicate the topic of the composition. No special topic was given to the poets, they wrote poems on the compilation of the imperial anthology and, more broadly, on the Japanese poetry.

In the above-given examples from Teika's text, it is clear that the topic is included in the *hashizukuri*. In the case when several poems are written down on a sheet, the topic of each poem is given before the poem. Kiyosuke talks about recording two songs on a sheet, giving the following scheme:

Topic -
Poem -
Topic -
Poem [Fukuro sōshi 1995, p. 9]

Kumano kaishi represent poems in this way. Thus, the *hashizukuri* of the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* collection complies with the rules described in the *karon* texts of the time.

The next element of the record is the poem itself. All the poems of male courtiers are written down in four lines (three lines + three characters). The requirement of writing down the poem in three lines and three characters was expressed by Kiyosuke. The phrase in *Fukuro sōshi* is: "Record in three lines and three characters. Recently, however, it has become optional" [Fukuro sōshi 1995, p. 11].

In his study on the recording of one poem on a *kaishi* sheet, Takei Kazuto notes that this statement by Kiyosuke raises at least two questions. The first is whether this rule (to record the poem in four lines with three characters in the fourth line) applies only to the case when one poem is written on a sheet, or to other cases as well. The second question, related to the first one, is what it means that recently it is not necessary to write poems down in this way. Is it not necessary to record one poem in this way, or, in the past, it was necessary to write in this way any number of poems, and now it is not necessary when recording two or more poems on a sheet [Takei Kazuto 1984, p.38].

The answers are to be found in the texts by other authors. The text *Yakumo mishō* makes it clear that the way of recording poems depends on how many poems are written on a sheet of paper. There are rules for recording one poem, two, three, or more poems.

Juntoku-in gives such rules for writing poems: writing in three lines and three characters refers to one poem, in the case of five to six poems, they are written in two lines, three poems are written in three lines.

In *Wakakai shidai* it is said that one poem is written in three lines and three characters. Teika also indicates that one poem is written in this way, regardless of whether it is a private or an official case. Teika also gives additional information: if there are two poems on a sheet, they are written in three lines, 5+7 characters in the first line, 5+7 characters in the second and 7 characters in the third. If there are three poems on a sheet, then they are written in two lines, and the number of characters is 5+7+5 and 7+7. If there are more than five poems, they continue to be written on the next sheet.

Thus, Teika not only gives information about the number of graphic lines in a recorded poem, but also writes about the desired number of characters to be written in two and three lines, and this number corresponds to the structure of the poem. Teika ends the part dedicated to writing poems with the following phrase: “This way [of recording] is not installed as mandatory” [*Wakakai shidai o yomu* 2011, p. 446].

Somewhat earlier than in Teika’s text, the same information about the number of characters in a graphic line of a poem was given by Fujiwara no Koreyuki (1139–1175) in the text known as *Yakaku teikinshō* (夜鶴庭訓抄, “Secret teachings of the night crane”, translation into English [De Coker, Kerr 1994]). Koreyuki’s text is considered to be the first essay on calligraphy in Japanese history. The text shows that, for the scribes, the structure of the poem is important, and that the record should be done in accordance with the internal structure of the poem. Koreyuki writes: “A way to record songs. If two lines, then one line 5–7–5, one line 7–7. If three lines, one line 5–7, one line 5–7, one line 7”. [*Jubokudō sanbushū* 1989, p. 7].

The peculiarities of recording one poem on a *kaishi* sheet could be a peculiar sign of belonging to a certain poetic school. Information about that could be found in *Chikuenshō* and other texts [Takei Kazuto 1984].

Neither the text by Kiyosuke, nor the one by Juntoku-in or Teika discuss the relationship between *kanji* and *kana* characters in the recording of poems.

The text of the poems in *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* is mainly written in *kana*, however, a small number of *kanji* is also used. The greatest number of *kanji* is contained in the poem by Gosaga-in.

三代までに古今の名もふりぬ光おみかけ玉つしま姫

The number of syllables in this poem is standard (31 syllables), but there are 23 graphic characters in the record: 8 *kanji* and 15 *kana* characters. A number of *kanji* which are consistently used in poems are read in

one syllable, so they do not affect the number of characters: 世世 (yoyo), 代代 (yoyo), 御代 (miyo), 葉 (ha), 千 (chi). However, some signs, like 光 (hikari), 事 (koto) and others, change the number of graphic characters relative to the number of syllables.

All but the first three poems of the collection have three graphic characters in the last line, and these signs include both *kana* and *kanji*:

るかな・うら浪・事の葉・らかせ・つねて・らたま・りけり・浦なみ・らなみ・とのほ・みる哉・らなみ・もらむ・はなし・えけり・るかな・ふかな・とのほ・らなみ・たへむ・うら浪・らかせ.

In five cases, the last line includes *kanji* and thus has three characters but four syllables: うら浪・事の葉・浦なみ・みる哉・うら浪.

Unlike writing in three and two lines, a four-line graphic recording of a poem the internal structure of which consists of five verses cannot be expected to be consistently connected with the internal structure. Consider a few examples.

Fujiwara no Saneo's poem:

わかくにのなかきた
からも君か代に
ふたたひつけるやまと
事の葉

(わかくにの // なかきたからも // 君か代に // ふたたひつける // やまと事の葉)

(Eternal treasures of our country – Yamato songs – in the age of our sovereign were collected for the second time).

In the four-line recording, the first two lines correspond to the first stanza of the song. In this case, the word *takara* is divided between two lines.

Fujiwara no Takachika:

もしほくさいにしへ
いまをかきとめてみ
たひつたふるわか
のう
らかせ

(もしほくさ // いにしへいまを // かきとめて // みたひつたふる // わかのうらかせ)

(They are collected for the third time, songs like pearl seaweeds, old and new. The wind is blowing in the Bay of Songs).

There is no coincidence between the internal structure of the poem and the graphic lines.

Fujiwara no Morotsugu:

あつめつくいにしへ
いまのことの葉のかす
も千とせのためしな
りけり

(あつめつく // いにしへいまの // ことの葉の // かすも千とせの
// ためしなりけり)

(Collected old and new songs give an example of plenty and longevity).

There is no coincidence between the internal structure of the poem and the graphic lines. Of the 22 songs recorded in four lines, in five cases, two graphic lines make up the first stanza of the poem (i.e., three verses).

The first three poems of the collection are significantly different from all the others in their graphic execution. They are divided into graphic lines as follows:

三代までに古今/の/名もふり/ぬ/光おみかけ/玉つしま/姫

(It is already the third collection preserving the words “old and new”. Please, make this collection shine like a jewel, oh, Tamatsushima-hime).

大宮院権中納言

わかめうらにかき/ あつめたることの / はや / 世々にたえせぬ / ため
しなる / らん

(This collection is an example: the words collected in the Bay of Songs will not be interrupted in centuries).

中納言

ことのはのつゆの/たまぬくあをや/きの/いとのためすそ/よよにつ
たへむ

(Infinite thin willow branches, glittering with dew drops like words of songs will stretch through the centuries).

The imperial and female poems of the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* are recorded in the way of *chirashigaki* 散し書き scattered script. With such a record, the number of lines and characters in a line is not defined, and the lines themselves begin with a significant indent from the top edge of the sheet.

In the article “Siting the Court Woman Poet: “Waka no kai” (Poetry Gatherings) in Rokujō Kiyosuke’s “Fukuro zōshi” Roselee Bundy indicates female *chirashigaki* in such a way: “Further, by the thirteenth century, women’s verses in *waka no kai* came to be written in *chirashigaki* (scattered writing), in which the poem was divided into six unevenly

staggered lines with one to eight syllables per line, in contrast to the male style of three lines of equal length and three or five syllables left for a fourth line” [Bundy 2009, p. 22].

A.P. Belyaev characterizes the *chirashigaki* script (in connection not with *kaishi* but with *shikishi* of Heian time): “Unlike those Heian monuments, in which all the lines are approximately the same length and the written text is no less important than its calligraphic performance, here the different length, slope and saturation of the lines each time form a natural, “lively” and original rhythm, as a result of which the works of this kind are of much greater value as objects for admiring, rather than as texts for reading (well-read contemporaries already knew these texts by heart)” [Belyaev 2017, p. 388].

Usually, when recording poems on *kaishi*, such an entry marks female poems, but not always, as, in the case of *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka*, the imperial poem is also recorded in this way.

Fujiwara-no Kiyosuke in *Fukuro sōshi* devotes just one sentence to female recording: “Female songs: neither the theme nor the characters of the name are written” [Fukuro sōshi 1995, p. 10].

A feature of female *kaishi* is the choice of paper. Female poems are written on thin paper (*usuyō* 薄様), the paper is often colored and has a picture. The fact that women write on thin paper, using two sheets laid one on another, draws the attention of Juntoku-in in *Yakumo mishō*. The choice of paper by the female participants of the collection *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka* is indicated by entries made with small characters to the right of the authors name.

Machida Seiichi writes in his article titled “Japanese thin paper”: “In the Heian era, men used thick *danshi* paper as *kaishi* (paper for writing down poems), while women mostly used thin paper. At poetry meetings, men wrote on a single sheet of thick paper, women wrote on two sheets of thin paper laid one on another, recording a song on the upper side, and the name of the author on the bottom sheet. When writing letters, they also usually used two sheets laid on top of each other” [Machida 1978, p. 13].

Thus, the recording of poems in the *Shokukokinshū kyōen waka*, as reflected in the *Gunshō ruijū* publication, is fully consistent with the rules of recording poems on *kaishi* sheets of paper given by poets of the 12th–13th centuries.

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TOROPYGINA Maria Vladimirovna – PhD (Philology), Senior researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Professor, Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies of National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE).

ORCID 0000-0003-3214-5610

E-mail: mtoropygina@hse.ru

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**Once Again About the
“Miraculous Power of *waka*”:
Setsuwa Tales About Poets in the *Jikkinshō***

N.N. TRUBNIKOVA

Abstract. The article deals with the approach to the interpretation of Japanese *waka* poetry presented in the *Jikkinshō* collection of *setsuwa* tales (mid-13th century). The conception of *waka* in this text proceeds from the words about the miraculous power of poetry in Ki no Tsurayuki’s preface to the *Kokinshū* anthology (early 10th century). On many examples from the life of Heian poets, the compiler of the *Jikkinshō* discusses the role of poetry in such spheres as human communication and shintō worship. The compiler examines the relation between various “ways” of realizing one’s talent (*waka* and *kanshi* poetry, music, etc). He demonstrates the usefulness of poetic skills in private and public life, the importance of the ability to understand other people’s poetical works and evaluate them judiciously. Relevance and compliance with current circumstances turn out to be the main condition for success in everything that concerns *waka*, as well as in other worldly affairs.

Keywords: Japanese philosophy, *setsuwa* tales, *Jikkinshō*, Buddhism, Confucianism, *waka* poetry.

In this article, I would like to return to the topic of *katoku* (歌徳), or the miraculous power of Japanese *waka* songs, as it is portrayed in collections of *setsuwa* didactic tales. In my previous article, I discussed the Buddhist view of the *waka* poetry in the *Shasekishū* (沙石集, “Sand and Pebbles”, 1279–1283) [Trubnikova 2013], ¹ and now I am going to discuss another

¹ See Russian translation in [Muju Ichien (without date)].

approach to interpreting the “native songs”, which can be named secular and, provisionally, Confucian. I will focus on the *Jikkinshō* (十訓抄, “Ten Maxims”, 1252)² – an earlier text, which, probably, had some influence on Muju Ichien, the compiler of the *Shasekishū*.³ Many tales about poets coincide in the two collections.⁴ However, all of these can be found in other monuments as well. As is generally the case with *setsuwa* collections, it is usually impossible to determine the source of a particular tale (one can only say in which of the texts available to us it appears for the first time).

Following the division of *setsuwa* collections into religious and secular ones, which is common for many academic works if not exactly strict,⁵ the *Shasekishū* undoubtedly belongs to the former group, while the *Jikkinshō* can be attributed to the latter. Compared to the *Shasekishū*, the *Jikkinshō* refers to the books of the Buddhist canon less frequently,⁶ while it has more quotations from the Chinese classics, works by Chinese historians and poets,⁷ as well as monuments of Japanese literature, including chronicles, poetic collections, *monogatari* tales, etc.

² I use the following edition: [Jikkinshō 1997]. Available also at: <http://yatanavi.org/text/jikkinsho/index.html>. (accessed: 10 December 2019). On the history of this compilation and the approaches to its study see: [Trubnikova 2015a].

³ The *Jikkinshō* is not mentioned in the *Shasekishū*, but, generally speaking, among all the *setsuwa* collections, Muju Ichien mentions only one, the *Hosshinshū* (“Collection on the Awakening of the Heart”, early 13th century, composed by Kamo no Chomei), though, most likely, he was familiar with other collections. I have no knowledge of works that compare the *Jikkinshō* and the *Shasekishū* in general. For comparison by one of the topics see, for example, the following article: [Hirakawa 2006].

⁴ The *Jikkinshō* and the *Shasekishū* are comparable by volume. The number of tales in the *Jikkinshō* is 282, and it is 152 in the *Shasekishū*. In both cases, the number is provisional, as the division of each of the collections into tales differs in various manuscripts and editions. As a rule, in the *Jikkinshō*, one “tale” is one story, while in the *Shasekishū*, a “tale” with a subtitle often contains several stories, each of which can be considered a *setsuwa* tale. According to [Jikkinshō 1997], 15 tales from the *Jikkinshō* found their way into the *Shasekishū*, and all of these are about poets.

⁵ About the classification of the *setsuwa* collections and their relation to other genres see: [Sviridov 1981, p. 7–51; Konishi 1991, p. 117–136, 314–331; Li 2009, p. 14–30; Eubanks 2011, p. 62–96].

⁶ The list of Buddhist sources of the *Shasekishū* includes more than a hundred texts, while, in the case of the *Jikkinshō*, there are only twelve. Most frequently, both books quote the “Lotus Sutra” (*Hokke-kyō*) – there are 29 quotations in the *Shasekishū* and 11 in the *Jikkinshō* (the numbers are according to my commentaries to the translations of both compilations; other approaches to determining quotations could produce other results, but I believe that the ratio would remain approximately the same).

⁷ For example, the “Analects” by Confucius are quoted four times in the *Shasekishū* and 11 times in the *Jikkinshō*; the “Records of the Grand Historian” by Sima Qian are quoted six times in the *Shasekishū* and 29 times in the *Jikkinshō*.

The two collections' goals, stated in their respective prefaces and afterwords, also differ. In the *Shasekishū*, the main goal is to show that the "Way of the Buddha" can be threaded differently: "There is not just one method for entering the Way, the causes and conditions for enlightenment being many. Once a person understands their general significance, he will see that the purport of the various teachings does not vary. And when he puts them into practice, he will find that the goal of the myriad religious exercises is the same." [Morrell 1985, p. 70–71]. Bidding farewell to his readers, Muju Ichien writes: "If a person reads these stories... he will see people who appreciated the profound intentions of the gods, trusted in the encompassing grace of the Buddhas, respected the exalted virtues of men of religious conviction, learned from the honesty and simplicity of householders, understood the operation of moral causation, discriminated between the wise and the foolish, became aware of the marvelous goal of the various doctrines, and entered the blessed path of the anchorite." [Morrell 1985, p. 266]. Among other ways to liberation, the "way of native songs" is the best for a beginner: the *waka* songs help both a poet and merely an admirer of poetry to proceed from an active life to one of contemplation, and after it is done, it is no great difficulty to master the Buddhist teaching.

