


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Editors

- Streletsov D. V.** Doctor of Sciences (History), Professor,
Head of Department of Afro-Asian Studies,
MGIMO-University,
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- Grishachev S. V.** Ph.D. (History), Associate professor,
School of Asian Studies, HSE University,
Executive secretary of the Association of Japanologists of Russia

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E-mail: japanstudiesinrussia@gmail.com
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Japan's New Spatial Development Strategy: Challenges of the 21st Century

I. L. Timonina

Abstract. The socio-economic consequences of regional unevenness remain one of the major problems of Japan's development in the 21st century. Despite some success in regional economic policy, the main quantitative indicators of territorial-economic proportions or lack thereof have changed little over the past 30 years despite certain successes of regional economic policy.

However, a number of internal and external factors have made it necessary to adjust approaches to regional strategic planning. These include globalization and the changing positioning of Japan in the world market, the partial loss of competitive positions in Asian markets, and increased competition between “international” cities for foreign investment. Internal factors include the decline of the Japanese population at a rate higher than previously expected, changes in people's lifestyles and shifts in their value system, the increasing importance of such of its components as stability, security, favorable environmental conditions, attractive landscapes, and diversification of lifestyles.

The new strategy of the 21st century is based on the idea of creating a multi-layered “compact and networked territorial structure”, which should ensure the availability of social services for residents of all localities by optimizing the social infrastructure and forming “new urban cores”. The economic development of regions should focus on the development of industries that rely on local resources and take into account local specifics, as well as the creation of “ecosystems” of innovations.

Along with vitalizing regional and rural economy, Japan's New Spatial Strategy also aims to adjust the excessive concentration of population and economic potential of large megacities (primarily Tokyo) and at the same time strengthen their global competitiveness.

As necessary conditions for achieving the ambitious goals, the Spatial Development Strategy calls for achieving economic growth, increasing industrial productivity, building innovation through regional resources and interregional cooperation, increasing the participation of women and senior persons in work and public life, using modern "smart" technologies, and sharing economy formats.

The traditional imperative in formulating Japan's spatial development strategy remains the obvious desire to solve the problems of territorial unevenness in conjunction with solving other socio-economic problems of the country, in particular, the problems of environment and demographic decline (which is especially noticeable in the regions), issues of upgrading economic and social infrastructure.

Keywords: Japan, regional development, spatial development strategy, sustainable development goals.

Japan's regional policy has a long history. It was formed as early as in the last third of the 19th century, when the government started to support or, rather, settle remote areas of the country (primarily the island of Hokkaido). After the Second World War, as the Comprehensive National Development Act was adopted in 1950, this policy acquired a consistent and systematic character and became an integral part of national economic policy.

Regional Disproportions in the 21st Century

During its more than a hundred-year-long history, the regional policy of the Japanese government acquired an institutional structure as well as flexible and effective tools. Regularly adopted governmental plans and programs, for example, the internationally renowned project to create technopoles [Timonina 1992, Timonina 2002], were quite successful. However, despite the existing achievements in correcting the regional imbalances, the socio-economic consequences of regional unevenness remain one of the major problems of Japan's development in the 21st century.

Among the positive effects of regional policy, one can note the decrease in the difference in per capita income between the richest and the poorest region of Japan in the 21st century. While, in 2006, the per capita income in Tokyo was 2,9 times that in the Okinawa Prefecture, in 2015, this indicator decreased to 2,5.¹ According to this indicator, Japan occupies a rather high 10th place among the OECD countries. The interregional Gini coefficient (by per capita income) in Japan is one of the lowest in the OECD (second from the end). And, generally speaking, according to the OECD experts, Japan's peripheral areas seem quite successful in terms of welfare and quality of life, judging by the standards of the organization [OECD 2016, pp. 11, 195]. At the same time, Japan still experiences the hyper-concentration of population in large cities with population of more than 500,000 people (in Japan, 70 percent of the population live in such cities, compared to the OECD average of 55 percent) [OECD 2019, p. 42].

A similar situation can be observed as far as the concentration of economic activity is concerned. In 2001-2014, the share of leading prefectures in the composition of the nation's GDP, including that in the most important industries, has hardly changed (see Table 1).

¹ Based on the data from: Ranking (Prefectural Data). <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures/rank>

Table 1

Dynamics of regional concentration
of gross prefectural domestic product (GDP)
(2001-2014, in 2005 prices, mil. yen, percent)²

GDP/GDP	2001 mil. yen	Share of 5 leading prefectures (percentage)		2014 mil. yen	Share of 5 leading prefectures (percentage)
Japan, total	520999,4		Japan, total	514296,3	
1 Tokyo	94 986,1		1 Tokyo	94902,1	
2 Osaka	40 371,3		2 Osaka	37934,0	
3 Aichi	33 508,8		3 Aichi	35990,3	
4 Kanagawa	30 708,2		4 Kanagawa	30322,0	
5 Hokkaido	20 213,4		5 Saitama	20914,4	
Total of the 5 prefectures	219787,9	42,2	Total of the 5 prefectures	220062,8	42,7
Finance and insurance in GDP/GDP	2001 mil. yen			2014 mil. yen	
Japan, total	29345,5		Japan, total	23416,6	
1 Tokyo	10288,1		1 Tokyo	9021,8	
2 Osaka	2481,2		2 Osaka	1580,8	
3 Aichi	1445,5		3 Kanagawa	1017,1	
4 Kanagawa	1235,1		4 Aichi	974,9	
5 Shizuoka	922,0		5 Saitama	731,4	
Total of the 5 prefectures	16372,0	55,7	Total of the 5 prefectures	13325,9	56,9

² Based on the data from: Ibid.

Manufacturing industry in GDP/DPDP	2001 mil. yen		2014 mil. yen	
Japan, total	97374,1		Japan, total	94662,2
1 Aichi	10324,9		1 Aichi	12005,0
2 Tokyo	7794,4		2 Tokyo	6540,8
3 Kanagawa	6562,0		3 Osaka	5394,3
4 Osaka	6108,7		4 Shizuoka	5368,7
5 Shizuoka	5372,4		5 Kanagawa	4930,8
Total of the 5 prefectures	36162,5	37,1	Total of the 5 prefectures	34239,7
				36,2

Comparing the situation in Japan to that in other OECD member countries, one can note that large cities in Japan produced 80 percent of the nation's GDP growth in 2016 (the Tokyo metropolis³ alone produced 37 percent of growth), while the OECD average was 68 percent. The capital region produces approximately a third of the nation's GNP (and this indicator even somewhat increased in 2000-2016) [OECD 2018, pp. 21, 97], and the overwhelming majority of jobs is created here (first place in terms of the share of jobs created in capital cities in the national ranking among the OECD member countries in 2006-2016) [OECD 2019, p. 42].

According to the Bank of Japan data, in 2015-2018, 64 percent of new enterprises were located in the three most developed regions of the country, Kantō-Kōshin'etsu,⁴ Tōkai, and Kinki, which is approximately the same as the indicators from 20 or 30 years ago, while the territorially large region of Hokkaido hosted only 2 percent [BOJ 2020, Table 5]. As far as the creation of added value

³ In this context, this refers to Tokyo and 3 prefectures – Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa.

⁴ Kōshin'etsu – the former Chūbu region.

in industry is concerned, the regions of Kantō, Kinki, and Chūbu lead as well. Their share in the national total has only slightly declined: 1995 – 71,5 percent, 2000 – 68,9 percent, 2005 – 71,8 percent, 2017 – 66,7 percent. A similar situation can be observed in the distribution of consumer expenses, investment, and exports.⁵

The situation with local finances remains quite difficult as well. The vast majority of prefectures in Japan are “subsidized”. In 2017-2018, the share of local taxes in the revenue part of prefectural budgets was 30,2 percent and 31,7 percent [MIC (Sōmushō) 2020, p. 16]. Of note are also the remaining inter-regional structural differences, which can be evaluated by the so-called “location quotient”, which is a quantitative estimate of the concentration of a specific industry, cluster, type of occupation, or demographic group in the region in comparison to the national average. The location quotient is calculated by the following formula:

$\frac{1}{2} * [\text{the share of the first industry in the nation's economy minus the share of the first industry in the region's economy} + \text{the share of the second industry in the nation's economy minus the share of the second industry in the region's economy} + \dots + \text{the share of the } N^{\text{th}} \text{ industry in the nation's economy minus the share of the } N^{\text{th}} \text{ industry in the region's economy}]$.