The goals stated by the compiler of the "Ten Maxims" are different: "In this world people differ greatly, having a huge variety of interests, but there is one thing that all have in common, whether they are mighty or humble: the wise gain much and the foolish lose much. [...] This is meant to be a help for the formation of good character in young people who have not yet had proper instruction of this type." The author almost does not speak of liberation, be it during one's life or in the afterlife, or of "entering the blessed path of the anchorite", focusing instead on life in this world, among people [Brownlee 1974, p. 133]. Here, one's fate after death is not so much rebirth in a new human or animal body, in hell or in the paradise of the Pure Land, but rather fame in the memory of descendants: "Since their bodies lie moldering beneath the moss, and only their names remain on record, one cannot help but feel sad when thinking of them." [Brownlee 1974, p. 161]. In this sense, the entire *Jikkinshō* collection can be viewed as a book not only about how to live a happy life, but also about how to leave good memory after oneself. Many ways lead to this purpose: the *setsuwa* tales speak of people who are kind, patient, persevering in their studies, faithful in friendship and in love, loyal to their master, witty in society, valiant in war, and, of course, of poets, musicians,

dancers, artists, and all those who in some way revealed talents inherited from one’s ancestors and knowledge received from one’s teachers. In the *Shasekishū*, Muju Ichien mainly addresses mature people, who have already understood that life is short and, therefore, it is time to focus on the important. Meanwhile, the target audience of the *Jikkinshō* are young people, who are still searching for their way in life.

Despite all the differences of the two collections, there are also noteworthy similarities. For instance, in the prefaces, both Muju Ichien and the compiler of the *Jikkinshō* mention the *kyōgen kigo* (狂言綺語, illusory words and florid language). In both cases, this unflattering definition refers to *setsuwa* tales, but, originally, in the writings of Bo Juyi (772–846), it meant secular poetry as compared to righteous Buddhist literature [Trubnikova 2013, p. 293–297]. Besides, both prefaces contain the word *moshiogusa*, which dates back to ancient Japanese poetry of the *Man’yōshū* (万葉集, “Collection of Ten Thousand Generations”, 8th century). This is “seaweed by burning which salt is made”, and the compilers use the word *moshiogusa* to refer to the material with which they work and which they offer to the reader. From the plethora of worldly tales, old legends and other stories, one is to extract the “salt”, a certain didactic meaning – which is what makes these stories the *setsuwa* tales they are. Hence, the connection of the tradition of collecting didactic tales with the poetic traditions of China and Japan turns out to be a defining feature of both collections.

Both in the *Shasekishū* and in the *Jikkinshō*, the *waka* songs are to be found across the entirety of the text. In the *Jikkinshō*, out of 282 tales, there are songs in 104, while the total number of songs is 138.⁸ In the *Shasekishū*, out of 152 tales, songs are included in 25, and there 112 songs in total.⁹ The distribution of songs in the *Shasekishū* is less uniform: most of the *waka* are placed in scroll Vb,¹⁰ which is devoted to poets and where a single tale sometimes contains up to two dozens of songs. Some scrolls of the *Shasekishū* contain no songs at all, while the *Jikkinshō* has songs in each of the ten chapters.

⁸ Not counting the songs from which only one line is quoted. Besides, in 65 stories of the *Jikkinshō* there are Chinese poems composed both by Chinese and Japanese poets (88 poetic fragments in total).

⁹ There are ten stories with poems and 20 poetic fragments (including the repetition of several poems from the Buddhist canon, which are particularly important to Muju Ichien).

¹⁰ Here and elsewhere, the references to the collections are given according to the following system. When referring to the *Shasekishū*, a Roman numeral denotes the scroll, and an Arabic numeral denotes the number of the tale; scrolls V and X have two parts each: “a” and “b”. When referring to the *Jikkinshō*, Arabic numerals denote the number of the chapter and the number of the tale in it.

The selection of songs in the two collections differs substantially. In the *Shasekishū*, Muju Ichien includes several *waka* of his own authorship, both pious and joking, as well as songs by his acquaintances, songs by unknown authors, songs by poets of the Eastern lands, who gained fame in Kamakura and its surroundings, but not in the capital. Together with *tanka* pentastichs, the *Shasekishū* contains “songs following the examples of the *Man'yōshū*” – Muju calls so all songs in the Japanese language which do not fit the *tanka* form. A whole tale (Vb-7) is devoted to the *renga*, or “song chains”. Here, this word denotes such a way of composition, wherein three lines of the pentastich are composed by one poet, and two – by another (chains consisting of a larger number of tristichs and distichs are not mentioned). As for the *Jikkinshō*, the *waka* contained in this collection are exclusively the time-tested *tanka* composed by famous poets of the Heian era and included in anthologies, from the *Kokinshū* (古今集, “Collection of Old and New Songs”, 905) and up to the *Shinkokinshū* (新古今集, “New Collection of Old and New Songs”, 1205/1210). Several songs in the *Jikkinshō* are taken from “The Tales of Ise”, “The Tale of Genji” and other Heian-era *monogatari*. Incidentally, the gentleman from the *Ise Monogatari* is confidently identified as poet Ariwara no Narihira, and about Prince Genji the author says that though he is a fictional character, his songs are brilliant (tale 6–14), which means that he can be put on par with real poets.

As a rule, songs are introduced in the text of the *setsuwa* in two ways. First, a song can be included in the part of the tale where its “moral” is expressed, it can support the narrator’s conclusions or argue with them. Second, a song can be a part of action: when, following the plot, in some circumstances a certain character makes a song by themselves or quotes another person’s one – receiving the response to it in the form of a song or some other reaction from other people. To the second type belong the “stories about the virtuous power of songs”, *katoku setsuwa*, where the response to the song not merely concludes the action (“all who heard it were wiping their tears”, etc.), but develops it further, in a certain way changing the life of the poet, the listener, or the reader. The *katoku setsuwa* are present in both collections (as they are, generally speaking, in most collections of didactic tales). In the *Shasekishū*, such tales describe how gods answer poets and fulfill their wishes (V6-1); the dead use songs to communicate with the living (V6-5); in response to a song, a criminal receives forgiveness, a simple fisher girl gets married to a nobleman, the emperor frees a villager from taxes, unfaithful husbands return to their wives, and students – to

their teachers (V6-2, VII-1). In all these cases, a *waka* song acts like an incantation of a sort. In Tale Va-12, Muju Ichien argues that songs are, essentially, the “true words”, mantras, only composed not in Sanskrit, but in the Japanese language [Trubnikova 2013, p. 299–303].

Similar tales can be found in the *Jikkinshō* as well. In the ten chapters of the collection, among the examples of each of the ten discussed virtues and vices, there are tales with songs. I will give the titles of the chapters and summarize some of the stories from them.

1. “Some Rules for a Chaste Mind and Virtuous Conduct”. Before her death, Empress Teishi (977–1001) left in her quarters a note with a farewell song about love, and the emperor found bitter consolation in her words (1–11). Fujiwara no Ietaka (1158–1237), when the regent himself asked him who the best poet currently was, took from within his robe a sheet of paper with a song – not his, but that of his competitor, Fujiwara no Teika (1162–1241). This act speaks not only of magnanimity, but also of foresight, as Ietaka was carrying the sheet with him (1–36).

2. “Being Without Pride”. Since her younger years, the proud beauty Ono no Komachi (ca. 825–900) dreamed of becoming the emperor’s concubine, but eventually remained single, wrote a song about “floating grass without roots” and married an old acquaintance of hers, also a poet (2–4).

3. “On Not Despising Humanity”. Female poet Koshikibu no naishi (d. 1025) entered palatial service as a girl. A young courtier was mocking her, but she made an excellent song, and the mocker was put to shame (3–1). Similarly, a young poet Ooe no Masafusa (1041–1111), when court ladies were haughtily making fun of him, responded with an exquisite and witty song, and since then he became respected (3–2).

4. “On Talking About People: A Caution”. At a poetic meeting, a famous poet Fujiwara no Kinto (966–1041) heard the line: “Spring receded on the twenty-ninth day”, and noted that the last month of spring has, in fact, thirty days. After these seemingly innocent words, the author of the song became deeply distressed, fell ill and died (4–17).¹¹

5. “Choosing Friends”. The former mentor of the crown prince was leaving for a new place of service in the provinces. Bidding farewell to him, the prince composed both a Chinese *kanshi* poem and a *waka* song. In the poem, he wished his mentor success, and in the song he asked: – If you do not forget me, look at the moon – the sky above us will be one and

¹¹ The same story is provided in the *Shasekishū* (Vb-6) as an example of extreme faithfulness to the “way of songs” and fatal passion for poetry. Unlike the *Jikkinshō*, Muju Ichien focuses not on the careless critic, but on the deceased poet.

the same.¹² This way, he made himself equal with his teacher as a friend, though the prince was higher by status, and the teacher was his senior in terms of age and experience (5–3).¹³

6. “On Loyalty and Devotion”. When a master dies, the ones who served him loyally do not remain to serve his heirs, but compose farewell songs and become monks (6–8, 6–9, 6–10), or die (6–13). Notably, “straightforwardness”, namely the readiness to contradict one’s master when he is mistaken, is expressed not in *waka* songs, but in *kanshi* poems.

7. “On the Primacy of Discretion”. Emperor Murakami (926–967, r. 946–967) sent several ladies the same song that sounded like a confession of love, and the ladies replied with gentle songs. Only one of the ladies, the real beloved of the sovereign, understood that the song was a *kutsukaburi* riddle in which a request to send incense was hidden, which the lady did (7–8).¹⁴

8. “Enduring Things”. A husband brought home a new wife and had the old one live in the same house behind a screen. Once, in autumn, upon hearing a deer bellow, the husband called for the previous wife, and she responded with a song – without reproach, but with love – after which the husband returned to her (8–7).¹⁵

9. “Giving Up Desirable Things”. Poet Kamo no Chōmei (1154–1216) came from a priestly family, but was not appointed a priest, became an hermit monk and, even if he regretted his lot, did not complain: when he was invited to participate in the compilation of the *Shinkokinshū*, he refused, but expressed his refusal with a song (9–7) [Kamo no Chōmei 2015, p. 36–37].

I will discuss the tenth chapter of the *Jikkinshō* in more detail, as it is here that the explanation of how the *waka* songs act and what constitutes their power is elaborated. In my opinion, summing up the above-stated examples, one can say that the general direction of the *katoku setsuwa* here is somewhat different than in the *Shasekishū*. The latter speaks about the miraculous power of songs as such, while the former – about the qualities

¹² *Translator’s note*: here and elsewhere, unless otherwise specified, the translations from the Japanese texts are rendered from the Russian version of the article.

¹³ The prince is the future Emperor Gosanjo (1034–1073, r. 1068–1073); the song and the tale about it can be found in the *Shinkokinshū* (No. 877). See: [Trubnikova 2015b].

¹⁴ On riddle songs see: [Toropygina 2016]. In the *Jikkinshō*, another riddle connected to a song is given in Tale 7–6, where a tanka pentastich is written in kanji cipher.

¹⁵ The story dates back to the *Yamato Monogatari* (“The Tales of Yamato”, 158) and is included in the *Konjaku Monogatari* (“Collection of Tales from the Past”, 12th century, Chapter 30, Tale 2), the *Shasekishū*, and other monuments. The song is also to be found in the *Shinkokinshū* (No. 1372).

of a person which can be realized through a song or in some other way, but it is these qualities that act upon people. The qualities themselves are usual, not “miraculous”, and they can be good or bad. The song only allows to express them, heightens the probability of other people responding – and sometimes, in its efficiency, this method approaches a “miracle”.

The list of virtues discussed in the first nine chapters of the *Jikkinshō* does not match exactly any of the schemes found in Japanese religious and philosophical traditions. It can be compared both to the ten Buddhist commandments and to the teachings of ancient Chinese sages [Trubnikova 2016b]. In some chapters, the narrator speaks like a Confucian: this is particularly so in the cases of “fidelity and rectitude” and, closely related to these, “filial piety” (Chapter 6) [Trubnikova 2016a], as well as of the choice of appropriate friends with whom a person becomes better (Chapter 3) [Trubnikova 2015b]. In all chapters of the *Jikkinshō*, one can trace other prescriptions which, I believe, can also be called Confucian. A person should exactly understand their place in the general hierarchy, follow their duty to their seniors and juniors. At the same time, the young reader of the *Jikkinshō* must learn to see the hierarchy as a whole and not to neglect anyone. Here, the examples to emulate are not only charitable Buddhist ascetics, for whom all people are equal, but also wise Confucian strategists, for whom people are different and everyone fits some purpose. The general rules of behavior are important, but what is much more important is the ability to act according to the situation, to use not only people, with their abilities and inclinations, but also circumstances, with their possible benefits and dangers. The worst thing that people do for themselves, for their close ones, and sometimes for the entire country, happens when they forget where they are and whom they are dealing with, when they act in an inappropriate and untimely manner.¹⁶ In order to act according to the situation every time, one must develop “sensitivity” and “insight”, learn to grasp hints, hear not only direct, but also implied

¹⁶ The *Shasekishū* interprets the key idea of Confucianism in a similar way. For instance, in the story III-7, Confucius, when talking to the ruler of the state of Lu, speaks about people who “forgot themselves”. Such were the last sovereigns of the Xia and Yin dynasties, who wallowed in vices and doomed their kingdoms. The disaster consisted not in their forgetting about their subjects’ needs, but in their ceasing to realize their own position in the world, to comprehend what it means to be human and a king (the story goes back to the *Kongzi Jiayu*, “The School Sayings of Confucius”, 3rd century AD). From this, Muju Ichien draws the following conclusion: we must not forget that we are mortal and subject to the law of retribution, for all woes stem from forgetting these main conditions of human existence. The *Jikkinshō* speaks mainly about the more concrete conditions in which a person acts, about the importance of not abandoning the ties of family, service, friendship, and other roles.

meaning in the words of others (and oneself). And in order to learn to “read between the lines”, to understand the implications and context, the study of poetry, both Japanese and Chinese, is especially useful (Chapter 1 in particular says a lot about this) [Trubnikova 2017].

The title of the concluding and the largest chapter of the *Jikkishō* is “On the Necessity of Artistic Talent and Accomplishment” (才芸を庶幾すべき事, *saigei o shoki subeki koto*, 79 tales). Here, once again, one can trace the influence of Confucian thought: a sage understands oneself, knows their abilities and develops them, and also discerns and values talents in other people. Ultimately, the best community is the one that singles out the gifted and relegates to each one the tasks with which they can cope better than others.¹⁷ In the introduction to Chapter 10, the compiler of the collection writes:

Unfortunately some of those born into the houses neglect the art and do not try to carry on the line; they should work hard to continue the tradition. As for the outsiders, they should realize that it is possible to attain the ultimate of perfection in the arts, so they should work hard to accomplish themselves. When people who are talented in the arts are mixed together in the ordinary affairs of life with those who are untalented, the difference between them is hardly noticeable. But when the talented are called upon to perform or even when they enjoy themselves at informal gatherings, they immediately come to the fore, doing everything well. The difference between the talented and the untalented becomes as obvious as the difference between the clouds in the sky and the mud-holes in the ground. They never fail to win admiration.

When you place a handsome and high-born person with little talent beside a humble but talented person, the handsome face and lofty manner always appear inferior. There is an analogy in the case of the evergreen tree beside the spring blossoms. At first sight, the blossom is incomparably more colorful, but when spring is over and the mountain storms have come and gone there remains only the green of the tree. The transitory fragrance of the flower is gone. So it is said, ‘The peach and the damson are the glories of but a single morning; the pine stands upright forever.’

¹⁷ At the same time, it is not important whether the state has formally adopted the principle of meritocracy, whether civil service examinations are held, etc. On the Confucian “knowledge of people”, the ability to discern others’ talents and find use for them see: [Malyavin 2007, p. 241–259].

[...] Ours is a changing world which has been going steadily downhill for a long time now. This is true of the arts too. Indeed, it is hard to be as accomplished as one’s forefathers; it is like blue trying to be bluer than indigo.¹⁸ Nevertheless it is a shame that they do not try to continue the ancestral arts in the same way as before, even in form alone¹⁹ [Bronwnlee 1974, p. 158].

The first two tales of this chapter are about sons who were or were not inferior to their fathers in terms of gifts. Both examples deal with the “way” of Chinese literature, i.e. composing *kanshi* poetry. After that, an old custom is described: when emperors were resting by the waterside together with their subjects, authors of songs were seated in one boat, poets in another, and musicians in a third one, and thus each of these “ways” performed their own art. After such a festivity, Fujiwara no Kinto (see above, Tale 4–17) once belatedly regretted that, when asked to choose the boat, he joined the *waka* poets. He should have joined the authors of *kanshi*, as, on the way of songs, Kinto’s fame was already great, and, on the way of poetry, it still had somewhere to grow (10–3). In old times, there also used to be such talented people as Minamoto no Tsunenobu (1016–1097). He could freely choose any of the three boats, and even when he was sitting with the musicians, his still composed both a poem and a song afterwards (10–4). In this way, the list of the three main “ways” is defined: *waka*, *kanshi*, and music.

Unlike Muju Ichien, the composer of the *Jikkinshō* does not offer his own particular theory of poetry. Discussing songs, poems, and other arts, he follows the plan set forth in the Kana Preface to the *Kokinshū* by Ki no Tsurayuki:

ちからをもいれずしてあめつちをうごかし、めに見えぬおに神をもあはれとおもはせ、をとこをむなのなかをもやはらげ、たけきもののふの心をもなぐさむるは、うたなり。

It is song that moves heaven and earth without effort, stirs emotions in the invisible spirits and gods, brings harmony to the relations between men and women, and calms the hearts of fierce warriors. [Kokin Wakashū 1985, p. 3].

By the time of compilation of the *Jikkinshō*, these lines had given birth to a whole tradition of interpretations. The Preface had already become the basis for Japanese poetological theory [Dyakonova 2016]. The author of the *Jikkinshō* links the words by Tsurayuki not only to *waka* songs,

¹⁸ Cf. *Xunzi* 1–1.

¹⁹ Cf. *Liezi* 5–15

but also to *kanshi* poems, music, and all arts in general. In this way, he emphasizes that, essentially, all “ways” are the same and, to a degree, interchangeable: whatever way a person chooses, they can employ their talents in it to their own and others’ benefit.

The author begins his discussion about songs by analyzing cases when they should be composed. One of such important cases is the emperor’s pilgrimage together with his courtiers to the Sumiyoshi shrine near the Naniwa Bay, as the local god patronizes not only sailors, but also poets [Toropygina 2013]. In Tale 10–5, Minamoto no Tsunenobu (cf. Tale 10–4) made a song in Sumiyoshi, everybody praised it, and he recalled another song about Sumiyoshi – one composed by Oshikochi no Mitsune at the turn of the 10th century and included in the *Kokinshū*. Tsunenobu humbly says that, at a feast, Mitsune’s song would sit on the honorable place of a minister, but his would probably sit near the gates, among the servants of his entourage. His interlocutor, Minamoto no Toshiyori (1055–1129), replies: no, yours should be seated in the place of a senior counselor (*dainagon*), only slightly lower than a minister. Here we have one more “way”, not yet clearly distinguished from the “way of native songs”, but still special. This is the way of poetic criticism. One can see the importance of correct and considerate judgement about poetry just from Tale 4–17, which has been discussed above. Meanwhile, here Tsunenobu elaborates on the comparison of the *waka* with a person and gives a verbal portrait of Mitsune’s song, describing it as majestic, as if an elder from a faraway land, wearing a brocade hat, were playing a flute or a zither, while leaning on an armrest of crimson sandal and reciting poetry. This is the look that befits it, Tsunenobu says (in this description, one can glimpse the image of god Sumiyoshi himself, as it would later be portrayed, for example, in the Noh theater).

Further on in the *Jikkinshō*, one finds several tales about how *waka* and *kanshi* poetry cause the response of “gods, spirits, and demons”. On the island of Chikubu, where people worship the goddess of music and singing Benzaiten, poet Miyako no Yoshika (834–879) was making poems together with the goddess. And in the capital, while walking along the street, he composed a *kanshi* line, and the demon who lived on the Rajomon gate made its continuation (10–6). Another poet, Sugawara no Fumitoki (899–981), survived during an epidemic together with his entire family, for the plague gods valued his talent in the field of *kanshi* (10–7). Ooe no Masafusa (cf. above, Tale 3–2) and other poets were composing poems in the Anrakuji temple in the island of Kyushu, where disgraced

courtier Sugawara no Michizane, also known as god Tenjin, the protector of scholars, poets, and those who have been slandered, is worshipped (10–8, 10–9). These tales do not explain how exactly Tenjin helped the poets, merely noting that the god responded to the poems.

Quite a few tales describe gods reacting to *waka* poems. The following one which goes first in this series (10–10) can serve as a textbook example of the *katoku setsuwa* as a type of didactic stories.

Monk-in-the-world Noin,²⁰ together with Sanetsuna, governor of the Iyo province,²¹ went to that land. In the beginning of summer, sunny days have continued for a long time, and the people’s plight was not easy. But even gods favor native songs! One must try to compose one and offer it to the Mishima Shrine!²² So the governor decided, and, at his command, Noin composed: From the Heavenly river water to the rice paddies send down, if the gods truly are gods descending from Heaven! (*Ama no kawa nawashiro mizu ni sekikudase amakudarimasu kami naraba kami*). He wrote the song on a *mitegura* offering and asked the shrine acolyte to read it to the gods. And immediately the scorching sky became covered with clouds, heavy rain poured down and the dried rice sprouts turned green again.

In the song, Noin provides a *kotowari*, the reason why gods can and should fulfill the wish of the people. As gods are styled *amakudari*, “descending from Heaven”, it means that they can send down heavenly waters and water the rice paddies. It is by means of the *kotowari* that songs influence gods, and, in the *Shasekishū*, this quality makes them akin to incantations.²³ However, the narrator of the *Jikkinshō* notes: by the way, this is the Noin who, when living in the capital, once made a song about travelling to the far North, to the Michinoku country (where he has never been). Noin laid this song aside and published it only many years later (10–10). Interestingly, the story does not make it clear whether the poet in fact went to Michinoku, or whether he just waited until the listeners would certainly not remember where and when he had travelled. A similar case happened to a 12th century female poet, lady Kaga. In her youth, she made a sad song about love – and hid it away till the moment she meets a worthy man and falls in love. So it hap-

²⁰ Also known as Tachibana no Nagayasu (988–1032), he is considered one of the “Thirty-Six Immortals of Poetry” of the Heian era.

²¹ Fujiwara no Sanetsuna (1012–1082).

²² Also: Ooyamazumi jinja in the Iyo province on the coast of the Seto Inland Sea.

²³ About songs as prayers for rain, *amagoi*, see: [Trubnikova 2013, p. 301–302; Kimbrough 2005].

pened, and the song was included in one of the anthologies, as without a real love story the song would not have such success (10–11). Here we should note that the question of timeliness of songs is closely related to the issue of their miraculous power. Prayer songs are probably effective precisely because appropriate words are said at an appropriate time. But then, there may be no miracle at all: a poet just utters a song when it is about to rain, or, as it were, anticipating the gods' decision to send down rain.

Many miracles of the *waka* songs are connected to family issues. In songs, people express their spousal and parental feelings, fulfill the Confucian virtues of “piety” and “fidelity”. God Hachiman in the Iwashimizu shrine, in response to a song, helped a poor girl to find a husband, so that neither she, nor her mother would be in need of anything (10–12).²⁴ Female poet Izumi Shikibu (late 10th – early 11th centuries), when her husband had lost his feelings for her, made a song about fireflies in the Kibune Shrine, and the god helped her to bring her husband back (10–13). The daughter of Izumi Shikibu, Koshikibu no naishi (see above, Tale 3–1), during a serious illness, made a song about how bitter it was for her to leave her mother, and got well (10–14).²⁵ Another female poet, Akazome-emon (956–1041), prayed with a song to god Sumiyoshi to take her life instead of the life of her sick son, and the son got well (10–15). Gods also help in the affairs of service: for instance, court lady Kodaishin was accused of the disappearance of the emperor's clothes. She prayed at the Kitano Shrine, and god Tenjin helped her to prove herself not guilty (10–16).²⁶

²⁴ The story also appears in the *Kokon chōmonjū* (“A Collection of Notable Tales Old and New”, 1254, Tale No. 173), in the *Shasekishū* (Vb-1), and in the *Hachiman-gudōkin* (“Admonition for Stupid Children about Hachiman”, 14th century). The following four tales from the *Jikkinshō* can also be found in the *Kokon chōmonjū* (Nos. 174–177) and in the *Shasekishū* (about Izumi Shikibu in the Kibune shrine – Vb-11; the rest – Vb-1). One can say that here we have several *katoku setsuwa* that are included in various collections as a set. On the relation between the *Kokon chōmonjū* and the *Jikkinshō* see: [Sviridov 1981, p. 44–46]. According to one version, these two collections were composed by the same expert in Heian antiquities, Tachibana no Narisue. In my opinion, another version is more persuasive, according to which, unlike the *Kokon chōmonjū*, the *Jikkinshō* does not belong to the palatial tradition of the capital, but constitutes an attempt to appropriate this tradition and adjust it to the needs of educating a young warrior [Trubnikova 2015a].

²⁵ The same stories about famous Heian female poets are included, for example, in the *Mumyō zōshi* (“Sketches Without a Name”, early 13th century) [Mumyō zōshi 2008].

²⁶ This tale is included in the *Kokon chōmonjū* (No. 177), *Shasekishū* (Vb-1), and also the *Kitano Tenjin-engi* (“Legend about the Heavenly Deity from Kitano”, late 12th century; see: [Fedyanina 2014, p. 258–259]) and in the *Shintōshū* (“Collection of the Way of Gods”, 14th century, Scroll 9, Tale 49). Another story about god Kitano and the rehabilitation of an unjustly accused person is provided in the *Jikkinshō* in Tale 4–6.

Ending this tale, and, together with it, this series of *katoku setsuwa*, the compiler of the *Jikkinshō* directly quotes the Preface by Ki no Tsurayuki: “...moves heaven and earth without effort, stirs emotions in the invisible spirits and gods...” In addition to what has been said before, here the text describes the case when a court official, a talented singer, managed to heal his old wet-nurse with singing. He performed an *imayo*, “a new style song”, and while here it is about the art of singing, and not poetry, the *imayo* lyrics are provided in the story; it is a Japanese rendition of several lines from the Buddhist Medicine Master Sutra.²⁷ According to the narrator, the *imayo* are not *waka*, but the situations are similar. “What an excellent man have I brought up!” – the old woman exclaims happily, and it is up to the reader to decide whether she was helped by a miracle of the Medicine Buddha, or by care and kindness of her pupil (10–17).

From the art of singing, the narrator moves on to music and dance. Some dances and plays, as well as some musical instruments were received by men from gods, from the spirits of the dead, or from demons (tales 10–18 to 10–20). Gods like to listen to music and watch dances, they respond to them with miracles (stories 10–21 to 10–23), help musicians and dancers (10–24, 10–25). The narrator compares these cases with how, in the Age of Gods, the “doors of the Heavenly Cave were opened” and how dance was used to call on the Sun goddess Amaterasu to return to the world (10–24). In the *Jikkinshō*, it is rather music and dance than poetry that has the power of incantation, and the miraculous response of gods to musicians sometimes looks even frightening: the shrine building is shaking, and so on. However, one musician was saved by his art from a bite of a poisonous snake (10–26), another one – from sea pirates (10–27). The narrator concludes: not only native songs, but also chants without words can “calm the hearts of fierce warriors”; here, he also speaks about the “virtuous power of music” (管絃の徳, *kangen no toku*).

After that, for the duration of twelve tales, the narrative returns to poets. Officials used *kanshi* poems to get to their superiors and received good appointments (stories 10–28 to 10–33). Their poems shared not only goals, but also contents: there, the authors described travelling to the island of Penglai and other abodes of immortals. In this way, the poets recognized the ambitiousness of their intentions and simultaneously wished longevity to the emperor and the

²⁷ The song is included in the *Ryōjin Hishō* (“Songs to Make the Dust Dance”, 12th century). Its source is a work by Korean scholar Taehyung (8th century), *Hongan Yakushi-kyō koshaku* (“Old Traces of the Sutra of the Main Vows of the Medicine Master”, Taishō Tripitaka 38, No. 1770, 258a-b), where the vows of the Medicine Master (*Yakushi*, Sanskr. Bhaisajyaguru) from the “Sutra of the Medicine Master” (*Yakushi-kyō*, Taishō Tripitaka 14, No. 450) are discussed.

higher officials by comparing them to immortals. Cases appropriate to compose such petition poems included not only service examinations, but also, for example, friendly gatherings of courtiers. Other people received promotions by means of *waka* songs in which the names of their desired positions or some features of these were encrypted (10–34).²⁸ Songs helped an exile to gain forgiveness (10–35), and a disgraced one to return the emperor’s favor (10–36). When a young courtier sneaked on a date with a recluse lady from the entourage of the future priestess of the Ise Shrine, a song saved him from punishment for the unrighteous act (10–37). In China, Bo Juyi once rode a horse into someone’s estate without invitation in order to admire some flowers, and he could justify himself by making a poem (10–38). In Japan, a certain provincial official used a song to soften the heart of the governor who had started investigating the official’s wrongdoings (10–39). The narrator says that songs serve poor people as a bridge helping to cross the sorrowful world.²⁹

Further on, the *Jikkishō* once again returns to the usefulness of songs in private life and to how they “soften relations between a man and a woman”, but here the participation of gods in family life is not assumed. Proceeding to the new topic, the narrator discusses a case which is difficult to interpret: when a song is widely known, but there are several tales about it, and, depending on the context, the meaning and the “moral” of the song vary (10–40).

For example, the *Gosenshū* (“The Later collection”, 955–957, No. 209) tells how, one summer night, princess-priestess Katsura (d. 958) asked her maid to catch some fireflies. The girl brought them to her mistress by wrapping them in the sleeve of her dress, and the light visible through the fabric caused somebody to utter:

<i>Tsutsumedomo</i>	Although I try to conceal it,
<i>Kakurenu mono wo</i>	The love in my heart,
<i>Natsumushi no</i>	Like the glow
<i>Mi-yori amareru</i>	Of the summer fireflies,
<i>Omoi narikeri</i>	Cannot be hidden.

[Tahara 1980, p. 23; Yamato monogatari 1982, p. 112–113].