The regions with economic structure close to that of the nation as a whole have location quotients close to zero. Regions with specific economic structure have location quotients approaching one.

The economic structure of the regions of Kinki and Kantō is closest to that of the national economy, which, given their superior macroeconomic indicators, demonstrates that the said regions continue being the backbone of the nation's economy. At the same time, the greatest differences from the structure of the nation's economy can be observed in “peripheral” regions – Hokkaido and Okinawa (see Table 2).

⁵ See: [METI 2010, pp. 16, 20]; Ranking (Prefectural Data). <https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/regional-statistics/ssdsview/prefectures/rank>

Table 2

Dynamics of the location quotient by Japan's economic regions
(1995-2005)⁶

Economic region/year	1995	2000	2005
Hokkaidō	0,1861	0,1710	0,1720
Tōhoku	0,0981	0,0901	0,0734
Kantō	0,0433	0,0392	0,0468
Chūbu	0,1268	0,1457	0,1645
Kinki	0,0416	0,0379	0,0394
Chūgoku	0,0842	0,0909	0,1260
Shikoku	0,1036	0,0888	0,0911
Kyūshū	0,0983	0,0781	0,0665
Okinawa	0,2829	0,2680	0,2242

Therefore, the quantitative indicators of territorial-economic proportions/disproportions have changed little over the recent 30 years. Accordingly, the problems engendered by these – the excessive concentration of population, economic resources and functions in the central regions and the lack of investment, population outflow, weak economic activity in peripheral areas – have not lost their significance. At the same time, the qualitative contents of “traditional” issues of uneven territorial development has, of course, changed in the 21st century, becoming increasingly complex and diversified.

Here, it is worth mentioning about the conclusions concerning the new conditions and contents of regional policy made by the OECD Regional Development Policy Committee. The Committee's experts believe that measuring the regional imbalances while taking into consideration various indicators of the people's welfare uncovers greater imbalances than in the case of measuring only the income levels. Accordingly, regional policy should not focus only on the tasks of

⁶ Calculated with data from: [METI 2010, p. 39].

equalizing the levels of income, economic growth, and competitiveness by territories, but rather account for all aspects of the residents' life, the issues of sustainability of local communities, taking into consideration the specifics, the unique features and potential of particular regions.

Hence, the experts conclude, regional policy at the national level is not limited to a certain set of directions, it is tightly intertwined with almost all other areas of national economic policy – promotion of economic growth and innovation, transport, energy, housing policies and others, i.e., it is a “policy of policies”. One more message of the Committee's document consists in the necessity to involve in the regional policy not only the state, but also non-governmental organizations, the private sector, international organizations [OECD 2019, p. 23].

Such conclusions and recommendations of the OECD are, generally speaking, relevant for Japan as well. Moreover, a comprehensive approach to solving the issues of regional development is quite typical for Japan. Nevertheless, under the conditions of deep systemic changes in the global economy, international relations, socio-economic life of Japan itself in the 2000s and, particularly, in the 2010s, there is a demand for innovative approaches to solving the traditional and the newly emerging problems of regional development. And the problems of regional development themselves remain a priority for the government.

In 2019, at the 18th meeting of the Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy (it will be discussed below), Prime Minister S. Abe stated that there could be no revitalization of Japan without vibrant regions, emphasizing that the Cabinet “has raised high the flag of regional revitalization and tackled this issue as a top priority through government-wide efforts for the last five years”.⁷

The concept of Japan's spatial development is reflected in various government documents, plans, and programs of the central government, ministries (primarily, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport

⁷ Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. May 20, 2019. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201905/_00028.html

and Tourism and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry), as well as plans, programs, and strategies of local governments.⁸

In this article, the author intends to focus on the conceptual innovations in the field of spatial development, so the analysis will primarily concentrate on the key documents defining the general principles, directions, and instruments of regulating spatial and regional development. These are the National Spatial Strategy (the 2008 National Spatial Strategy and the 2015 New National Spatial Strategy, henceforth referred to as the Spatial Strategy and the New Spatial Strategy), the Grand Design of National Spatial Development towards 2050 of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), as well as the Comprehensive Strategy for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy, adopted by the Abe Cabinet in 2014.

Factors Determining the Present-day Concept of Japan's Regional Development

The 2008 National Spatial Strategy, which essentially became another, sixth Comprehensive National Development Plan,⁹ and its 2015 revised version, the New National Spatial Strategy, which contains the directions of regional policy for the next decade and a “long-term, comprehensive vision” of regional development to 2050, reflect the present-day understanding of goals and principles of regional planning and regional policy.

The authors of the strategies pointed out several diverse factors which determined the necessity of a certain correction of approaches to

⁸ For a detailed analysis of the institutional structure of regional policy and the system of regional planning in the second half of the 20th century, see [Timonina 2002].

⁹ According to the 1950 Comprehensive National Development Act, Japan consecutively developed four Comprehensive National Development Plans, while the fifth one was called Grand Design for the 21st Century (1998).

regional strategic planning. Some of these are connected to globalization and Japan's positioning in the world market. Here belong Japan's loss of its position as the second economy of the world, meteoric growth of East Asian economies and partial loss of competitive positions in Asian markets, as well as growing competition between "international" cities for foreign investment.

Among the internal socio-economic factors, the first one to be mentioned is the factor of Japan's population shrinking faster than expected. Other key factors determining the general direction of spatial development are the changes related to people's lifestyles, shifts in their value system (with such of its components as stability, security, good environment, attractive landscapes growing in importance), as well as the diversification of lifestyles.¹⁰

A separate group is constituted by factors connected to technological innovations and security, which were given special attention in the 2015 version of the Strategy. The threat of natural and anthropogenic disasters, the problems of securing sources of food, water, and energy, the necessity to maintain global environment, as well as technological innovations, first of all, in the field of information and communication technologies – all of this gives rise to new challenges and, at the same time, creates new opportunities for solving the problems of regions.¹¹

The totality of factors which were pointed out in the 21st century strategies of regional development and which, without doubt, reflect both the modern realities of Japan's economy and social life and global external challenges, were taken into consideration by governmental experts developing the present-day strategic goals and tasks of

¹⁰ National Spatial Strategy. Pp. 1, 3, 4. <http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/images/NationalPlan2015.pdf>; Grand Design of National Spatial Development towards 2050, Japan. <http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/images/GDNSD2050.pdf>; National Spatial Strategy (National Plan). August 2015. Pp. 1-6. https://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/international/spw/index_e.html

¹¹ Grand Design...; National Spatial Strategy (National Plan)... Pp. 1-6.

regional policy and its tools. What became another imperative – rather a traditional than a new one – in the process of forming the strategy of spatial development, was the obvious intention to solve the problems of territorial unevenness in conjunction with solving other socio-economic problems of the nation, which, it should be emphasized, is in accordance with the concept formulated by the OECD Regional Development Policy Committee.

Abe Cabinet's Comprehensive Strategy for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy

As Abe Shinzō came to power in 2012, regional development policy became increasingly coordinated with the issue of population decline, which is especially noticeable in regions. This was pointed out by the Prime Minister on multiple occasions in his speeches and statements, including his speeches delivered in the Diet¹² and on the floors of international organizations.

In Japan, the interrelation of these problems is seen in the following way: the decline of population in peripheral regions leads to the growth of the area and number of abandoned and vacant land plots, residential houses, to the “death” of commercial areas in small towns. As the Director of International Research and Cooperation of the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research Hayashi Reiko said at the sessions of the UN Commission on Population and Development,

¹² For example, this problem was paid special attention in the Prime Minister's speech at the 187th session of the Japanese Diet on September 29, 2014. There, among other things, he announced the establishment of a special body – the Headquarters for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy (referred to as a council in other documents). See: Policy Speech by Prime Minister to the 187th Session of the Diet. Monday, September 29, 2014. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201409/policyspch.html

the trend of absolute population decline in Japan's regions – outside the largest cities – started to manifest earlier than in the country in general and is even more pronounced. According to the data of a review of internal migration, Tokyo remains the number one priority for people planning to move within the next five years. According to R. Hayashi, to overcome the trend of further concentration of population within the Tokyo metropolis, measures have been taken to vitalize the peripheral regions of Japan, including promotion of local innovation with government subsidies, stimulation of return migration of retired persons, state subsidies to local universities and industries. At the same time, Hayashi believes that, despite the fact that stopping free movement of people within the country seems neither possible nor practical, it would be beneficial to encourage at least a small number of people to stay in less populated municipalities or even move there.¹³

The importance and the interconnection of the issues of population decline and regional development, each of which is comprehensive and “interdisciplinary”, is attested to by the fact of the Japanese government creating a special body in 2014 – the Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. The government developed the Comprehensive Strategy for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy, within the framework of which the Basic Policy for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy is developed annually. Meanwhile, local governments form their own original strategies.