²⁸ This story includes five tales, and two of them are present in the *Shasekishū* (Vb-2).

²⁹ The paraphrase from the preface to the *Kokinshū* by Ki no Yoshimochi (d. 919). Unlike the preface by Ki no Tsurayuki, this one was written not with *kana* (*Kanajō*), but with kanji (*Manajō*). In the preface by Yoshimochi, the quoted words describe the age of decay of mores, when poetry has lost its educational function and became to many just a tool of seducing beauties, or a source of income. But it seems that, in the *Jikkishō*, these words are given in a positive meaning.

The song speaks about love with unusual sincerity, but the anthology does not state whose words these are. As the narrator notices, in ancient times, even “Song Yu’s neighbor”³⁰ was not in love so passionately. Probably this means that the author is a woman, the priestess herself or her maid. But it is not clear who they were in love with (though the priestess is known to have been the object of passion of many men). The same song can be found in the *Yamato Monogatari* (episode 40), where it is said that the song was composed by the maid and that she was in love with a prince, the priestess’s brother, and it was him who ordered to catch the fireflies when he was visiting his sister. And in the *Korai fūtai shō* (“Concise Treatise on the Classical Styles in Poetry”), Fujiwara no Shunzei (1114–1204) writes that a servant boy, who was in love with his mistress, both collected the fireflies for the priestess and made the song. The narrator does not attempt to decide which interpretation is true, giving the names of several more people named Katsura, and also a song by Shunzei’s nephew, monk Jakuren (d. 1202) from the *Shinkokinshū* (No. 1032), where there is a reference to this song.

Songs help lovers, “calming” not only the hearts of a man and a woman themselves, but also the circumstances unfavorable to their love. In the *Ise Monogatari* (episode 95) a gentleman used a song to confess his love to the empress herself – and managed to meet with her (10–41). Sometimes, with a song a commoner gained the love of a noble lady (10–42), or even of a famous female poet Izumi Shikibu (10–43);³¹ both of these men broke the established custom by delivering their message personally, without an intermediary, but this did not hinder them. However, when love and marriage proposal are the issue, *kanshi* poems are also sometimes delivered without an intermediary – not to the lady herself, but to her father (10–44). And, vice versa, when a nobleman falls in love with a common woman, a song comes to help again: it touches the heart of her master, so he lets his maid go to another man (10–45).³² Songs help a woman to bring her husband back after he became indifferent to her (10–46, here,

³⁰ Song Yu (ca. 319–298 BC) was famous as a poet and as a handsome man. In the poem “Dengtū, the Lecher” he confesses: my neighbor, a woman of exceptional beauty herself, has been peeping at me over the fence for three years, but I do not respond to her. That is why I cannot be called a lecher, but courtier Dengtū, who accuses me of lechery, can, as he is married to an extremely ugly woman, but is happy with her, and they have five children [Kitaiskaya klassicheskaya proza... 1959, p. 66–70].

³¹ The story about Izumi Shikibu and the peasant can be found in the *Shasekishū* (Vb-2).

³² Same in *Shasekishū* (Vb-2).

the wife did not pray to gods, but just expressed her feelings in a song); with a song delivered in an unusual way, one can attract the attention of an unapproachable beauty (10–47, what acted here was the fact that the lady could not find the song immediately, rather than the song itself).

Monks use songs to ask for alms for a temple (10–47, 10–49), and, under certain conditions, a song can bring a person to the Way of the Buddha. So it happened to Ooe no Sadamoto (d. 1034).³³ When he became widowed and was mourning his wife, a poor woman knocked on his door and offered to buy a mirror from her. On the back side of the mirror, a sorrowful song was written:

<i>Kefu nomi to</i>	Tears fall today as I gaze into my mirror
<i>Miru-ni namida no</i>	For the last time
<i>Masukagami</i>	Oh, My Mirror,
<i>Narenishi kage-wo</i>	Do not tell others
<i>Hito-ni kataru na</i>	About my intimate reflections.

[Buddhist tales of India, China, and Japan...2015]

Eventually, Sadamoto became a monk and went to China. He died during a pilgrimage to the Buddhist holy places of Mount Wutai. The narrator cites his deathbed *kanshi* poem about rebirth in the Pure Land – noting, however, that its authorship is debatable (the same poem is attributed to another Japanese poet). Furthermore, according to legend, Sadamoto was the rebirth of one of the famous Chinese monks, and when he arrived to China, the locals would recognize him (10–48).

Tale 10–50 contains the following short reflection. Even if a person is lowly, due to art (芸能, *geinō*) they can fulfill their wishes and obtain a reward. There are many such examples both in ancient times and in our days, and they are innumerable. Even such wretched and lowly creatures as women of pleasure (遊女, *asobime*), puppets-for-sale (傀儡, *kugutsu*), if they excel at singing and music and love native songs, can be received by noble people, and their works are selected for collections.

³³ This story is one of the most popular *setsuwa*. It can be found in the *Konjaku Monogatarishū* (“Anthology of Tales from the Past”, 12th century, Chapter 24, Tale 48), in the *Kohon setsuwashū* (“Collection of Old Setsuwa Tales”, 34), in the *Hōbutsushū* (“Collection of Treasures”, second half of the 12th century, 7), in the *Kokon chōmonjū* (No. 197), in the *Shasekishū* (Vb-2), and other monuments.

Courtesan Shirome (10th century), whose songs were enjoyed by higher officials and even the emperor, is an example of this. The compiler of the *Jikkinshō* names other beauties from pleasure houses whose songs were included in anthologies. Besides, among poets and even compilers of anthologies there were commoners and even *hinin* outcasts (10–50). And about one courtesan it is known that, having been badly wounded by sea pirates, she sang an *imayo* song before her death and was reborn in the Pure Land (10–51).³⁴

If an *imayo* song had such an effect, then real *waka* songs are even more beneficial for future life; they help to die in a right state of mind. Poet Sugawara no Fumitoki (see above, Tale 10–7) was told by a certain monk: when you feel that you are dying, make a song! Fumitoki did exactly this and was reborn in paradise (10–52). Fujiwara no Ietaka also made songs about the Pure Land before he died (cf. Tale 1–36). Here, the narrator says that the poet “turned his merits” (廻向, *ekō*) obtained from making songs towards rebirth. Thus, making *waka* songs is also thought of as a virtuous deed in the Buddhist sense of the word (as it gives merit), though the *Jikkinshō* does not state it directly (10–53).

Proceeding to the topic of “fierce warriors” whose hearts are calmed by song, the narrator poses the question more broadly: human fierceness is calmed not only by *waka*, but also by *kanshi* and “literature” (文, *mon/fumi*) in general. The examples are Japanese warriors who were well-versed in Chinese poetry, such as Kiyohara no Shigefuji, who lived in the 10th century (10–54). The first and the third Kamakura shoguns, Minamoto no Yoritomo (1147–1199) and his son Sanetomo (1192–1219) were excellent *waka* poets, and their songs were included in anthologies (10–55).³⁵ Minamoto no Yorimasa gained renown as an archer, and he shot monster Nue, which was flying above the palace and disturbing the emperor’s sleep. The courtier who was awarding the warrior uttered the initial lines of a song, and Yorimasa managed to continue it skillfully (10–56).

Further tales in this chapter of the *Jikkinshō* are devoted not to poetry, but to other arts. Monastic skills (first of all, the performance of rites) can be considered an art of a kind, and Tale 10–57 names the famous monks

³⁴ One more story about a girl from a pleasure house can be found in Tale 3–15: while she is singing an *imayo* song, an ascetic monk sees in her Bodhisattva Fugen from the “Lotus Sutra” [Trubnikova 2016b].

³⁵ Interestingly, Yoritomo’s song (*Shinkokinshū*, No. 1785) seems warrior-like, even “barbaric” – and at the same time reveals the author’s mastery of *waka* techniques. All of it is composed of words behind which the names of places in the faraway Eastern lands are hidden: Shinobu, Iwate, etc.

of the Heian era. After that, the text once again speaks of musicians, both Chinese and Japanese, and of how people's hearts respond to music (tales 10–57 to 10–67, 10–70 to 10–72). Calligraphy (10–68) and the game of ball *kemari* (10–69) are also said to belong to arts.

The text returns to people's responses to “native songs” in Tale 10–73. In a capital temple of Daigoji, during the season of cherry blossoms, “dances of youths” (*warawamai*) were once held. Monk Sojun, a “teacher of sacraments”, was amazed at the beauty and skill of one of the dancers. The story calls this youth the “Junior General” (*shōshō no kimi*). The monk sends him a song: Yesterday, I saw a reflection in the Sugata pond, and my sleeves became wet. How shall I let know the one who could wring them out? (*Kinofu mishi Sugata no ike ni sode nurete shiborikanenu to ika de shirasemu*).³⁶ The youth replies: In the Sugata pond, one can see many reflections: because of whom did you have to wring out your sleeves? (*Atama mishi Sugata no ike no kage naraba tare yue shiboru tamoto naruramu*).

The text proceeds to describe the reaction of other people to these songs:

...The community elder from the Middle Cloister³⁷ also watched these dances. Having heard about the teacher's correspondence with the youth, he thought: beautiful! – and once spoke about it in the presence of the Minister of the Right, who had embarked on the way of the Buddha and was residing in the same cloister.

– This is elegant, I think!

The lord, who had embarked upon the Way, asked:

– So, do you remember their songs?

– How could I not! – replied the elder. – Teacher of sacraments Sojun sent a song to the house of the Junior General: “Have the sleeves not soaked because of what I saw yesterday?” So he wrote, and the Junior General replied: “Indeed, they have soaked terribly!”³⁸

So he was speaking, and it was difficult to refrain from laughter. But it was not without reason that the lord was honored as a living Buddha (*ikibutsu*): he replied politely and was obviously restraining himself. Yes, it was awkward...

³⁶ The song is based on the consonance of words 姿, *sugata*, “image”, and 菅田, *Sugata*, “Sedge Field”, the name of the pond.

³⁷ Monk Shohen (1133–1185).

³⁸ *Kinofu mishi-ni koso sode wa nureshi ka; kōryō-ni koso nurekere*. Neither phrase fits a song line.

That worthy monk, who was well-versed in the seen and the unseen and who was proficient in the Law of the Buddha, had no relation to the way of native songs. And yet he felt something! This is precious.

Here, *waka* acts even upon a stranger, but its action is “miraculous” in an unusual sense: the songs touch the monk’s heart, but he is unable to memorize them.

Tales 10–74 to 10–78 touch upon the topic of rewards and punishments: “... If you are not quite sure of the guilt of someone who is alleged to have committed a crime, you should be lenient and deal lightly with him, unless you believe that punishing him will serve a purpose for his lord or for society. This is the principle of truly virtuous government. You must be universally compassionate.” (10–76) [Brownlee 1974, p. 160]. And the reward can be given even in a case of doubt, as the books say so (10–78). Here, the main focus are punishments for rebellion and rewards to those who pacified the rebels, but *waka* poets also appear here. When a new appointment of Ooe no Kin’yori (d. 1040) was discussed, one of the courtiers said: this man is in love with a lady named Sagami (995–1061?), and not without mutuality; he is good as a writer, but he will most likely neglect his service. As the text states, Kin’yori and Sagami were not particularly upset by this severity; they got married and both of them became famous as *waka* poets (10–78).

The final tale of the *Jikkishō* (10–79) also speaks of punishment, but a posthumous one, in hell. Fujiwara no Arikuni (943–1011) uses the art of magic to bring his dying father back to life. He performs a rite directed to the god of Mount Tai (*Taizan-fukun* in Japanese, worshiped in the tradition of *Ommyōdō*, “The Way of Yin and Yang”). Upon waking up, the father says that he has been to hell and there heard a dispute of the “servants of darkness”. Some said that the old man should be let go, and the son punished for using magic, though he was not “a man of this way”, namely, not an *ommyōji* sorcerer. Others objected: Arikuni can be forgiven, as he lives in a “remote country”, where hardly anyone is knowledgeable in magic, and, besides, he acted as a pious son. In the end, it was decided to let both of them go. Here we have another example of how art acts: Arikuni could not, in fact, put an incantation on anyone, but his effort, bravery, and care for his father impressed the servants of hell. The narrator concludes by stating that one should hurry forward in rewards, restrain oneself in punishments, and put mercy to the fore. Thus the narrative goes full circle, as the collection began with stories about mercy.

Therefore, if they are good, *waka* songs, as well as *kanshi* poems and music, help one to get what one wants: in service and family, in relations

with people and gods. This has to do both with preserving what one already has and with obtaining something more. And vice versa: if one managed to express a wish with a good song worthy of being recorded in history, it means that the wish itself was good and appropriate, and because of this it came true. Such view of poetry is dominant in the *Jikkinshō*, and Muju Ichien in the *Shasekishū* largely thinks the same way. The difference is that, in the *Shasekishū*, the narrator divides wishes into silly and clever ones, shallow and deep ones, and eventually considers worthy only those which are aimed at liberation in the Buddhist sense of the word. The *Jikkinshō* lacks this external evaluation by the author. The narrator relies on the judgment of tradition, by which some songs and tales related to them have already been chosen as exemplary. At the same time, Muju Ichien readily says which songs he likes or dislikes, discusses the cases when someone was praised or condemned for a song, but almost does not touch upon poetic criticism as a special skill. But in the *Jikkinshō*, the narrator finds it important not only to help the reader to learn to understand and to appropriately quote *waka* songs – but also to show how one should react when songs are uttered by someone else. In my opinion, this goes contrary to the usual understanding of *katoku setsuwa*. If the power of poetry is miraculous and irresistible, then the listener seemingly has no choice about how to react to a song. But if we assume that a wrong reaction is indeed possible, then one is at least partially free in their perception of poetry.

In the *Jikkinshō*, various critics of poetry (who are not necessarily thoroughly knowledgeable in it) appear not only in the chapter on talents, but in other chapters as well. Here, the rules for composing poetry are almost not discussed as such. Rather, the text focuses on how a critic justifies his opinion by giving examples from the *waka* tradition (4–12, 4–13). When a son of Ki no Tsurayuki criticized others' songs made to be written on screens and, in his opinion, not quite fitting the painting, he was given the example of his father's song, which also served as a caption to a painting and was not exactly fitting (4–11). For songs, as well as for actions, appropriateness is most important, but it should be evaluated with caution. For example, songs in anthologies are mostly linked to particular seasons, as matching the season is extremely important for *waka*. However, several songs are known where the words seemingly do not match the season, but the general impression is excellent (4–14, 4–15). Songs in which inappropriate words make a bad omen, are indeed deserving of condemnation, though criticism is unable to ward off the disaster (1–47). However, there are more complicated cases in terms of appropriateness/inappropriateness. In Tale 1–30, a critic father condemns his poet son for

an excessively good song: it was a New Year wish for a prince, and now, if one has to make a similar congratulation for the emperor, the poet will hardly be able to compose a better one. And in Tale 7–15, men, taking a scene from the *Genji Monogatari* as an example, hold a “comparison of letters”: each of them writes a letter to his lady, so as to select the best reply afterwards. The woman who saw through it and supported the game won, and the one whose feeling was sincere lost.