At the regular meeting of the Council in May 2019, Prime Minister Abe reported the achievements of the first phase of realizing the Comprehensive Strategy, such as the increase in agricultural exports,

¹³ Statement by Dr. R. Hayashi Director of International Research and Cooperation National Institute of Population and Social Security Research At the Forty-Eighth Session of the United Nations Commission on Population and Development. April 2015. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/pdf/commission/2015/country/Agenda%20item%204/Japan_Item4.pdf

the development of tourism as a promising industry, and the rise of the share of taxes in the revenue part of the majority of local budgets. At the same time, the Prime Minister noted that the situation of population and economic functions being overconcentrated in Tokyo persists, and its overcoming, along with the continuation of support for local initiatives, is to become one of the tasks of the second phase of realization of the Strategy (2020-2024), which was declared in 2019.¹⁴ As the Prime Minister said at the 21st session of the Council in December 2019, during the second phase, the government intends to further promote the initiatives to regulate excessive concentration of population in Tokyo and to pursue the balancing of migration flows between Tokyo and other regions. These goals were confirmed in the Council's document titled "The Japan's Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens" (September 2020).¹⁵ In order to promote "creative and innovative" local initiatives in three directions – recovery from disasters, overcoming the downward risks of the economy, and investment for the future – the government provides grants to facilitate the vitalization of regions.¹⁶

Also, as one of the measures to reach the goals stated in 2019-2020, a scheme has been launched to provide up to 3 mil. yen to people who move from Tokyo to regions and either find a job or open a business there. S. Abe claimed that, due to the launch of this scheme, migration movement has already started, and more than 400 cases of new businesses opened in the regions has been registered. The government intends to broaden the application of this scheme, in particular, by softening the criteria for candidates. Also, a new

¹⁴ Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. May 20, 2019. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201905/_00028.html

¹⁵ The Japan's Plan for Dynamic Engagement of All Citizens. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/content/jpnplnde_en.pdf

¹⁶ Forum for Consultations between the National and Local Governments. December 11, 2019. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201912/_00023.html

mechanism is expected to be launched to encourage people who live and work in big cities to take up another or an additional occupation outside these cities by means of assisting them in covering their commuting expenses.

The government also intends to expand a special system of corporate taxation, the so-called “hometown tax”,¹⁷ which can be called quite a “creative” instrument.

The “hometown tax” is a system, launched in 2008, which allows taxpayers to make donations to their hometown or any municipality of their choice and receive tax benefits, in particular, in the income and residential taxes. Those who pay a “hometown tax” in a region are supposed to receive local products as gifts. The system was introduced to decrease inequality in tax revenues between urban and rural areas and is aimed at attracting tax income and donations to smaller towns and rural areas.

Prime Minister Abe highly praised this system (“the ‘hometown tax’ has changed our future in a good way” – from the speech by S. Abe at the 187th session of the Diet in 2014) and saw its potential not only in equalizing financial flows between big cities and the periphery, but also from the point of view of popularizing specific and/or unique local products on the national level. In his speech, the Prime Minister promised to strengthen support for commercializing new “hometown specialty goods” that make use of local resources.¹⁸

At the same time, one must point out that the system, rational and “just” by its design, has also demonstrated some negative effects in practice. In September 2018, the government has announced its intention to radically rework it, as its realization has led to fierce competition between local authorities for attracting donations by means of expensive

¹⁷ Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. December 19, 2019. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/actions/201912/_00030.html

¹⁸ Policy Speech by Prime Minister to the 187th Session of the Diet. September 29, 2014. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201409/policyspch.html

gifts, such as vouchers and personal computers. There were fears that only financially viable municipalities would be able to attract donors, which contradicts the goal of the program to decrease disparity in tax revenue.¹⁹ Nevertheless, as S. Abe said in December 2019, the system will continue to be used as one of the financial instruments to realize the Comprehensive Strategy.

The concept and the realization of the Comprehensive Strategy for Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy is tightly intertwined with the general strategy of socio-economic development of Japan, Abenomics. Prime Minister Abe directly pointed this out at the 11th meeting of the Council in 2016: “We will spread Abenomics to every corner of Japan, and raise the average income in local economies”, “we will create jobs in the regions through ‘local Abenomics.’”

¹⁹ Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications Noda Seiko stated that the government intended to change the Local Taxes Act to limit the cost of gifts given by local authorities to 30 percent of the sum of donations. This amendment excludes from the program the local governments that do not follow the rules, which makes it impossible for the donors of such municipalities to receive tax benefits. The government planned to introduce the draft act to a regular Diet session and enact it in April 2020. Despite the calls of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to cease making expensive gifts, some local authorities did not obey, receiving unjust advantages.

“If these outliers are allowed to continue as is, unfortunately the whole scheme could be undermined,” Noda warned. According to the ministry’s survey released in September 2018, 13.8 percent of Japan’s 1,788 municipalities were offering gifts whose values exceeded 30 percent of donations, and 9.7 percent stated they had no intention to change their practices. The number of municipalities providing gifts such as branded beef and wine that were not produced locally stood at 190. Some local governments said they had no local products that could be sent as gifts. See: Japan to curb expensive gift incentives under ‘hometown tax’ program. *Japan Times*, September 11, 2018. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/09/11/business/japan-curb-expensive-gift-incentives-hometown-tax-program/#.Xjp4FIhwmM8>

Another feature of the Comprehensive Strategy is that it is based on the principle of inclusivity. What is meant by this is the use of all local, “internal” resources, involvement in the development of regional economies of all population groups, including women, elderly people, as well as young people who earlier moved to big cities. For the latter, there are special measures of support provided if they intend to start their own business in their hometown or other regions outside the megapolises.²⁰

Goals and Directions of the 2015 New National Spatial Strategy

The New National Spatial Strategy (2015) is the currently effective and the most detailed document containing the general vision of the regional development strategy at the national level. It declares three imperatives defining the future image of the nation: security, economic growth, and active participation in international community. The basis of the New Strategy is the idea of creating a multi-layered “compact and networked territorial structure”, which should be resilient to natural disasters, encourage the accumulation in regions of industries that emphasize local features and simultaneously encourage the creation of “ecosystems” of innovations. “Compactness” in this context means the consolidation and optimization of various social services – domestic services, commerce, medicine – necessary for the residents of nearby communities, including those with decreasing population. At the same time, all residential areas are to be united in a “network”, i.e., provided with modern efficient communications which allow local residents

²⁰ Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. December 15, 2016. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201612/14article1.html; Meeting of the Council on Overcoming Population Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy in Japan. May 20, 2016. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/actions/201605/20article1.html

to reach both the “service centers”, where all the necessary social and consumer infrastructure is concentrated, and other residential areas.

As for the future of the megapolises, the New Strategy, as well as its predecessors, focus on the correction of excessive concentration of population and economic potential in Tokyo and, simultaneously, on maintaining the high-level city functions, including international business functions, in the Tokyo metropolis. This, in turn, is supposed to strengthen its international potential and competitiveness as a leading “cosmopolitan” global city.²¹ Therefore, the New National Spatial Strategy contains the two traditional directions and, accordingly, the two key goals of Japan's regional policy: vitalizing regional and rural economy and strengthening the global competitiveness of large megapolises, first of all, that of Tokyo.

So, what does the New Strategy suggest in order to achieve the designated goals? As far as the practical measures are concerned, it lays out plans to form territorial units of different types, where high-level urban functions can be concentrated, so that such cities could become effective drivers of growth for the entire region where they are located.

It is worth mentioning that, in various strategies and accompanying documents and presentations, the names of the planned new territorial units somewhat vary. However, one can designate three main types thereof – joint “core” urban territories, sustainably developing residential territories, and the so-called “small basic stations”. Within the “core” urban territories, which include several municipalities, the emphasis is made on the cooperation of local governments in developing the entire territory (60 such territories have been designated). The goal of the program of sustainably developing residential territories is to revitalize sparsely populated towns and villages (140 territories). The projects of “small basic stations” cover the territories of school districts (with population of ca. 20,000 people each) and are also aimed at the sustainable development of these territories with financial support in the form of subsidies of the Council on Overcoming Population

²¹ New National Spatial Strategy (National Plan). Leaflet.