The general impression of a song is more important than strict observance of rules. Even in song contests, victory is sometimes given to songs with obvious mistakes (1–10). However, making songs in a contest is harder than in any other situation, and responsibility is not the only reason for this. Sometimes participants willingly or unwillingly obstruct each other (7–18, 7–19), and judges are not always fair. For example, a famed poet and master of literature Minamoto no Shitago (911–983) was a biased judge: every time, he gave victory to ladies. Gentlemen found a way to delicately point it out to him: they recalled a *kanshi* poem, wherein Shitago described the love of an old man to a “girl flower” *ominaeshi* (plant *Patrinia scabiosifolia*), and rendered these lines into a *tanka* song (1–22). When critics sometimes evaluate not the song, but the poet, neglecting them due to lowly origins, etc., this is bad (1–52), and often these critics present themselves as fools (3–4, 3–6, 4–14). But sometimes a poet and one of their songs become intertwined so tightly that, both in the opinion of society and in the memory of posterity, the poet forever remains as the author of some famous line (1–48).

In a sense, everyone who hears or reads a song and decides whether to respond to it, and if so, then how to do it, has to be a critic. Of high importance here is the role of intermediaries, who have already been mentioned. Sometimes, it is better not to deliver a good, but inappropriate song (1–42), and sometimes it is the intermediary who responds, deciding which of the feelings that they have been entrusted with to express, and which to conceal (1–18). Generally speaking, the best way to reply is to make a song in response to a song (1–3, 6–23, 7–24, 8–5, 9–8, etc.). Sometimes, the original song and the reply are divided by many years (1–18, 5–2). Unfitting song replies can be found even in the *Ise Monogatari* (1–54); here, the narrator refers to the opinion of an expert, Minamoto no Toshiyori (1055–1129). Sometimes, the reply follows the original song almost verbatim, changing only one word in it (“a parrot’s reply”); in Tale 1–26, the poet does not write a reply, but only crosses out one word in the message and writes another one next to it. A *kanshi* poem can serve as reply to a *waka* song, and vice versa; of note here is the introduction to Chapter 8, where a quote from the “Lotus Sutra” is given in two renderings – to the languages of Chinese poetry and Japanese songs.

It is always bitter when a song is berated, justly or not. Sometimes one has to comfort and talk sense into a poet who turns out to be too severe a critic to their own work (7–20). But praise can also offend: one poet decided to stop composing after his song was condescendingly approved by a universally recognized *waka* connoisseur (1–57). Yet, the same tale describes how a song by a poet named Norinaga was shown to Fujiwara no Kinto, and he wrote on the same sheet of paper: “Who is this Norinaga? He understands the essence!” Norinaga was not offended, but, vice versa, asked to return the sheet and kept it like a treasure.

The compiler of the *Jikkinshō* does not give his readers advice on how to succeed on the way of “native songs”. His instructions focus on how one should treat songs, which of them to quote, how to use them to solve various life problems, and what to do if the problem is a song awaiting reply.

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TRUBNIKOVA Nadezhda Nikolaevna – Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy). Leading researcher, School for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. Professor, Institute of Asian and African Studies (IAAS), Lomonosov Moscow State University.

ORCID 000-0001-6784-1793

E-mail: trubnikovann@mail.ru

Personal web-site: <https://trubnikovann.wixsite.com/trubnikovann>

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Japan's Karafuto Governorate (1905–1945): History and Social Memory

S.V. GRISHACHEV

Abstract. The history of colonies under the rule of the Japanese Empire in the first half of the 20th century has not been explored well enough so far. For example, the history of Karafuto Governorate (1905–1945), which existed in southern Sakhalin, is covered very little, while some aspects of its history are not known at all. This article focuses on the history of Karafuto Governorate's formation and its socio-economic structure, namely territorial development after the Russo-Japanese war, its role and status in the colonial system of Japan, the use of the island's main economic resources and the creation of socio-cultural space, as well as along the memorialization of the colonial past of the Japanese Empire's northern borders. In addition, this article describes the process of the governorate's liquidation (it started after the accession of southern Sakhalin to the USSR after the Second World War) followed by passing the governance to the Soviet administration, co-residence of Soviet and Japanese people on the same territory in 1945–1948, the deportation of Japanese people and the fate of the Korean population of the island. The article gives examples of how the memory of the Japanese presence on Sakhalin Island is preserved in Japan and Russia today.

Keywords: Karafuto Governorate, colonization, Japanese Empire, Toyohara, the Second World War, social memory.

Historical Background

From the moment relations between Russia and Japan were established and up to the end of World War II, Sakhalin Island was a territory which the two countries repeatedly divided between themselves. As per the Treaty of Saint Petersburg of 1875, the entire island became territory of the Russian

Empire, while Japan got in exchange the group of the Kuril Islands stretching up to the Kamchatka Peninsula. The strategic importance of the island can hardly be overestimated, as it safeguards the mouth of the Amur River, i.e. the main river route from Eastern Siberia to the Sea of Okhotsk and further to the Pacific Ocean. In addition, in the mid-19th century, rich coal deposits were found there, which made it possible to supply fuel to the Russian warships in the Far East. However, the extreme remoteness even from the administrative centres in Eastern Siberia, as well as the adverse climate, made the development of these territories extraordinarily difficult. Beginning from 1869, the main method of their development was the re-settlement of exiles and convicts. After serving their term of punishment, convicts sent to hard labour on Sakhalin did not have the right to leave the island and had to stay there to live as exiles. Their life changed dramatically after 1905, and the war brought about unexpected relief.

Throughout the Russo-Japanese war, the main battle ground was southern Manchuria, but after the Russian fleet was defeated in the Battle of Tsushima Strait, the insecurity of Russian territories in the Far East became fully evident. On 24 June 1905, the Japanese fleet launched a landing operation in southern Sakhalin. After a short resistance, the few Russian military units and militia detachments laid down their arms in late July 1905. [Vysokov (ed.) 2008, p. 374].

Through the Portsmouth Peace Treaty of 1905, the southern part of Sakhalin, i.e. the territory below the 50°N parallel, passed under the control of the Japanese Empire. A joint Russian-Japanese demarcation commission was set up to carry out topographical works on the ground, which resulted in boundary delimitation. Thus the first land border appeared between Russia and Japan.

Russian subjects were allowed to decide for themselves whether to stay or to leave. The majority of the population were exiled settlers who welcomed the news with great enthusiasm and, taking advantage of the removed restriction of movement, soon left the island. They went to other regions of the Far East, which fact seriously alarmed the authorities in Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Vladivostok. They were concerned about the arrival of a great number of migrants from a potentially criminal environment. In 1906, the Sakhalin penal colony was closed, and the few prisoners that were there at the time were transferred to the Nerchinsk penal colony. As a result, the northern part of the island which remained Russian territory was virtually depopulated. The situation did not improve even when free migration to the island as allowed in 1908: in two years only 400 people moved there [Burykin 2009, p. 4].

Young Colonial Empire and New Colony

The situation was different in the southern part of the island where the Japanese established a new colony. During the first few years, the territory of southern Sakhalin was under the rule of the military, and in 1907, control was handed over to the civil administration of the newly created Karafuto Governorate.

The creation of colonies in the early 20th century was a kind of confirmation of Japan's status as an empire, which the country sought throughout the entire Meiji period. In fact, for the first time in its history, Japan made it one of its priorities to pursue an active (and even aggressive) foreign policy. After 1905, i.e., as a result of the two wars through which Japan acquired a number of large colonies, the world's leading powers recognized Japan as a member of their elite club.

Japan's three major colonies (excluding the Liaodong Peninsula rented from China) were Korea, the island of Taiwan and Sakhalin. Along with the Kuril Islands and the Ryukyu archipelago, they constituted the concept of *gaichi* (outer lands 外地). Hokkaido Island belonged to the category of *naichi* (inner lands 内地) together with the proper Japanese islands, but in fact its development required the same strategies and expenditure that were applied to Karafuto Governorate. Thus, the empire took on an enormous burden without having sufficient experience for that. The development of the colonies was a new thing, and in this the Japanese also had to learn and adopt European experience. Remarkably, in 1908, a department of colonization was even created at the University of Tokyo.

Japan's colonies were not the same; they had very different social, ethnic and economic characteristics. For instance, Korea and Taiwan were territories with an obvious predominance of the local population. Japanese immigrants there accounted for no more than 7 per cent of the total population. As for Sakhalin, here, on the contrary, 239 thousand immigrants from the mainland had been compactly brought in by 1930, which made up 98 per cent of the population [Vysokov (ed.) 2008, p. 428].

Unlike, for example, the island of Taiwan, Karafuto Governorate was not a "jewel of the Japanese Empire". Its status and prestige were substantially lower. Whereas Korea and Taiwan were ruled by governor generals who had very broad powers, Karafuto was controlled by civil servants of a lower rank. [Molodyakov, Molodyakova, Markaryan 2009, p. 51].

Initially, its capital was at Otomari (now the port of Korsakov). Later, when Karafuto's administrative centre, Toyohara (now Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk), was built, the government was transferred there. The island became gradually inhabited by Japanese colonists.

The Japanese government made capital investments in the development of Karafuto's economy – in building new cities and making motor and rail roads. The development of economic resources was proceeding quite rapidly. The local economy has certain climatic and geographical differences from that of the mother country. Sakhalin became the only place densely populated by a great number of Japanese people where the Japanese dietary product, rice, was imported from the mainland and other colonies. Karafuto's economy was based on the fishing, wood-working and coal-mining industries. Sakhalin, sparsely populated and never intensively developed until the early 20th century, became the number 1 supplier of wood in the empire. Starting from the 1920s, forests were intensively cut down, mainly for the pulp and paper industry. Paper production laid the foundation for the thriving business of the famous Oji Paper Company. Its factories emerged all over the governorate. Around them appeared settlements of workers who were employed in these factories, such as Shiritoru (now Makarov), Esutoru (now Uglegorsk), and Tomarioru (now Tomari). In 1941, these factories produced 70 per cent of Japan's paper and pulp [Burykin 2009, p. 10].

Rich coal reserves on Sakhalin formed the backbone of its economy. Coal production here increased and came out on top as compared with the other colonies in the 1930s. This became particularly visible after 1937, when Japan launched war in China [Miki Masafumi 2017, p. 166]. At the same time it is important to recall that the Japanese concessionaires, by agreement with the USSR, after 1925 received the right to develop several coal concessions in the northern, Soviet part of Sakhalin, which was essential for the increasingly militarized Japanese economy.

In fishing, Sakhalin began to play the same role as Hokkaido, being a place for catching northern species of fish. The major centres of the industry were the ports of Otomari (Korsakov), Honto (now Nevelsk) and Maoka (now Kholmsk).

Ideology and Symbols of Karafuto Governorate

When expanding the territory of their empire, the Japanese cared not only about the economic and social development of the new lands, but also about the ideological development of the new space, creating their mental and memorial justification. Karafuto Governorate was established as a result of the war with Russia, and it was this event that became the starting point of its history. Associated with it are numerous monuments and historical symbols. For instance, at the site of the Japanese landing in the summer of 1905 a stele was erected in memory of this event near Otomari (Korsakov).

The year 1908 saw the beginning of the construction of the Toyohara Jinja, the main Shinto shrine of the governorate's new administrative centre bearing its name. A few years later, the construction of the Karafuto Jinja was started nearby. This sanctuary, unlike the one in Toyohara, had a special status. Being in fact a branch of the Yasukuni Jinja, it was dedicated to officers and soldiers who died during the fighting in 1905. The Karafuto jinja was considered "the patron of the north of the Great Japanese Empire" [Komarovskiy 2002, p. 295]. Soon in the yard of the sanctuary they installed a funnel from the cruiser *Novik* which took part in the battles with the Japanese fleet at the height of the Russo-Japanese War¹.

In Otomari (Korsakov), in proximity to which the Japanese landing operation took place, a sanctuary was also built at the burial place of the soldiers who perished in the summer of 1905. Also, a trophy 230-mm gun from the cruiser *Novik* was installed on a pedestal there [Samarin 2005, p. 12–13].

The new governorate was to have a symbolic connection with the main territory of Japan. This connection could be shown by means of visits of the imperial family members to the new territories. In 1925, Karafuto was visited by the heir to the throne, the future emperor Hirohito (Showa). During his visit to Toyohara there were numerous special events, in which not only the Japanese people participated. His Highness was to see members of other peoples. The passage of the heir was accompanied by dances and songs of the Ainu and Orochi; even a deer race was arranged. Thus the Empire demonstrated its grandeur and emphasized its historic mission in relation to smaller nations. On the occasion of the heir's visit to the governorate, a memorial column was erected in Toyohara [Fedorchuk 2013, p. 12–14].

Besides the heir, in the late 1920s, Sakhalin was visited by another two members of the imperial house; both were military men. The visits were supposed to remind of Russia's propinquity and of victory over Russia. It was not by chance that it was they who visited Sakhalin. In 1929, Karafuto was visited by Prince Fushimi no miya Hiroyasu, who devoted his life to marine affairs and made a career in the Navy. He took part in the Japanese Navy's operations during the Russo-Japanese War. Two years later Prince Kan'in visited Sakhalin. This prince made a career of a professional military man. He took part in the Russo-Japanese War and subsequently paid an official visit to Russia during World War I. Commemorative columns were also erected on the occasion of their visits [Fedorchuk 2013, p. 53–55].

¹ The cruiser *Novik* took part in the defence of Port Arthur. In the summer of 1904, after a long journey, it approached the coast of Sakhalin to replenish its coal stock. *Novik* accepted the battle with the enemy's cruisers, after which it was scuttled. After the war, the vessel was salvaged and commissioned in the Japanese Navy as *Suzuya*. In 1913, it was decommissioned for scrap.

The governorate was gradually gaining not only symbolic, but quite tangible, practical ties with the mainland. In 1935, air communication was opened between Toyohara and Sapporo on Hokkaido. By that time a flight chain had connected the capital and the major cities in the north-east of Japan, and with transfers to Aomori and Sendai one could fly further to Tokyo.

In 1935, the anniversary of the governorate was celebrated quite magnificently. A new edifice for the local history museum was built then and soon put in operation. The author of the project – architect Kaizuka Yoshio – made it in Japanese colonial style – *Teikan yōshiki* (or *Nihon shumi*). Actually lots of buildings in Japan and its colonies of that time (1920–30th) were built in this style. The building itself is usually western-like and roof is in Japanese style. It symbolizes amazing combination of Western progress and unique Japanese traditions.

The museum was designed to expand and memorialize the geographical and historical space of Karafuto, to emphasize the unity of the cultural space and the ties between the past and present of the Japanese Empire. The museum had collections related to the history of Karafuto's development and to the small ethnic groups that inhabited its territory, such as the Ainu, the Nivkhs and some others. In the museum's yard there was a small park with all the trees and shrubs growing on the territory of the governorate.

Joint Residence: Russian and Japanese People in 1945–1949

World War II spared the territory of Karafuto. And though in the late 1930s a fortified area was constructed on the border with the USSR, yet during all the years of the war, Soviet and Japanese border guards did not look at each other through sighting notches, but only through binoculars. In 1945, the population of the governorate was about 400.000 [Amano Naoki 2017]. Most of them were Japanese, but there were also Koreans (see below).

The Soviet army crossed the border of Karafuto on August 11, 1945. Except for local skirmishes, the Soviet troops practically did not meet with any resistance. Just as the occupation of Sakhalin by the Japanese troops in 1905 was a rapid and nearly bloodless epilogue of one war, the arrival of the Soviet troops and the 2-week blitzkrieg forty years later became the equally rapid epilogue of another war. As for the non-combatants in large cities, fearing artillery strikes and air raids, they left their homes in an organized way and went to the mountains; the cities emptied. The operation to occupy southern Sakhalin was completed two weeks later. Soon after Japanese scouts began to appear in the cities in order to

find out about the situation. After interacting with Soviet patrols, residents started to return, in an organized way again, to their homes.

The Headquarter of the Second Far East Front set up a civil affairs department that was responsible for arranging peaceful life in the occupied territory. At the same time, the Japanese institutions, except for the police, continued to work and functioned until 1946. Technicians and engineers continued to work at their facilities for a longer time. The governor of Karafuto, Ōtsu Toshiro, also remained at his workplace. When the Soviet administration of the territories was established, Ōtsu, along with many of his subordinates was removed from post as a government official and interned in Khabarovsk. The Soviet civil administration was put in place in February 1946 [Amano Naoki 2017, p. 320].

Soon, Vice-Premier of the Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan arrived in southern Sakhalin with an inspection trip. As with East Prussia, in the territory of which Kaliningrad Region was created, a development and settlement plan was drafted for the former governorate of Karafuto. In 1947, Toyohara was renamed as Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, and at the same time Sakhalin Region was formed to include both parts of the island and the Kurils. [Vysokov (ed.) 2008, p. 455–456].

The Japanese remained to live on the island for another few years, and the period between 1945 and 1948 was an amazing period in the two countries' history, when so many Russian and Japanese people constantly interacted and watched each other. It was an important life experience, albeit with elements of ideological absurdity. The Japanese were inevitably involved in ideology-driven Soviet life: former residents of militaristic Japan were now forced to celebrate Soviet holidays and take part in May Day demonstrations. The Soviet people, for their part, were amazed by the Japanese way of life. They were struck by the absence of sidewalks on the streets and by the lack of central heating despite the harsh climate.

The autumn of 1945 brought about the start of repatriation of the Japanese people, during which about 380,000 people were sent to Japan. It was done jointly by the USSR, USA and Japan. Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (ex-Toyohara) became a kind of collector where people were brought from Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. It must be noted that the Soviet side did not want the Japanese to leave too soon. The post-war economy needed local hands until enough Soviet settlers arrived. The Japanese were moved out only by whole families, and breaking up families was not allowed. Every week two ships took out 1,500 people. Between December 1946 and July 1949, about 290,000 Japanese were removed from South

Sakhalin in five trips. By 1949, the Japanese population had been repatriated from Sakhalin [Amano Naoki 2017, p. 328].

Together with the Japanese, the few Ainu were also removed. But the fate of the Sakhalin Koreans brought during the war for heavy work in coal-mining and fishing was deplorable. Militaristic Japan had recruited people from one of its colonies to maintain the economy of another colony. After 1945, the USSR refused to return these people to their homeland for the same reason – a shortage of labour in the economy of the now Sakhalin region. According to different estimates, in Karafuto at that time there were 23,000 to 50,000 Koreans [Kuzin 2010, p. 80]. They all had to stay in the USSR. In addition, in 1950, murderous war broke out in Korea, and the country was divided into two camps. Even when it became possible to return, there was only one option – to become a citizen of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In 1957, the leaders of North Korea and of the USSR reached an intergovernmental agreement that the Koreans living in the Sakhalin region could determine their place of residence for themselves. Some did just that. However, those people whose relatives remained in the Republic of Korea had to wait for a reunion for many decades, and many did live to see it at all. A monument in the form of a halved funnel, which was opened in Korsakov in the autumn of 2007, became a symbol of grief and separation from one's homeland.

Karafuto-Sakhalin: Elimination and Preservation of Memory

The forty-year presence of the Japanese in South Sakhalin left its mark, but the new government handles this legacy in different ways. In 1949, the Sakhalin Regional Executive Committee ordered to destroy the traces of the Japanese presence. The sanctuaries Toyohara Jinja and Karafuto Jinja were demolished. The columns installed to commemorate the visits of the members of the imperial family were demolished, too, but strange as it may seem, their pedestals could not be destroyed as they were made of very strong concrete. These concrete blocks are still in place [Fedorchuk 2013].

Residential buildings in large cities were gradually pulled down; instead, buildings of typical Soviet architecture were put up, while the same street layout was maintained. Gradually, the cities completely lost the Japanese appearance. With rare exceptions, the Japanese architecture disappeared. Oddly enough, the building of the Governorate Museum remained intact and even continued to be used for its intended purpose. Today it houses the Sakhalin State Regional Museum.

Economic and industrial facilities were preserved, since they were badly needed in the poorly developed Soviet economy. Technological memory providing evidence of the Japanese presence on the island proved to be more durable due to its functionality, which is best seen on the example of the operation of the railways. By 1945, in the south of the island, about 700 kilometers of railway tracks were laid and 618 bridges were built [Kostanov 1997, p. 40]. The standard for the Japanese track was the so called Cape gauge – 1067 mm, which was narrower than the Soviet gauge (1520 mm). The spiking of the track to the Russian standard had not started until 2000. It is planned to complete the works in 2020.

It is widely known that for the Japanese an important condition for both individual and national identification is the cult of their ancestors, which is implemented in particular in increased attention to preserving the graves of relatives. For those who left Sakhalin in the late 1940s visiting the graves of their ancestors became a matter of paramount importance and, consequently, a subject for discussion between the leaders of the USSR and Japan. In 1965, consent was given for Japanese citizens to visit cemeteries in Sakhalin Region according to a strictly specified schedule, with a limited number of facilities to visit and under close supervision by the local KGB and party agencies. It is surprising that in the texts of party and government documents this process was terminologically perceived as “reception of Japanese tourists” [Prussakova 2000, p. 142].

Japan, too, preserved the memory of Karafuto Governorate, but with certain particularities. In 1957, the All-Japan Federation of Karafuto, *Zenkoku Karafuto Renmei* (全国樺太連盟), was established. The purpose of this organization to this day is to coordinate ties between the governorate’s former residents. It has provided assistance in publishing works on the history of the former Japanese colony and preservation of its memory in the present-day Sakhalin region [Miki Masafumi 2010]. In Sapporo, in the former building of the Hokkaido administration there is a museum room – *Karafuto Kankei Shiryōkan* (樺太関係資料館), which is part of the tourist space dedicated to the history of northern Japan. Here one can see documents, photographs and other evidence of the Japanese life on the island which has long been a part of another country.

Conclusion

The nearly semi-centennial history of the Japanese colony is an experience of the political, social and economic development of a new space, which hap-

pened very rarely in Japan's history. Throughout their ancient and medieval history, the Japanese showed little inclination to acquire new lands beyond their own territory. In large part, the history of the Land of the Rising Sun is a history of hermitage and non-interference in the affairs of neighbours. The course towards building an empire, which became part of the modernization project in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, resulted in the country's defeat in World War II, also creating great difficulties in relations with neighbours – China and the countries of the Korean Peninsula. In contemporary Japan the attitude to the political history of that period is clearly negative. However, it should be noted that the history of Karafuto Governorate is probably a rear and somewhat forgotten instance of conflict-free ethnic expansion. The fact that after 1945 these territories became part of the USSR (and then the Russian Federation) did not in the least degree complicate relationships between ordinary people. Both after 1905 and after 1945, Sakhalin Island did not become a subject of any serious mutual claims. Today the Karafuto period (*Karafuto Jidai* 樺太時代) is the history of ordinary people who, though they lived outside contemporary Japan, should not be forgotten. This past is an integral part of the historical memory and national identity of the Japanese people rather than of the Japanese state.

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GRISHACHEV Sergey Victorovich – PhD (History) Associate professor, Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH).

E-mail: grayskyway@gmail.com

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Origins of the *Shōnen-ai* and *Yaoi* Manga Genres

Yu.A. MAGERA

Abstract. This article discusses mainly the works of Japanese manga authors of the 1970s – Takemiya Keiko and Hagio Moto, who created the manga genre *shōnen-ai* (boys' love). This manga genre, intended for female audiences and developed in Japan, had been considerably influenced by European art, especially by French literature and cinema. Such films as “This Special Friendship” (1964) or works of Jean Cocteau and other French writers formed a special aesthetics of manga about beautiful boys who love each other.

Keywords: Aesthetic fiction, female comics, Japanese literature, French art, homoeroticism, manga, shonen-ai, yaoi, Year 24 Group.

From the beginning of the 1970s, such manga genres as *shōnen-ai* (boys' love) and later *yaoi*, which portray relationships between male characters, became very popular in Japan. These stories are created by women and for women. Currently there is no strict division between the two genres, and Japanese publishing houses unite such products under the common title “boys' love” (ボーイズラブ), sometimes abbreviated as “BL”.

Researcher Mizoguchi Akiko says: “The term “*yaoi*” was coined in the early 1980s by amateur fanzine writers of the *ani-paro* (parodies of popular animation shows) subgenre as a self-derogatory term” [Mizoguchi 2003, p. 50]. *Yaoi* is an abbreviation formed from the initial characters of the Japanese phrase “Yama nashi, ochi nashi, imi nashi” (“no climax, no punch line, no meaning”), which was used to characterize low-grade stories, mostly of pornographic content, created by fans and non-professional writers. Therefore, the term “*yaoi*” is commonly used in Japan in relation to amateur non-commercial works called *dōjinshi*. There were other terms to refer to the stories about same-sex relationships, such as *bishōnen manga* (beautiful boy comics) or *tanbi shōsetsu* (aesthetic fiction), but they do not reflect the essence of this phenomenon so well.

The development of women's comics, and the *shōnen-ai* genre in particular, is associated primarily with the development of periodical manga magazines since the late 1960s. As the frequency of issues increased and they switched to tighter deadlines, additional resources were required and, as a result, women became actively involved in the comic books industry. Besides, the generation of baby boomers, who grew up reading manga, were eager for new themes and subjects. Before that, manga for girls was created by male authors, who set the style and theme of *shōjo* manga (girls' comics).

But the situation changed with the advent of young women in the manga industry. They turned their view to new subjects and genres, performing the function not of a mentor, but rather an "elder sister" for the readers. In the 1970s, such authors as Ikeda Riyoko, Takemiya Keiko, Hagio Moto, Aoike Yasuko, Ōshima Yumiko, Yamagishi Ryōko, etc. started their careers as manga artists. Subsequently, they became known as the "Forty-Niners" or the "Year 24 Group" (*Nijūyo-nen gumi*), as the majority of the authors were born in 1949, or year 24 of Showa era according to the Japanese calendar.

The birth of the "girl dressed as boy" character

One of the earliest popular *shōjo* manga created by a man is "Princess Knight" ("Ribon no Kishi", 1953) by Tezuka Osamu, where a "girl dressed as boy" character appears for the first time. This manga tells how, due to an angel-in-training Tink's fault, Princess Sapphire got two hearts, male and female, and in order to inherit the throne she had to play the role of a prince – she wore a man's suit, rode a horse and skillfully fenced with a rapier. There is no doubt that such a work, depicting a female character dressed as a boy and behaving like a young man, referred to the Takarazuka Revue actresses, as the peculiarity of this theater (founded in 1913) was that all roles were performed only by women.

To this day, there are two main roles in the Takarazuka Revue: the male role called *otokoyaku* and the female role called *musumeyaku*. The *otokoyaku* are appreciated much higher because the more talented and physically stronger girls are selected for this role. Besides, the *otokoyaku* actresses enjoy incredible popularity among the audience. All the women acting in the Takarazuka Revue are obliged not to marry and not to have affairs with men throughout their career. Moreover, an *otokoyaku* actress is not allowed to appear in public with a man because it can harm her image.

The name of the theater comes from the name of Takarazuka city near Osaka. The "god of manga", Tezuka Osamu, grew up in this place. Tezuka's mother was a big fan of the Takarazuka Revue and often took

her son with her to see the performances, which later influenced him to create a “girl dressed as boy” character.

But Tezuka was inspired not only by Japanese, but also by European sources. The manga “Princess Knight” contains references to the names of famous historical figures who behaved like the opposite sex. When villains in the manga are trying to usurp the throne and accuse Sapphire of having links with pirates, which, according to the laws of the Kingdom, is punished by death, the Princess hides in the Palace. Court ladies refuse to give out Sapphire and decide to join the battle together with men. When they put on the uniforms, they feel like Joan of Arc or George Sand [Tezuka 2011–12, vol. 3, p. 20].

The Takarazuka Revue is still a place where women’s dreams about an idealized man without roughness, played by female actresses, come true. The Takarazuka repertoire is based mostly on adaptations of famous literary and manga works. The show “The Rose of Versailles”, based on a manga by Ikeda Riyoko, where the main character lady Oscar also appears in the image of a “girl dressed as boy”, has great success among the audience of the Takarazuka Revue.

One of the main features of female comics in Japan is the ambiguity of gender, and such genre as “boys’ love” is the most striking expression of this trend, along with the presence in the stories of an androgynous heroine displaying a male type of behavior.

A female writer who anticipated the *shōnen-ai* aesthetics

Before the appearance of the *shōnen-ai* manga genre in the 1970’s, novels for girls called *shōjo shōsetsu*, whose origins date back to a series of short stories “Hana Monogatari” (“Flower Tales”, 1916–1924), created by Yoshiya Nobuko, were popular in Japan. A typical *shōjo shōsetsu* heroine is a beautiful, innocent girl who suffers from misfortune, but, after overcoming all hardships, she finally becomes happy. A novelist Mori Mari (1903–1987) worked in this genre for a long time. But, among her works, we can also find three stories dedicated to male homosexuality: “The Lovers’ Forest” (“Koibitotachi no mori”, 1961), “I Don’t Go on Sunday” (“Nichiyōbi ni wa boku wa ikanai”, 1961), and “The Bed of Withered Leaves” (“Kareha no nedoko”, 1962). A keen interest in Mori Mari’s works arose quite recently, only in the early 2000’s. Before that, not a single one of her novels had been translated into English or any other foreign language. When scholars began to study her literary heritage, besides the recognized works for which she received various literary awards in Japan, they found

stories about homoerotic love. They were criticized in literary circles at the time, but later were highly appreciated by manga researchers.

Mori Mari was a daughter of a famous Japanese writer Mori Ōgai (1862–1922) – the founder of Romanticism in Japan and a translator of German literature and especially Goethe’s “Faust”. During the period of Japan’s modernization known as Meiji era (1868–1912), the young Mori Ōgai was sent by the Army to study military medicine in Germany, where he also developed his interest in European literature and culture. Later, after returning home, he gave all his children European-sounding names. The name of Mori Mari itself comes from the name “Maria”, and her brothers and younger sister were named Otto, Louis (Rui), Fritz, and Anna.

As a child, Mori Mari was surrounded by the luxury of European interiors, wore beautiful European dresses and called her father “dad” (パパ) in a foreign fashion. After her marriage, she went to Paris, where she learned French and worked as a translator. Her vast knowledge of European culture influenced the environment of her stories significantly.

The novel “The Lovers’ Forest”, published in 1961, was written in the genre of aesthetic fiction *tanbi shōsetsu*, the roots of which go back to Oscar Wilde’s novel “The Picture of Dorian Gray” (1890). For this work, Mori Mari was awarded the Tamura Toshiko Literary Prize, which is presented to female novelists for their literary works. This story shows a love affair between a 19-year-old boy Paulo and a 38-year-old professor of French literature named Gidou. At the end of the story, Gidou’s wife finds out that her husband has an affair with a young man and kills Gidou with a gun.