Decline and Vitalizing Local Economy. In all cases, the main drivers of development are local governments, which will receive support in the form of redistributed taxes and subsidies.²²

The general idea, therefore, consists in optimizing the system of providing urban services to population in all parts of the country based on the more efficient use of social and transport infrastructure, as well as maximum mobilization of the region's internal resources.

It is also planned to "rank" the existing urban communities: cities with different number of residents will perform different functions. According to this idea, smaller cities (with a population of less than 100,000 people), together with "basic small station", provide urban services of a level higher than that in rural areas. They also provide jobs and communications with each other and with "small stations". The role of the latter, it is supposed, will be especially noticeable in small towns, villages, and rural areas, where the population is decreasing and the share of elderly people is high. In addition to providing services (commerce, healthcare, social services), they will also help to sustain rural communities.

The capitals of prefectures and the cities with population of several hundred thousand people and more will provide urban services of a yet higher level. They are also expected to create new jobs, develop new enterprises, including high-tech ones, which are able to create a competitive environment.²³

As for the social infrastructure, for example, large hospitals located in urban centers will serve the residents of nearby smaller communities, while smaller clinics as well as elderly and child care facilities will primarily be located in major residential areas. It is believed that this will prevent the growth of cities depending on cars, which is economically and environmentally undesirable. At the same time, urban centers and residential areas must be connected by efficient public transit networks.

²² [OECD 2016, p. 80]; New National Spatial Strategy (National Plan). Leaflet.

²³ National Spatial Strategy (National Plan). Pp. 1-6.

Thus, networks will be created which operate on different scales and use modern communications to connect with smaller towns and villages, as well as nearby service “nods” (“basic stations”) and neighboring medium-sized cities and the mega-regions of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka [OECD 2016, pp. 80-81]. Interestingly, the concept of differentiated development of urban settlements of different level and with different functions, which was formulated in 2008-2015, found its way into the mainstream of research of the problems of urbanization and urban organization conducted by the OECD jointly with the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. The OECD and EU experts have introduced the concept and the definition of a metropolitan territory as a “functional urban area”, including the city proper, with a high density of population, and the so-called “commuting zones” (the areas surrounding suburbs and cities which are socio-economically integrated in the city).²⁴

The report “Cities in the World. A new perspective on urbanization”, which contains the results of the aforementioned research, defines three classes of settlements instead of the dichotomous approach (urban and rural settlements): 1) cities (or densely settled areas); 2) cities and areas with a medium population density; 3) rural areas (or less populated areas). It is noted that the metropolitan territories grow faster than medium- and small-sized towns, which makes politicians face the problems of adequate development of transport and social infrastructure in densely populated big cities and, simultaneously, of supporting quality of life in other communities [OECD 2020].

As has already been noted, Japan's New National Spatial Strategy pays substantial attention to competitiveness and the future development of the nation's largest cities, first of all, Tokyo. Among the tasks intended for the megapolises are promotion of investment, adaptation of cities to the needs of elderly people and families with children, and also attraction of investment from other countries and strengthening the external

²⁴ What is a metropolitan area? OECD. <https://www.oecd.org/regional/regional-statistics/metropolitan-areas.htm>

connections of Japanese megapolises, especially with the nations of East Asia and the Eurasian continent in general.

The New Strategy, as well as the ones that preceded it, provides for the possibility of and recommends the local governments to independently develop plans of developing their areas. Despite the diversity of local plans and strategies, the common features of regional development are: support for the development of attractive tourist destinations on the basis of public-private partnership, further development of inbound tourism, prevention and mitigation of danger from natural disasters, forming national territory that is secure and resilient to natural disasters, support for regional communities.²⁵ It is no surprise that, after the 2011 catastrophe and taking into consideration the location, topographical and geological conditions of Japan, the National Strategy pays yet greater attention to the problem of resilience to natural disasters. It is common knowledge that the nation often suffers from earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons, floods, and severe snowfalls, which makes resilience one of the central problems of spatial policy.

In recent years, Japan is increasingly promoting the ideas of sustainable development of economy and the social sphere. Both the modernization of infrastructure and regional development are, according to governmental statements and documents (the 2015 Spatial Strategy, MLIT documents), increasingly bound to the achievement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and environmental policy.

For example, Chapter 4 of the MLIT annual White Book (2019), which is devoted to the issues of regional development, directly states that the realization of the projects of regional development is tightly intertwined with the initiatives to promote the SDGs. In 2018, the government requested from the local governments (prefectures and municipalities) initiatives of projects of development corresponding to the SDGs. From them, 29 cities were selected as “SDG Cities of the Future”, ten of which were additionally selected as Model Local Government SDG Projects.

²⁵ New National Spatial Strategy (Regional Plans).

Considering the necessity of cooperation between various interested parties in advancing the SDGs, in 2018, a “platform” of public-private partnership was created for the promotion of regional development in the context of achieving the SDGs, and, in 2019, the 1st International Forum on SDGs for Regional Revitalization was held for the purpose of promoting the exchange of initiatives between the SDG Cities of the Future in Japan and all over the world.²⁶

Japan's regional policy is tightly coordinated with the environmental one. The 2018 Basic Environment Plan directly states the intention to maintain “community living areas” as an integral “daily life zone” in hilly and mountainous areas marked with sharp population decrease and aging. Also, measures to form “small hubs” to create a sustainable community are provided for. Meanwhile, particular attention is paid to the use of local resources and to the development of local economies that provides sustainable growth, preservation of natural resources, and local biodiversity.²⁷

Regional Policy and Infrastructure Creation

As has already been pointed out above, in Japan, as well as in other countries, the goals and contents of regional policy have a comprehensive character, which is, to a large degree, defined by its coordination with other areas of regulating the national economy. The policy in the field of creating, maintaining, and modernizing national infrastructure, which largely falls under the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, traditionally and quite naturally has the strongest connection to regional policy.

²⁶ White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism in Japan, 2019. <https://www.mlit.go.jp/common/001325161.pdf>

²⁷ The Basic Environment Plan. Pp. 43, 49. http://www.env.go.jp/policy/kihon_keikaku/plan/plan_5/attach/ref_en-01.pdf

First, all strategies and plans of regional development adopted in Japan always provide for the development of territory, including both large cities and peripheral regions, in order to create conditions for doing business and comparable level of comfort for any citizen of the country, irrespective of their place of residence. At the same time, despite the high quantitative indicators of availability of industrial and social infrastructure, Japan faces the problem of aging and deterioration of infrastructure objects, a large share of which was built in the period of rapid economic growth, i.e., more than 50 years ago. According to a representative of MLIT, in the 21st century, the nation's infrastructural policy has entered the phase of "maturity", when the emphasis is made on qualitative, rather than quantitative indicators. Therefore, what is prioritized now are such goals as urban development with smaller environmental pressure, "smart city" projects, concepts of "compact networked structure", utilization and renewal of housing.

Second, construction and maintenance of infrastructural objects facilitates the creation of jobs in regions and is thus traditionally and for good reason considered by the government to be an instrument of stimulating local economy. The currently effective 4th Priority Plan for Infrastructure Development, adopted by the government in September 2015 and conceptually related to the key idea of the New Spatial Development Strategy, provides for the following:

- "strategic infrastructure management aiming at maximizing the Stock Effects of the infrastructure" based on effective use of the existing facilities and focusing on the projects with high Stock Effects;
- securing and training skilled construction engineers and technicians;
- securing stable investment.²⁸


Now, let us elaborate upon the notion of "stock effect", for it is one of the key ones not only for the strategy of infrastructural development,

²⁸ Mugishima, T. National Level Strategy for Infrastructure Development in Japan. <https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/123701486602287702/20170209-National-Level-Strategy-for-Infrastructure-Development-in-Japan.pdf>

but also for the plans of spatial development. The stock effect of infrastructure is subdivided into the effect of investment and of the objects themselves (see Figure 1).