Many scholars pay attention to how Mori Mari depicts the main characters. First of all, they are the so-called “*hāfu*” (mixed). For example, Professor Gidou de Guiche is half French and half Japanese. Paulo is described as a young man with grey eyes and brown hair: “Paulo’s beauty, as a child born from a mixed marriage of an Englishman and a Frenchwoman, captivated Gidou so much that he didn’t want to leave him for a moment, while the innocent perversity and cunning of the young man pleasantly tingled Gidou like rose thorns. He imagined Paulo biting into him like a young hot pink thorn that has first appeared on the rose stem. A spoiled boy, he didn’t even know how poisonous he was. A little destructive poppy flower. That’s what he has done. He was like opium. Gidou didn’t know his genealogy, but it was clear that European blood flowed in his veins. His dark eyes glowed grey like a kabuto beetle’s carapace, the Japanese do not have such” [Mori 1993, vol. 2, p. 50–51, *trans. by Yu.M.*]. Thus, Mori Mari was one of the first Japanese writers who turned to the theme of *hāfu* – people of mixed ethnic

background. Manga characters also blur the boundaries of ethnic identity and cannot be attributed to any particular race.

But an even more interesting thing is the fact that the age of the protagonist Paulo coincides with the age of Mori Mari when she lost her father. Also, the bar where we first meet the main characters is called “Marie”, while the title of the novel, “*Koibitotachi no Mori*”, contains the surname of the writer. This allows foreign researchers to consider her story within the framework of psychoanalysis. The key concept in this case is the “Electra complex”. The name of the complex comes from the name of an ancient Greek tragedy heroine – the daughter of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. The term “Electra complex” was introduced by Freud’s student, Carl Jung, who identified it as the Oedipus complex in girls. In other words, a girl becomes very attached to her father and, as a result, she becomes jealous of her mother.

If we consider “The Lovers’ Forest” from the point of view of psychoanalysis, then, according to this theory, Mori Mari encodes herself in the image of Paulo, her father – in the image of Gidou, and her own mother – in the image of Gidou’s wife. In such an allegorical and unconscious form, Mori Mari presents her experiences and hidden feelings associated with the loss of her father, whom she idolized since her childhood. She wrote her stories about same-sex love at the age of 57, when she was left all alone, after two unsuccessful marriages.

Researcher Keith Vincent has called Mori Mari “Japanese Electra” and has demonstrated how the image of a young man Paulo is, in fact, imbued with female character in “The Lovers’ Forest”. He notes: “There was something in Mari’s fantasy world that would capture the imagination of a whole new generation of women beginning in the 1970s for whom marriage and heteronormative adulthood was looking less and less attractive” [Vincent 2007, p. 69].

Despite the fact that the authors of the “Year 24 Group” were not familiar with Mori Mari’s works, they, however, were also interested in the theme of human relationships, and the narrative in their stories focused exclusively on male characters. In particular, there are some elements in Mori Mari’s works similar to *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga genres: 1) a handsome young man, who is attractive to female audience, but chooses another man as an object of love; 2) the action taking place in European countries; 3) the type of story, according to which forbidden love between male characters certainly ends with a tragic finale.

Indeed, if we turn to the early works of the *shōnen-ai* manga genre, we see that, very often, they take place in such countries as France or Germany, the characters belong to European nobility, and the story often ends with the death of one of the characters.

As noted by Nagaike Kazumi, Paulo and other characters of Mori's trilogy are a kind of a male version of "femme fatale", being "*homme fatal* young boys, whose extraordinary beauty and sexual power lead their partners to tragic end" [Nagaike 2007, p. 40–41]. She sees a protest against the foundations of the patriarchal culture in this type of hero, when the desire to break the rules and to overthrow the Father authority is expressed in such a symbolic way.

Influence of European art on the development of the shōnen-ai manga genre

Since the middle of the 19th century, after the end of its self-isolation policy, Japan has often been influenced by European and American cultural trends. Cultural borrowings and adaptations continued into the 20th century, receiving a new impetus in the works of female Japanese comics authors.

In the 1960s, the number of manga readers increased in Japan, and, along with the growth of boy's manga magazines, girl's manga magazines, such as "Shōjo Sunday", "Nakayoshi", "Margaret", "Ribon", "Shōjo comics", etc., gained huge popularity. Women started to try themselves in new manga genres – science fiction or stories about same-sex love. Such comics were highly appreciated by critics and became popular not only among the teenage audience, but also among older readers.

In addition, under the influence of the sexual revolution, the position of women in modern society has been changing since the late 1960s. More often, young women began to pursue an independent lifestyle, not burdened by housework or care for children. The development of contraception and the overall improvement of quality of life also contributed to this.

When a group of young female manga authors, at that time only about twenty years old, began to create their own stories about beautiful boys in the late 1960s, they were inspired not only by Japanese, but also by European sources. This can be seen if we refer to their autobiographies or interviews.

In her recently published autobiographical book entitled "Boy's name is Gilbert" (Shōnen no na wa Jirubēru, 2016), Takemiya Keiko notes how, in the 1960s, she visited an exhibition dedicated to a group of the Barbizon school French painters. She was struck by the rich story and narrative power that was felt in every single picture. She particularly liked the picture "Daphnis and Chloe" by Jean-Francois Millet, where two lovers, a shepherd and a shepherdess, are fishing.

This ancient Greek motif is often depicted by many artists in different works. Takemiya liked the “Daphnis and Chloe” by Millet so much that she even put its reproduction in her own room [Takemiya 2016, p. 30]. The shepherd and the shepherdess’ figures occupy a relatively small space in the picture, while dense forest fills most of the canvas. Although the picture is made in dark colors, a bright stream of light illuminates the bare feet of Daphnis, which forced Takemiya to think about male eroticism for the first time.

Later, there were other sources that caused female manga authors to think about same-sex relationships more deeply. These were European literature and cinema, and the person who played the key role in introducing the young Takemiya Keiko and Moto Hagio to them was Masuyama Norie – a screenwriter and part-time producer of Takemiya¹. She lived next door to Takemiya and Hagio, who rented an apartment together in the Ōizumi area of Tokyo at the beginning of their careers. Here, in a place that would later be known as the “Ōizumi salon” (*Ōizumi gakuen*), they managed to gather a team of female manga authors – future members of the “Year 24 Group”. If Takemiya Keiko took the theme of homosexual relations with enthusiasm, Hagio Moto, on the contrary, didn’t show much interest in it.

However, they were both very impressed by a French film “This Special Friendship”, released in 1964. The idea of going to see this movie also belonged to Masuyama. It was a film adaptation of Roger Peyrefitte’s novel “Les Amitiés Particulières”, written in 1944. In the Soviet Union, the novel was banned as condoning homosexual relationships. However, the film itself does not contain any explicit scenes. It shows an intimate friendship between a 14-year-old boy Georges de Sarre and a 12-year-old boy Alexandre Motier at a Catholic boarding school. The priests soon become aware of their “special friendship”. They ask the boys to confess, and Georges agrees, but little Alexandre continues to insist that their relationship is a private matter. On his way home, unable to withstand the betrayal and separation from his older friend, Alexandre commits suicide by throwing himself from a train.

This film largely explains why the first works in the *shōnen-ai* manga genre were devoted to boys boarding schools and why such a style was chosen. It is reflected in such works as a single-volume manga “The November Gymnasium” (1971) by Hagio Moto and its sequel, published under the different title of “The Heart of Thomas” (1974, 3 volumes), as well as the 17-volume manga “The Song of Wind and Trees” (1976–1984) by Takemiya Keiko.

¹ Masuyama Norie, being a scriptwriter, created a manga series “Hensōkyoku” (“Variation”, 1974–1985) and a novel “Kami no kohitsuji – Agnus Dei” (“The Lamb of God – Agnus Dei”, 1990–1994) together with Takemiya Keiko.

But the very first *shōnen-ai* manga was Takemiya Keiko's "In the Sunroom" ("Sunrūmu nite"), published initially under the title "Snow and stars and angels..." ("Yuki to hoshi to tenshi to...") in a special issue of the "Shōjo comics" magazine in 1970. Here, "like most early *shōnen-ai* manga, the work's protagonists were beautiful boys in love with each other and the story was set in Europe" [Welker 2011, p. 212].

After that, Hagio Moto created a manga "The November Gymnasium" ("Jūichigatsu no Gymnasium", 1971), which tells about a boys' relationship at a German boarding school. At that time, it was very risky to print manga about love between male characters. As Hagio Moto mentioned in her own interview, she tried to make a story about girls, but it turned out to have a very different atmosphere, so she finally decided to keep the male version of "The November Gymnasium" [Thorn 2005, pp. 138–175]. In the center of this work is a story about twin brothers Erich and Thomas, separated in their childhood, who accidentally meet at school. Suddenly Thomas dies of pneumonia during school holidays, and Erich begins to investigate the story of his mother's secret love.

The next work was a 3-volume manga "The Heart of Thomas" (1974) about Thomas Werner, who commits suicide and leaves a letter to his beloved Julusmole. Thomas argued that Julusmole would fall in love with him, but Julusmole had never had such feelings and rejected Thomas's love. Soon, a new student named Erich Fruehling, who looks like the deceased Thomas, arrives at school. Hagio Moto continues to develop the twin brothers theme in this work in the same way as in "The November Gymnasium", where sudden death of one of the characters also entails the protagonist's torment and a series of new investigations. In addition, at the beginning of this manga, we see a football playground which is very similar to the scene from the film "This Special Friendship".

The influence of "This Special Friendship" is also felt in Takemiya Keiko's manga "The Song of Wind and Trees" (Kaze to ki no uta, 1976–1984), which is considered a *shōnen-ai* manga classic. This manga takes place in French Lacombrade Academy near Arles. It tells a story about the relationship between two students, Gilbert Cocteau and Serge Battour. The manga ends with the death of one of the characters. In visual terms, not only the theme of a boys gymnasium is borrowed, but also some characters, as well as a greenhouse as a place for romantic meetings.

To create "The Song of Wind and Trees" manga, Takemiya Keiko also collected albums with illustrations and photos. She had an album with Paris photographs by a French photographer Eugene Atget (1857–1927) – one of the urban photography pioneers. Takemiya inherited her love for

France from Masuyama Norie, who adored European cinema and collected film booklets [Takemiya 2016, p. 147].

The main character of “The Song of Wind and Trees” is Gilbert Cocteau, whose name is not accidental and alludes to a French writer, poet, and film director Jean Cocteau (1889–1963). Takemiya and Hagio were well acquainted with the works of this writer, especially with his autobiographical novel “The White Book” (1928), where he writes about the awareness of his unusual sexuality.

Jean Cocteau was an eccentric creative personality, a frivolous aesthete, known for his homosexual tendencies. During the war, he helped Jean Genet (1910–1986), another French writer who touched on the homosexuality theme, to publish his novel “Our Lady of the Flowers” in 1943. Subsequently, the name of Jean Genet served as the title for a Japanese magazine “June”, publishing *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga since 1978. The French surname “Genet” in Japanese sounds like “June” (ジュネ), which is consonant with the English word “June”, which is written in Japanese in the same way as the French writer’s name. The influence of the magazine was so great that there even appeared a special term “*sōsaku June*” (works in June manga magazine style), which was used together with such definitions as *shōnen-ai*, *tanbi shōsetsu*, and *bishōnen manga*. From the beginning, the “June” magazine had a section called “Drawing classes” (*Oekaki kyōshitsu*), the editor of which was Takemiya Keiko. She helped amateur authors to create manga and gave various recommendations – what movies to watch or what literature to read on this topic.

There were other works devoted to boys’ boarding schools which influenced the *shōnen-ai* manga style, such as the British drama film “If...” (1968) about the protest of high school students at an English private school, or the novel “Beneath the Wheel” (1906) by Hermann Hesse about a talented boy from a small village sent to study at an elite seminary. Hagio Moto also mentioned in her interview [Thorn 2005, pp. 138–175] the French-Italian co-production film “Death in Venice” (1971), which was an adaptation of Thomas Mann’s novel. The theme of same-sex desire was touched upon again in this film, where a great composer, who came to Venice for a vacation, is fascinated by a beautiful adolescent boy named Tadzio from an aristocratic Polish family.

Despite strong European influence, the term “*shōnen-ai*” was borrowed by Takemiya Keiko from a Japanese writer Inagaki Taruho (1900–1977), who published an essay “The Aesthetics of Boy Loving” (“*Shōnen-ai no bigaku*”) in 1968. Inagaki described various examples of love between beautiful young boys of the same age in this essay [Angles 2011, p. 235],

which subsequently influenced the representation of male characters in Takemiya Keiko's manga, who do not have a big age difference.

In search of a new aesthetics, female manga authors turned to the works of European high literature writers with queer sensibility and films about same-sex love. As women, they were interested in male characters, but they could only find the view of a man as an object of adoration in the homoerotic tradition. So it is no wonder that the works of such writers as Roger Peyrefitte, Jean Cocteau, and Jean Genet, as well as the movies "This Special Friendship", "If...", and "Death in Venice", were taken by the members of the "Year 24 Group" and reinterpreted by them within their own style, characterized by beauty, grace, and melancholy.

Homoeroticism influence: Was there a boy?

In spite of the fact that the *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga genres borrowed many elements of gay culture (the names of writers with queer sensibility, the style of their literary works and film adaptations), these have never been stories about gays or for gays.

For example, there was a case in Japan when a gay activist Satō Masaki published an angry open letter to the readers of *yaoi* manga in a feminist journal called "Choisir" in May 1992. His main claim was that the representation of love between male characters in *yaoi* had nothing to do with real gay relationships. In other words, the same-sex relationships between beautiful young boys called *bishōnen*, which are portrayed by women in *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga, are just female fantasy [Vincent 2007, p. 70]. For many readers, Satō's letter was a real shock and caused active disputes around *yaoi* (*yaoi ronsō*).

Trying to escape from the idea of themselves as sexual objects, women preferred to portray only male characters in their stories. So, it would be wrong to link the *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga genres only with the theme of homoerotic relations. There are two basic character types in boys' love manga: *seme* (the active partner) and *uke* (the passive partner). While the *seme* character represents strong masculinity and aggression, the female audience often associate themselves with the more passive *uke* male character. In addition, many researchers note that boys' love manga characters are neither boys nor girls, but rather representatives of the so-called "third sex". Because readers of this manga genre are mostly teenage girls, androgynous characters represent an idealized relationship on equal terms. It is known that, during

the puberty period, boys and girls first pay attention to their own sex: “One of the tasks imposed in the object selection consists in not missing the opposite sex. This, as we know, is not solved without some difficulty. The first feelings after puberty often enough go astray, though not with any permanent injury. Dessoir has called attention to the normality of the enthusiastic friendships formed by boys and girls with their own sex” [Freud 2018, p. 78]. Thus, such works are primarily aimed to attract attention of the relevant youth audience.

One of the reasons why the “Forty-Niners” turned to the subject of same-sex relationships is the fact that, at Masuyama Norie’s initiative, Hagio Moto and Takemiya Keiko learned about “Barazoku” (“Rose tribe”) – the first Japanese gay magazine, which also attracted some women who considered relationships between men intriguing [Thorn 2005, pp. 138–175]. But one should point out that the first issue of the “Barazoku” magazine was released only in 1971, one year after Takemiya Keiko published her manga “In the Sunroom” (1970) – the first *shōnen-ai* work.