Figure 1

Expected stock effects of infrastructure²⁹



For example, the opening of parts of an expressway around the Tokyo Bay (Ken-O Expressway) led to the growth of the value of manufactured goods shipped in the nearby cities by 120-166 percent, while the opening of other parts of this expressway in 2013-2015 and the construction of the Kuki transportation terminal led to the growth of land prices in the areas adjacent to these infrastructure objects

²⁹ Composed from: Mugishima, T. National Level Strategy for Infrastructure Development in Japan. <https://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/123701486602287702/20170209-National-Level-Strategy-for-Infrastructure-Development-in-Japan.pdf>

that surpassed the prefectural average,³⁰ which attests to the growth of business activity there. Therefore, the understanding of these “effects” directly links the goals of regional and infrastructural policy, and the modernization of these approaches and policies proceeds in a parallel and coordinated fashion.

The Role of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in the Development and Realization of Regional Policy

In the practical realization of regional policy in Japan, a substantial role is played by Japan’s key economic ministry – the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Many activities of the ministry are connected to regional development, among them support for small business and regional brands, creation of clusters, and, of course, structural policy. One of the most important directions of Japan’s regional policy belonging to the field of responsibility of METI is the location of productive forces. The Regional Economic and Industrial Policy Committee (within the Industrial Structure Council of the Ministry) works on the issues of locating manufacturing plants and other business units and, when necessary, introduces amendments or conducts the expertise of suggested amendments to the Factory Location Act.

In the policy documents of the METI Industrial Structure Council, regional development is considered in the context of upgrading infrastructure, improving the people’s quality of life while taking into consideration the diversification of needs and lifestyles, as well as promoting the achievements of scientific and technological progress under the conditions of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.³¹ For example, in the “Lifestyle” section of the METI New Industrial

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ New Industrial Structure Vision. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/publications/pdf/vision_171222.pdf

Structure Vision, it is directly stated that the decline of Japan's population, accompanied by the “shrinking” of consumer market, particularly affects regional economies, which suffer from the lack of labor force. Smaller regional economies do not provide economic opportunities for local residents, which makes it difficult to maintain social infrastructure, prompting more people to move to areas with more opportunity and leading to further loss of population. A vicious circle is created. Therefore, Japan will develop a new approach to community-building to create vitalized areas (small-scale compact territories are meant here – *I.T.*), where residents can live “with peace of mind”. Smart technologies and the sharing economy can help these “imperiled” communities regain their livelihoods and independence.³²

Practically, one of the steps in this direction is the promotion of so-called “sharing cities”. The government has designated 30 such pilot cities receiving support.³³ The city of Kamaishi, which hosted the Rugby World Cup in 2019, can be an example. The city hoped to use this opportunity to promote itself as a tourist destination. Foreseeing problems with housing and transportation, the local government turned to the idea of sharing business. In October 2016, a contract was signed with Airbnb to use farm housing for renting, while Airbnb was supposed to issue English guidebooks for tourists. The city also partnered with TABICA, a platform that introduced people to the daily lives and customs of locals through guides and workshops, and launched a PR campaign – “Meetup Kamaishi” – to promote local tourism. The local authorities also partnered with COGICOGI, a cycle-sharing service, and ShareNori, a car-sharing service, to offer transport to visitors during the event [World Economic Forum 2017].

Another initiative is connected to the development of so-called “smart cities”. Initially, the idea of smart cities was based on providing efficient energy supply, but later the concept gained a comprehensive

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

character, including wide use of information technologies, creating highly efficient industrial and social infrastructure on the basis of modern technological solutions. A notable example of combining the goals of vitalizing regions with scientific and technological development can be the initiative of the city of Aizu Wakamatsu (Fukushima Prefecture), located in the region recovering from the 2011 natural and man-made disaster. As the city population was increasingly shrinking, Aizu Wakamatsu City Hall, in cooperation with corporate partners, Fujitsu Limited, an electronic company, and Tohoku Electric Power Co, the regional power supply company, developed the concept of and, in 2013, launched the project of promoting the intellectual community named Aizu Wakamatsu Area Smart Community. The local Aizu University, which specializes in IT and which is given the important role in the attempt to create an IT cluster, also participates in the project. All of this, according to the idea of the project, is supposed to attract new businesses and create new quality jobs.

The project is coordinated with the strategic plans of developing the prefecture – the Plan for Revitalization in Fukushima Prefecture and the Reconstruction Efforts Aimed at Local Community Revitalization in the Aizu Wakamatsu city. The goal of this effort was to create an environmentally clean, low-carbon society; to vitalize local community; to create new enterprises and to become the pioneer in forming urban environment which is resilient to natural disasters and convenient for local residents. The project received grant financing from METI within the framework of METI's Subsidy for Projects Promoting the Introduction of Smart Communities and projects increasing the efficiency of energy use (including the use of renewable energy sources) in the three prefectures that suffered from the Great East Japan Earthquake – Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima.³⁴

³⁴ New Industrial Structure Vision...; Fujitsu, Aizu Wakamatsu City and Tohoku Electric Power Launch Smart Community Project in Japan's Aizu Wakamatsu Region. Tokyo, May 01, 2013. <https://www.fujitsu.com/global/about/resources/news/press-releases/2013/0501-01.html>

Conclusion

When analyzing Japan's present-day strategy of regional policy, one sees an emphasis on the social problems, including demographic ones, and the positioning of the strategy of spatial development as an integral part of the comprehensive national development strategy – Abenomics. This is clearly expressed in the formulation of the general goals of spatial policy and in the designation of the contours of the nation's future image: this will be a country “where people can feel safe and affluent”, where the damage from natural disasters and accidents is reduced to the minimum, where the supply of food, water, energy, income, jobs, and life services is secured, where the citizens are proud of regional attractions under diverse lifestyles. As an essential condition to achieve the ambitious goals, the authors logically name the maintenance of economic growth, the increase of industrial productivity and the creation of innovation through regional resources and interregional cooperation, the activation of women and elderly people under the condition of population decline.

Japan's regional policy is, in the full sense of the word, “a policy of policies”. With the comprehensive spatial development strategy, which we analyzed above, present, various aspects of regional development are “built in” the key policies and strategies developed and realized by various executive bodies – ministries and agencies – and are “supported” by their plans. This is quite understandable, as any projects within virtually every single direction of national economic policy have a territorial “binding”, and, on the other hand, regional policy itself has a “multidisciplinary” character. Any region – from the Tokyo metropolis to the most remote prefecture and a small town – is an integral socio-economic and natural complex, where, in this way or another, businesses are developing, social infrastructure is created, and innovative activities are conducted.

Japan's “internal” regional policy is formulated with the consideration of the country's global positioning. The Spatial Development Strategy declares the intention to become a country that is actively present in the international community, to become a global base of growth,

to accumulate cultural, industrial, scientific and research, financial, and other functions, to develop transportation and improve quality of life in accordance with international standards and to realize the model of an “open country”, encouraging people from abroad to visit, conduct research, do business, and invest in Japan.

It is necessary to point out that the modern regional policy is, to a large extent, based on the concepts and approaches already tried in the second half of the 20th century, but modernized with consideration to new challenges, new opportunities, and new needs emerging under the conditions of globalization and the unfolding of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. This is especially relevant for the concept of multipolar development, on the basis of which the “poles of growth” – new industrial cities in regions – were created as early as in the 1960s, and which underwent substantial change in the Technopolis project in the 1980s, when the initiative of regional planning was largely transferred to the local level. This trend of the balance shifting towards local governments and local interests, innovative for its time, found its continuation in the most recent variants of the spatial development strategy.

One more example of continuity of regional policy can be such form of organization of residential territories as “Sustainable residential areas”, *Teijū Jiritsu Ken*, described in the Spatial Strategy. In our opinion, it shares conceptual foundation with “integrated residential zones”, introduced in the 3rd Comprehensive National Development Plan for 1976-1990. The “integrated residential zones” were supposed to be conglomerates of urban and rural territories including natural complexes (mountains, rivers, plains, seashore), areas of residence, as well as transportation and communication of people. In the practical sense, the *teijūken* turned out to be unviable as “poles of growth”, but, conceptually, they heralded another stage of searches for models of territorial-industrial formations. This concept appeared at the wrong moment and was ahead of its time.³⁵ However, even now, analyzing the

³⁵ This conclusion was made by the author in her 2000 publication. See: [Timonina 2000, pp. 177-184]; see also: [Timonina 2014, pp. 260-289].

strategies from the 21st century, we find among the suggested models of development the “sustainably developing residential territories”, the “small basic stations”, the concept of which bears definite similarity to *teijūken*.

In conclusion, one cannot but note one more traditional “Japanese” approach in the field of regional (and not only regional) policy: all new is practically tested, modernized, and adapted to new realities old.

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TIMONINA Irina L'vovna – Doctor of Science (Economics), Professor, Institute of Asian and African Studies of Moscow State University; Institute of Business Studies (IBS-Moscow), RANEPA.

125009, Russia, Moscow, Mokhovaya street, 11/1.

E-mail: timonina2000@yahoo.com

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Abe Cabinet Migration Reforms: Cautious Liberalization?

M. A. Shipilova

Abstract. Japan is a developed country which, however, is facing an acute problem of population aging and demographic decline, including that of the number of working-age population, due to a combination of low fertility and high life expectancy. Most countries solve the problem of labor shortage by actively attracting labor migrants to the country. However, Japan – one of the most mono-ethnic countries in the world – is known for its strict migration legislation. The migration balance in 2018 amounted to a little more than 160,000 people, despite the fact that, in order to stabilize the population, the influx of people into the country should be about 500,000 annually. This situation is largely caused by limited migration attractiveness of Japan, where migrants still often face violations of their rights, difficulties in renting housing, employment and in everyday life due to the language barrier, complexity of administrative procedures, and socio-cultural characteristics of Japanese society.

Given the demographic trends, the use of labor migration to fill the shortage of labor in Japan seems to be not only reasonable, but also an uncontested option. That is why the migration policy of Japan became one of the most important issues with regard to the well-being of the Land of the Rising Sun during the premiership of S. Abe, who decided to gradually move to liberalize migration legislation. Since 2012, initiatives and goals of Abe Cabinet in the field of immigration control, in fact, affected all categories of migrants – highly qualified specialists, students, low-skilled workers, medium-skilled workers, and illegal immigrants.

The article will examine what measures were taken during Abe's premiership to attract foreigners and how the liberalization of migration legislation correlated with the growth strategy of Japan, Abenomics.

Keywords: migration policy, migration legislation, labor migrants, illegal migration, Abenomics

The issue of gradual liberalization of migration legislation is one of the hottest in Japan's politics. On the one hand, the trends of internal and global development literally push Japan towards attracting foreign workforce more actively. Currently, one of the most serious problems for Japan is the aging and decrease of population, including that which is economically active. According to forecasts, by 2065, out of 88 million people – and this is what Japan's population is going to be if the present-day reproduction level persists – only 39 million will be of working age. For comparison, in 2019, the population of the Tokyo urban agglomeration alone, which includes Tokyo, as well as Yokohama, Kawasaki, Saitama, Chiba, and Sagami-hara, was estimated to be 38.5 million people. According to the data of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), in 2018, 20 sectors experienced acute shortage of workforce, among them construction (average of 8.5 positions for a single candidate), mining industry (7.4), healthcare (4.66-3.27), automobile repair (4.25), transportation (3.66-3.28), hotel and restaurant business (3.08), food industry (3.07), and others.¹ Moreover, *The Japan Times* reports that even such a popular and cutting-edge industry as IT is expected to have a deficit of 800,000 workers by 2030 [Hughes 2019]. Yamada Hisashi, chief researcher at the Japan Research Institute, a leading think tank in Tokyo, said that, to meet this demand, it will be necessary to bring the number of foreign workers to 3.9 million, so that they make up 5 to 6 percent of the total

¹ Jobs with Labor Shortages in Japan, Ranked (2019). <https://izanau.com/article/view/labor-shortages-japan>

workforce [Tanikawa 2019]. On the other hand, for a monoethnic state like Japan, which is a country with a “closed” mentality, liberalization can prove no easy task.

Even though the prospect of liberalizing the rules of entry and residence, as well as creating beneficial conditions of life and work for foreigners began to be discussed at the turn of the 21st century, the first politician who endeavored a massive rework of immigration laws was Prime Minister Abe Shinzō. Since 2012, Abe amended the legislation with measures aiming to attract more highly skilled specialists and students, protect the rights of technical interns, fight illegal immigration, and, in 2018, he gained the approval of the Diet to establish two new categories of visas permitting the work of medium-qualified migrants. In the light of these innovations, politicians, researchers, and the general public are increasingly discussing the liberalization of migration processes in Japan. However, neither Abe nor his colleagues pronounced this phrase aloud, probably fearing the negative reaction of the public and the probable gaps in the realization of the strategy.

This article aims to characterize the immigration reforms conducted by the Abe cabinets, to understand what goals the prime minister pursued, how these measures related to his key strategy of national growth, Abenomics, and to evaluate how far Japan is going to be able to advance in terms of liberalizing its migration legislation.

Key Changes of Migration Legislation under the Premiership of Abe Shinzō

Japan is known as one of the most monoethnic countries of the world. According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2016, 98.1 percent of its population were ethnically Japanese (this figure includes the people of Ryūkyū, the Ainu, and some other native peoples of Japan), 0.5 percent were Chinese, 0.4 percent were Korean, and only 1 percent represented other ethnicities (primarily the citizens of the Philippines,

Vietnam, and Brazil). Traditionally, the nation's migration policy was based on limiting the entry of unqualified migrants, and the share of foreigners in Japan's population did not exceed two percent.

However, starting with the 1980s, when the country faced the shortage of workforce, the Japanese government started to reconsider its migration policy. In 1983, the goal was set to increase the number of foreign students from 10,000 to 100,000 by 2000, in 1990, the Immigration Control Act was revised, simplifying the entry of foreigners, in particular, of those of Japanese ancestry, and in 1993, the TITP internship program was launched. The share of migrants in the population was gradually increasing, from 0.67 percent in 1979 to 1.88 percent in 2016.² In 2018, the Japanese and international media reported that the share of foreign population exceeded two percent for the first time and reached 2.66 million people.³ One of the reasons for this was probably a more “welcoming” policy of the Japanese government. Nowadays, both conservatives and liberals understand that, under the conditions of the demographic crisis, not only highly qualified, but also medium- and low-qualified foreign workers are a necessary condition to maintain the viability of Japanese economy and to retain its positions in the international arena.

Since 2012, the government undertook several measures to promote migration, as well as to strengthen the protection of foreigners and improve their living and working conditions in Japan. At present, the 2015 Basic Plan for Immigration Control (5th edition) is in effect, its main goals consisting in more actively attracting foreign workers in the light of demographic decline in Japan, fighting illegal immigration, and creating

² Heisei 28 nenmatsu genzai ni okeru zairyū gaikokujin sū ni tsuite [About the number of foreigners at the end of 2016]. Ministry of Justice, Japan. <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001237697.pdf>

³ Gaikokujin saita no 266 man nin, 20 dai ga 3 wari. Rōdōryoku sasaeru [The number of foreigners reaches 2.66 million people, 30 percent of them are in their 20s. Japan's labor force is supported by foreigners]. Nikkei. <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO47203370Q9A710C1EA1000/>

conditions for harmonious co-existence of the Japanese and foreign citizens.⁴

As far as the general liberalization of migration policy is concerned, the present Residence Management System was introduced in July 2012 and replaced the alien registration system which existed since 1952 according to the Alien Registration Law of April 28, 1952.⁵ It was claimed that the old system stopped being efficient due to the number of migrants rising and their spheres of activity becoming more diversified. According to the new system, in order to stay in Japan, foreign citizens must receive one of the 30 residence statuses designated by the addenda to the 1951 Act. This status defines the length of stay and the type of work that the foreigner is permitted to do while staying in the country. At present, the maximum period of stay does not exceed 5 years (with the exception of diplomats and permanent residents), but some are allowed to have it extended.⁶

Attracting highly Qualified Workers

At present, the majority of qualified migrants are highly qualified specialists, entrepreneurs (managers and executives), engineers or specialists in the humanitarian or international fields, as well as professionals of a narrow specialization. Up to the 2010s, the Japanese government put an emphasis on attracting qualified workforce to facilitate the exchange of knowledge and experience and thus to revitalize the nation's economy. However, attracting talented foreigners and keeping

⁴ Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Basic Plan for Immigration Control (5th Edition). http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/seisaku/2015_kihonkeikaku_honbun_pamphlet_english.pdf

⁵ Alien Registration Law. <http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=36&vm=04&re=01>

⁶ Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Procedures for examinations for entries into and departures from Japan – Q&A. <http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/english/tetuduki/kanri/qa.html>

them in the country turned out to be not so easy due to several negative factors – high homogeneity of Japanese society, the language barrier, the rejection and suspicion on the part of the local population, weak legal protection of the migrants' rights. In 2012, aiming to increase Japan's attractiveness in the eyes of foreigners, the government introduced a points-based system of evaluation for highly qualified specialists. A similar system is in use in Australia, the US, Canada, and a number of other Western countries.