There is a separate comics genre with a romantic title “*bara*” (薔薇, “rose”) in Japan, describing male same-sex relationships. The symbolism of the rose was first borrowed by the “Barazoku” editor Itō Bungaku, and later his idea gave the name to the whole genre, although we are not quite sure where this name came from. Unlike “boys’ love” manga (BL) aimed at the female audience, the *bara* genre is designated as “men’s love” (ML) and is intended for men with a non-traditional sexual desire. In addition, there is an area called Shinjuku Nichōme in Tokyo with bars and clubs for sexual minorities, where it is also possible to buy comics of the *dōsei-ai* (homosexual manga) genre, but not *shōnen-ai* manga. Fans of “boys’ love” manga gather in a completely different place – an area in the Ikebukuro district on the street called Otome-rōdo (“girl’s alley”), where one can find a huge amount of goods for female anime and manga fans.

It is considered that the *bara* genre dates back to the 1960s, namely to the erotic photo session called “Barakei” (“Killed by roses”), featuring a famous Japanese writer Mishima Yukio as the model and created by photographer Hosoe Eikō in 1961. The series of photos, soaked with homoeroticism, was first shown at the exhibition at the Matsuya Ginza Department store and later was released as a photobook in 1963.

Mishima Yukio, who, after a trip to Greece, became interested in body-building, shows his muscular body and is often depicted with a rose flower in these photos. In one of the photos, he represents the figure of St. Sebastian, which is considered a symbol of homoeroticism. It is known that the image of St. Sebastian in Mishima’s work can be traced back to the

pages of his provocative novel “Confessions of a Mask” (1949), where the main character feels his first sexual excitement when looking at a reproduction of the picture by Guido Reni. The characteristic pose of the Christian martyr with crossing hands and arrows plunged into the flesh awakens homosexual and sado-masochistic tendencies inside the main character: “Ever since becoming obsessed with the picture of St. Sebastian, I had acquired the unconscious habit of crossing my hands over my head whenever I happened to be undressed. Mine was a frail body, without so much as a pale shadow of Sebastian’s abundant beauty. But now once more I spontaneously fell into the pose. As I did so my eyes went to my armpits. And a mysterious sexual desire boiled up within me” [Mishima 2016, p. 47].

The symbolism of the rose and various comparisons with this flower can also be seen in Jean Genet’s novel “Miracle of the Rose” (Miracle de la Rose), published in 1946. This autobiographical work tells about the years of imprisonment which Genet spent in Mettray Penal Colony and Fontevault prison and his homosexual love feelings for other prisoners. In the description of one of the prisoners named Arcamon, who was sentenced to death, Genet idealizes his image and transforms the chains on the prisoner’s arms into a garland of white roses. The novel “Miracle of the Rose” was first translated into Japanese in 1956 by Horiguchi Daigaku from the “Shintyōsha” publishing house. Thus, similar parallels with rose flowers can be detected in works by both Japanese and European authors with homosexual orientation.

Using the *bara* genre with its flower symbolism as an analogy, Japanese women of homosexual orientation began to use the term “*yuri*”, which in Japanese means “lily”. The appearance of this term is also associated with the activities of editor Itō Bungaku, who decided to create a column titled “Lily tribe’s room” (Yurizoku no heya) on the pages of the 46th issue of the “Barazoku” magazine in 1976 [Welker 2011, p. 219]. Subsequently, manga telling about the relationships between female characters became known as the *yuri* genre. In this connection, the “Forty-Niners” were also known as the “Year 24 Flower Group” (Hana no nijūyonen gumi). The origin of such floral attributes associated with the term “hana” (“flower”) is that, according to Zeami Motokiyo’s “The Transmission of the Flower Through the Forms” (Fūshikaden) treatise, it means “skill”. With regard to the “Forty-Niners”, this indicates their outstanding abilities and a revolution made in female comics, so they are also often called the “Magnificent Forty-Niners”.

If the symbolism of the rose has obvious parallels with works of writers with homosexual orientation, the works of the “Year 24 Flower

Group” members do not have such a link and go a slightly different way. Boys’ love manga about same-sex relationships is rather fantasy than stories about homosexuality in the literal sense of the word.

Moreover, if we take a look at Gilbert Cocteau – the main character of “The Song of Wind and Trees”, we will see that his boy appearance is ambiguous and feminized. According to Takemiya Keiko, the character is dual in his nature, having both male and female qualities, and the *shōnen-ai* genre reflects this idea pretty well [Toku 2003]. In other words, the manga represents the idea of an androgyne – a person who combines masculine and feminine characteristics. We can find a similar idea in the Japanese novel “The Tale of Genji”, where the main character has both male and female features. In “The Song of Wind and Trees” we also meet a character whose description is similar to the description of Paulo from the novel “The Lovers’ Forest” and represents a *homme fatal* prototype: “Gilbert, there is a devil that lives inside you. A devil that wants more than anything to be held. At first you resisted him, but you can’t defeat him. You gave your body to the devil...” [Takemiya 1977, vol. 1, p. 55, trans. by Yu. M.].

It is interesting to observe the process of “gender conversion” in Hagio Moto’s sci-fi manga “They Were Eleven” (“Jūichinin Iru!”, 1975), where one of the characters has indeterminate gender. Frol Frolbericheri considers himself a man, though his appearance, physique, and emotions are more like those of a woman. He came from the planet Vienna, and he is one of the so-called *menīru* (メニール) nation, the members of which possess the characteristics of both sexes in their bodies. They can determine by themselves whether they would be a man or a woman during their period of secondary maturation. Frol, who has successfully passed the team test on the spaceship, decides to become a woman, although at first he wanted to be a man.

Thus, male characters of *shōnen-ai* manga could easily be associated with female characters. But what makes the special charm of the manga is that characters occupy an ambivalent position and cannot be confidently attributed to either of the two sexes. The readers decide for themselves what characters appear before them. Are they boys? Or is it just a game of “boys’ love”? It is one thing when it is depicted, and another when it is implied. In addition, such characters allow the readers not only to identify with them, but also to distance themselves from them, to be a kind of an outside observer if something is not to their liking. Finally, such manga allows one to enjoy the beauty of a male *bishōnen* character.

Japanese literature of the Heian period and gender questions

Long before a group of talented Japanese women in the 1970s created the manga we discussed above, there were court ladies of the Heian period (794–1192) who, through the development of the Japanese syllabary called *hiragana*, had created the world of Japanese literature. They left behind outstanding *monogatari* novels, *nikki* diaries, *zuihitsu* (“follow the brush”) essays. This phenomenon, called “women’s literature” (*joryū bungaku*), is unique and has no analogues in the world. Just like the female manga authors of the 1970s, who created a special language and atmosphere in their comics, the women of the Heian period developed themes and raised issues the female audience was interested in.

The most famous writer of the Heian period was Murasaki Shikibu, who wrote a masterpiece of Japanese literature, “The Tale of Genji” (“Genji monogatari”, 10th–11th centuries). The main character of this novel, Prince Genji, is a son of the Emperor, but he has been deprived of the Prince of the Blood status. He is portrayed as an extremely handsome man with various talents. Murasaki Shikibu often provides a “feminized” image of male beauty in her work. For example, in a scene of a conversation of young men about women’s advantages and disadvantages, she compares Prince Genji to a female: “He was wearing several soft white singlets with an informal court robe thrown loosely over them. As he sat in the lamplight leaning against an armrest, his companions almost wished that he were a woman. Even the “highest of the high” might seem an inadequate match for him” [Murasaki 2002, p. 36]. As researcher Polina Boyarinova notes: “Studying the literature of the Heian period, it can be noted that visual differences in gender display were not so big, and the same attributes of appearance were appreciated in men and women” [Boyarinova 2015, p. 109].

In the film “Genji: A Thousand-Year Love” (“Sennen no koi – Hikaru Genji monogatari”, 2001) the role of the Prince is played by Amami Yūki – a Japanese actress famous for male roles in the Takarazuka Revue. Apparently, in order to realize the fully “feminine” ideal of male beauty of the Heian era, the film director casted a woman as Prince Genji. This curious approach helps to take a fresh look at the literature of the Heian period.

There were also themes related to gender issues in the literature of the late Heian period. For example, the Japanese novel “The Changelings“, or “Torikaebaya Monogatari”, written by an unknown author, tells about a high-ranking courtier who has two similar-looking children from different wives. But his son named Wakagimi is more like a girl, and his daughter named Himegimi resembles a young man, so parents decided to educate Wakagimi as a girl and Himegimi as a boy. Next, we see how the brother and

sister are brought up in accordance with their chosen gender, and Wakagimi becomes the sheltered princess's confidante in the Palace, while Himegimi becomes a mid-ranking courtier Chūnagon. And only Himegimi's pregnancy restores the situation. When Himegimi becomes pregnant, she hides away from the court in the distant Uji province. At that moment, Wakagimi, overcoming his inherent shyness, recalls his male duties and goes to seek his sister. As a result of this, the gender confusion is safely resolved. Wakagimi returns to the male role and Himegimi – to the female role. Despite the fact that there is no condemnation of gender deviation in "Torikaebaya Monogatari", strict correspondence between biological sex and gender still remains the acceptable model of behavior within the patriarchal culture.

After the Heian period, the Japanese culture was no longer in a situation wherein a large number of literary works were created by female authors and conveyed their feelings and experiences. It was only in the 20th century when art created by women gained popularity again. Thanks to the example provided by Murasaki Shikibu, "other women began to write, and feminine sensibilities found expression in their own literature. Just as these authors had refined the written word, so their modern counterparts would eventually enrich manga, Japan's popular literature, with a similarly heightened sensitivity" [Gravett 2004, p. 76].

As a result, since the early 1980s, the members of the "Year 24 Group" and other female manga authors began to pay attention to the myths and ancient literary works of Japan. For example, Yamagishi Ryōko created an 11-volume manga "Emperor of the Land of the Rising Sun" ("Hi Izuru Tokoro no Tenshi", 1980–1984) about Prince Shōtoku (ca. 574–622), a great reformer and preacher of Buddhism in Japanese history. However, in the manga, Prince Shōtoku was transformed into a cross-dressing character, who hopelessly fell in love with statesman Soga no Emishi. In 1998 Kihara Toshie, also a member of the "Year 24 Group", produced a single-volume manga "Torikaebaya Ibun", based on the novel "Torikaebaya Monogatari". Even earlier, in 1986, Yamauchi Naomi, in collaboration with scriptwriter Himuro Saeko, created a 4-volume manga "The Change!", and in the 2000s, Saitō Chiho began to publish a manga "Torikae Baya" (2012–2018), which has 13 volumes.

The novel "The Tale of Genji" is also reflected in comics by various authors, but the highest recognition has been received by Yamato Waki's manga "Asaki Yume Mishi" (1980–1993, 13 volumes). The author worked on it for thirteen years, in order to accurately recreate the historical details of the Heian period. Thus, after a period of "Westernization", Japanese female manga

authors became interested in the cultural heritage of their own country, which they successfully transform into the language of female comics.

Conclusion

During its historical development, the genre of women's manga at some point rejected the "girl dressed as boy" character in favor of feminized boys. Here we see the situation where a female character is no more required to hide under the guise of a man, so it is easier to be a feminine boy, or *bishōnen*.

The emergence of *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga genres gives all girls a chance to try a male style of behavior which means greater freedom in action and allows one to take an active position where one chooses instead of being chosen. This explains the fact that some female fans of *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* talk about themselves in a male manner or do cosplay of male characters. For girls, the *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga has become a demonstration of their independence and helps them to find "their own people".

Such manga is a place of freedom, where girls and young women can run away from the stereotypical roles of a housewife or a mother with a baby, and just enjoy the sensual side of the story. As mentioned by Nakata Kaori, "women readers find an outlet for their frustrated hopes in the pages of Mori Mari's novels and in the pages of *shōjo* manga" [Nakata 2004, p. 48]. From the psychoanalytical perspective, girls who represent themselves as a man realize their hidden desires in this way. The *shōnen-ai* and *yaoi* manga genres become a self-treatment letting girls to console themselves and escape from the harsh reality and loneliness.

In addition, according to the information provided above, the development of women's comics in Japan coincided with another cycle of borrowings from European art, French art in particular. Thus, this shows the hybrid character of manga, as Japanese culture is often based on the principles of borrowing and adaptation of foreign culture to the national tradition. This explains the reason for the amazing popularity of manga, which combines various elements, familiar to both European and Japanese readers.

As a result, the women's literature of the Heian period, the works by Mori Mari, and the manga of the "Year 24 Group" members all touch upon gender issues. While searching for an art language that would be close and understandable, first of all, to female audience, the authors try to go beyond the boundaries of the patriarchal culture in their original way. In the 1990s, the *yaoi* and *shōnen-ai* genres were labeled under the common title of "boys' love" and became a commercially successful product that deliberately borrowed both the elements of homoeroticism and the features of female sensibility.

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
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Pict. 1. Princess Sapphire and angel Tink on the cover of the Russian edition of the manga “Princess Knight” (vol. 1) by Tezuka Osamu, Comics Factory, 2011



Pict. 2. “Daphnis and Chloe” by Jean-François Millet, 19th century




Pict. 3. Georges de Sarre and Alexandre Motier on the film poster
“This Special Friendship”, 1964



Pict. 4. “In the Sunroom” (“Sunrūmu nite”) by Takemiya Keiko –
the first work in the shōnen-ai manga genre, 1976 reprint



Pict. 5. Students play football – a screenshot from the film “This Special Friendship” (1964) and a manga page from “The Heart of Thomas” (vol. 1) Shōgakukan bunko 1995, p. 55




Pict. 6. Greenhouse as a place for secret meetings – a screenshot from the film “This Special Friendship” (1964), and a manga page from “The Song of Wind and Trees” (vol. 1) Shōgakukan 1977, p. 52




Pict. 7. The first issue of the “June” magazine, 1978



Pict. 8. On the left: “Saint Sebastian” by Guido Reni, ca. 1615.
On the right: Mishima Yukio in the photo session “Barakei”
 (“Killed by roses”) by Hosoe Eikō, 1963



Pict. 9. Feminized image of Gilbert Cocteau on the cover of “The Song of Wind and Trees” manga (vol. 2) 1977



Pict. 10. “Feminized” image of male beauty, performed by actress Amami Yūki – screenshot from the film “Genji: A Thousand-Year Love”, 2001



Pict. 11. On the left: Yamauchi Naomi and Himuro Saeko's "The Change!" (vol. 1) 1986. On the right: Saitō Chiho's "Torikae Baya" (vol. 1) 2012



Pict. 12. On the left: young Prince Shōtoku looks like a girl on the cover of Yamagishi Ryōko's manga "Emperor of the Land of the Rising Sun" (vol. 2) 1981. On the right: Prince Genji on the cover of Yamato Waki's manga "Asaki Yume Mishi" (vol. 8) 1987



MAGERA Yulia Aleksandrovna – Senior lecturer. Institute for Oriental and Classical Studies of National Research University “Higher School of Economics” (HSE)

ORCID 0000-0002-6601-5032

E-mail: JuliaM14@yandex.ru

Personal web-site: <http://mangalectory.ru>

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Association of Japanologists of Russia
Institute of Oriental Studies of Russian Academy of Sciences
12, Rozhdestvenka street, Moscow, 107031

Telephone: +7 (495) 628-9780
E-mail: japanassoc@gmail.com
Web sites: www.japanstudies.ru
www.japanreview.ru