The points-based system gives foreigners several advantages. First, it provides for fast-track document review for highly qualified specialists. It takes no more than 10 days to receive the Certificate of Eligibility, which defines the status of the applicant, and no more than 5 days to have the status of residence confirmed. Second, foreigners with a high points score can apply for a permanent residence status earlier – after 3 years for highly qualified specialists with more than 70 points and after 1 year for highly qualified workers specialists with more than 80 points.⁷ Besides, since 2019, the Immigration Service started accepting visa applications on-line.⁸

Highly qualified specialists can also bring their family members with them (using the “Family Member”, 家族滞在 *kazoku taizai*, visa), with the latter being permitted to work, or domestic workers (using the “Designated Activities”, 特定活動 *tokutei katsudō*, visa). One of the advantages especially relevant for people from Asian countries is the opportunity to bring with them to Japan not only a spouse and a child, but also parents to take care of a pregnant mother or a child if the child is younger than seven years old. Such a practice is widespread in Asian countries, and this opportunity makes the “Highly Qualified Specialist” visa especially convenient for Chinese citizens. It is probably

⁷ Immigration Services Agency of Japan. Points-based Preferential Immigration Control and Residency Management Treatment for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professional. http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_3/en/index.html

⁸ Abenomics, March 2020. The Government of Japan. https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/_userdata/abenomics/pdf/2003_abenomics.pdf

to attract them that this provision was introduced. In recent years, China experiences an “emigration boom”, and Japan, located within an average two-hour flying distance from the central cities of China, is one of the “hottest” directions. For example, a native of Shanghai said that Tokyo was very convenient because of its clean air and because it was a good place to raise children, and some of his friends were very interested in obtaining the Japanese visa permitting to live there together with relatives [Himeda 2017]. Due to the barriers lowered in 2017, the number of foreign specialists increased 12-fold compared to 2013 – from 800 to 10,500 people,⁹ while in December 2018 it reached 15,300 people.¹⁰

The Strategy of growth in Japan aimed at attracting 10,000 qualified workers by and 20,000 by 2022. One must notice, however, that even though the former goal was reached ahead of schedule, the COVID-19 pandemic and the travel restrictions caused by it will likely undermine the achievement of the latter. Significant attention is paid not only to attracting specialists to work in Japanese companies but, even more so, to attracting foreign investors. S. Abe claimed: “The Japan that I am pursuing is a Japan that leads to being wide open to the entire world. What is necessary for Japan’s revival is a powerful catalyst that will restyle the old Japan and then make the “new” Japan even stronger. These are the expectations I hold towards direct investments into Japan”.¹¹

To do this, the government took measures to simplify the visa procedures for highly qualified specialists, as well as administrative procedures for entrepreneurs and foreign companies. In particular, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) provides free market information assistance to companies planning to open a new or expand

⁹ The Government of Japan. Welcoming Government. https://www.japan.go.jp/investment/welcoming_government.html

¹⁰ Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (2019). Report on Priority Measures and Others for Innovative Business Activity Action Plan. <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/keizaisaisei/pdf/report190621en.pdf>

¹¹ Talk to JETRO First about business in Japan. JETRO. https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/reports/pdf/talktojetro_en.pdf

an existing business in Japan, conducts consultations on administrative procedures for business registration, visa, labor, and tax issues, and also assists in searching for potential partners among Japanese companies. The organization has already supported more than 17,000 foreign companies willing to start business in Japan, and more than 1,700 of them continued working there successfully.

Moreover, in 2013, as a part of Abenomics, several National Strategic Special Zones (NSSZ) were created in Japan, where structural reforms aimed at the realization of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are conducted and where the government actively attracts highly qualified specialists. In 2015, startup visas, simplifying entry and stay for startup entrepreneurs, were introduced for starting business in the NSSZs. A startup visa can be received if one starts a business in one of the NSSZs in certain industries deemed useful for the region: innovative manufacturing; healthcare and medicine, social sphere; environment and energy production; logistics; commerce. To obtain this type of visa, one must present a CV, a detailed business plan, a roadmap of work, as well as a residence confirmation and a bank account statement confirming the ability of the applicant to reside in Japan during a half-year stay in Japan. If the application is approved, the startup entrepreneur will have from 6 months to a year to finish all the necessary preparations while staying in Japan and apply for an extendable Business Manager Visa. This initiative deserves high praise, for it will be able to significantly simplify the entry of new entrepreneurs into Japanese market and will facilitate further growth of the number of foreign specialists.

Based on the above, it can be said that the conditions of work and life of highly qualified foreign specialists in Japanese companies, as well as the conditions of entry of foreign investors into the Japanese market are improving. Nevertheless, their number remains comparatively small (slightly over 10,000 people), and this is not enough to stimulate the growth of Japanese economy. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic causes a postponement of indeterminate duration in the achievement of the set plans. Still, the increase of the number of professionals, their positive opinions about life and work in Japan and their stories of success in the

Japanese market demonstrate that the Japanese government is moving in the right direction in accordance with the goals of revitalizing the nation.

Attracting Medium-qualified Specialists in Sectors Experiencing the highest Workforce Deficit

According to the current immigration legislation, only the *nikkeijin* foreigners of Japanese ancestry (the so-called “front door” of immigration) and foreign students and technical interns (the so-called “side door”) can apply for unqualified jobs in Japan, while immigrants of medium qualification can enter the country using the “Specified Skilled Worker” (特定技能 *tokutei ginō*) visa since April 1, 2019. The Technical Intern Training Program, which promotes studying technology and mastering skills and knowledge in Japanese public or private organizations, was officially launched in Japan in 1993. It is considered the “side door” because it is meant to satisfy the demand for unqualified workers in sectors experiencing labor deficit while hiding this fact from the population, which does not approve of the influx of “aliens” [Korostikov 2018]. The intern training program is sponsored by the Japanese government and is conducted according to the 2016 Act on Proper Technical Intern Training and Protection of Technical Intern Trainees. The period of stay of different categories of interns has a one or two-year limit, with the total period of training being at most five years long. The trainees primarily come from China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia.

Within the framework of the program, upon arriving in Japan, the interns hear a lecture course on Japanese language, specifics of work in Japanese companies, as well as on the legal basics (primarily in the fields of immigration and labor law) for at least two months (320 hours), after which they start receiving practical skills directly in the companies. To advance to the next level (there are three of them, I, II, and III), it is necessary to pass an exam. In the case of passing it successfully, one can

apply for a visa of the next category, while, in the case of failure, it is necessary to go back home with the right of passing the exam again after not less than one month.

Despite the original design – training foreign specialists as a part of exchange of technologies and manufacturing skills between developed Japan and the developing nations of East and South East Asia, the TITP quickly turned into a channel of importing cheap and relatively disempowered workforce. From the very beginning, the interns were doing work characterized by the “three K’s” – 汚い *kitanai* (dirty), 危険 *kiken* (dangerous), and きつい *kitsui* (hard), while training itself was taking the back seat [Douglass & Roberts 2000, p. 6]. The employers were hiring foreigners in the areas where the latter could stay “invisible” to Japanese customers, so as not to spoil the company’s image. Even in such low-qualified fields as cleaning streets, taking out the garbage, or housekeeping, where, in other countries of the world, a significant part of workplaces is occupied by foreigners, Japan did not permit foreign labor.

The Japanese intern training program has often been criticized by interns and lawyers, who called it exploitation of workers for a small salary [IHRB 2017]. Due to this, the Japanese government has on numerous occasions taken measures to strengthen the legal basis in this field. The most recent amendments were made in 2016, as the Technical Intern Training Act was adopted and the responsibility of receiving organizations as well as the control over them was strengthened.¹² Article 3 of the Act claims that the goal of TITP is developing human resources, rather than it being “a means of adjusting labor demand and supply” in the national labor market.

According to the new legislation, since 2016, the implementing organizations (there are more than 35,000 of them) and the supervising organizations (more than 1,900) started to be monitored by the Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT). Its goals include

¹² Ministry of Justice, Japan. 2017. New Technical intern Training Program. <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001223972.pdf>

sanctioning the establishment of organizations and issuing licenses to them, accreditation of training plans, inspecting their facilities, accepting notifications from the organizations, preparing reports, supporting and protecting the rights of technical interns, as well as other interactions with controlling, implementing, and dispatching organizations. The maximum period of stay for interns was increased from 3 to 5 years.

The new legislation also requires the appointment of designated officers – a supervising manager, who successfully finished the relevant training within the recent three years, a technical training instructor with the experience of working in the industry for at least five years, and an officer responsible for the daily life of the technical interns. A hotline has been established to provide for communication between the OTIT and the interns, which receives complaints and provides consultations in the most frequently used languages – Chinese, Vietnamese, Indonesian, Tagalog, English. Probably the most important feature is that the legislators managed to impose the obligation to pay foreign workers a salary that is not lower than that paid to the Japanese doing the same work. This measure is aimed at preventing the decline of salaries due to using cheaper foreign labor.

One more achievement is the introduction of fines for breaking the Technical Intern Training Act, immigration, or labor laws. For example, forcing a foreigner to participate in the intern training program by means of assault, intimidation, or any other violent means is punished by imprisonment with penal labor for a term from 1 to 10 years, or a fine of 200,000 to 3,000,000 yen. Imposing fines or punishments for an intern, taking away their passport or taking control over their bank accounts, as well as limiting their freedom of action outside the workplace is punishment by imprisonment for up to 6 months or a fine of up to 300,000 yen.

Of course, now it is too early to speak about the efficiency of the measures proposed by the government, but one can be sure that the strengthening of the legislative base and the control system, as well as imposing punishments for inappropriate realization of the TITP demonstrates the responsible approach of the Japanese authorities to the

interns' problems. This, in turn, can be explained by two factors. First, this is a matter of reputation, as the problem of exploitation of trainees and human rights violations in Japan has been covered by regional and global media, with human rights activists in Japan and the immigrants' countries of origin increasingly focusing on this. Such a development can undermine Japan's reputation while it aims to play a significant role in global politics and economy.

Second, the labor deficit does not decrease, while potential interns are not as willing to participate in the program due to the negative experiences of their compatriots. Internal measures taken by the Japanese government to compensate for the consequences of the demographic decline, such as increasing the retirement age and material stimuli of a later retirement, or facilitating the participation of women in workforce, are not sufficient to retain the production potential. Therefore, the demand for importing workforce from abroad does not decrease either. Naturally, it is only possible to attract the increasingly cautious migrants only by persuading them of the absolute safety and profitability of the program, which is what the government is trying to do.

One more measure aimed at tackling the lack of labor resources was the amendment of immigration laws in December 2018. On December 8, the Diet of Japan passed the law opening the access to the country of low-qualified foreign workers with visas of the "Specified Skilled Worker (I)" and "Specified Skilled Worker (II)" type.¹³ They are meant for the employment of persons who have professional skills in areas designated by the Japanese government as experiencing deficit of workforce. There is a total of 14 of these – electronics, construction, industrial machinery, shipbuilding and ship machinery, raw materials industry, automobile repair and maintenance, food service industry, aviation, food and beverages, agriculture, fishery and aquaculture, nursing care, accommodation industry, cleaning. It is worth noting that the aim of this visa is to increase the number of foreign workers, unlike the technical

¹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Specified Skilled Worker. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/ca/fna/ssw/us/index.html>

intern visa, which should not be used to cover the “gaps” in the labor market.¹⁴ This visa will suit those who do not have higher education but graduated from a professional school or have experience of working in one of the 14 above-mentioned areas.

The category I skilled workers have a period of stay of 1 year, 6 months, or 4 months, with the possibility of extending it to a maximum of 5 years. For the category II skilled workers it is 3 years, 1 year, or 6 months, with the possibility of extending it for an unlimited number of times. Currently, only applications from the workers of the category I are accepted. One of the features of this residence status is that the workers are not permitted to take their family members with them, but the government expects that, after receiving enough experience of work under this visa category, the workers will be able to apply for category II, with all the advantages provided by it, including the right to bring a spouse and children under the family visa. This is likely meant to stimulate the attraction of permanent labor resources to the country, who have not only the skills and knowledge necessary for work, but also a sufficiently high command of the Japanese language and the Japanese culture, unlike the technical interns.

Despite the fact that both technical interns and skilled workers are usually hired in the same industries, their different statuses of residence determine their different terms of staying in Japan. First, the skilled workers’ activities are performed exclusively on the basis of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, while the technical interns are also subject to the Technical Intern Training Act. Second, unlike the technical interns, in order to sign a contract with the receiving organization, the skilled workers must pass two exams: a language proficiency one (at least the N^o4 or equivalent level), and a professional one. At present, the exams are held in nine countries: China, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Nepal, and Mongolia.

¹⁴ JITCO. What is the Technical Intern Training Program? <https://www.jitco.or.jp/en/regulation/index.html>

Staying in the country under this visa is also permitted to citizens of other countries, including those from the CIS countries, but initial entry has to be done under a different visa (for example, a student one as a part of studying Japanese language), and, at the same time, the two exams necessary for the skilled worker visa have to be taken. However, it is unlikely that there will be many applicants, as salary expectations in Russia and Central Asia are higher than in South East Asia, so the emphasis is most likely going to be made on the SEA nations [Korostikov 2018].

Skilled workers work directly with the receiving organization and do not require intermediaries like the dispatching or controlling organization. Moreover, unlike the technical interns, they can apply to any support organization to receive help in searching for a place of accommodation, adapting to the Japanese way of life or studying the Japanese language, receiving consultations on administrative procedures, promptly resolving any issues related to their work, and receiving assistance in the case of being fired. They also have a right to freely change jobs within the industry or even within adjacent industries, provided they have qualification proven by the test. The amendments became effective on April 1, 2019. It was expected that, within 5 years, up to 345,000 people would enter the country under the Specified Skilled Worker visa if the market conditions do not require a larger or smaller number of workers. Meanwhile, the industry quotas may change following the increase or decline of the demand in the labor market. The government was going to estimate the first results of the initiative after two years and make changes, should it be necessary.

Immediately after the Immigration Control Act was amended, the government published a document titled Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign nationals,¹⁵ which laid out the ways of safely and efficiently introducing the new system. In particular, the

¹⁵ Ministry of Justice, Japan. (2018). Comprehensive Measures for Acceptance and Coexistence of Foreign nationals. <http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001301382.pdf>

government decided to establish unified consultation centers throughout the country, working in 11 languages, so that every foreigner could receive necessary information; to create the environment accessible to foreigners in the fields of healthcare, communications, banking services, education; to develop a program of Japanese language training to help foreigners adapt to the Japanese culture and customs. The government also recommends full-time employment as regular workers, directly without intermediaries, so as to provide equal working conditions for Japanese citizens and foreigners (without differences in providing days off, paid vacations, bonuses, social and medical insurance, etc.). The employer is also required to transfer the salary to the worker's bank account or pay it in a different way that can be verified – this measure is meant to protect foreigners from not being paid their salaries [OECD iLibrary 2019].

Despite the initiative being criticized by the opposition, in particular, due to the documents being not detailed enough, to the insufficient protection of rights of foreign workers, as well as to the inability to properly regulate the existing program of attracting low-qualified workforce (TITP), at present, there is a consensus in political circles concerning the necessity to use migrants to satisfy the internal demand in industries experiencing labor deficit. The introduction of a new category of working visas also helped to partly alleviate the problem of employment of people who have professional education, but do not have a bachelor's or a master's degree. It seems that this amendment of migration legislation demonstrate a change in the approach to the issues of immigration, which will likely significantly influence Japanese society and its future development.

Is Gradual Change of Migration Legislation a Structural Element of Abenomics?

To understand the essence and the depth of the reforms, the measures undertaken by the government in the field of migration control need to be considered not only in the context of the demographic crisis as

such, but also in the context of other initiatives, first and foremost, the large-scale and comprehensive program of Abenomics, which remains the backbone of the government's economic policy even after Suga Yoshihide succeeded Abe Shinzō as Prime Minister in September 2020. Initially, in 2012, the goal of Abenomics was to vitalize the stagnant economy by means of “three arrows” – monetary policy to overcome deflation, flexible fiscal policy to support the economy, in particular, infrastructure projects and developing new technologies, and also a growth strategy involving structural reforms aimed at securing the sustainable growth of Japanese economy. The plans included the creation of special economic zones, the labor legislation reforms, including the abolition of lifetime employment and the realization of the “equal pay for equal work” principle, involvement of women in the economy and keeping elderly persons there, cancellation of several restrictions for businesses, attraction of foreign investment and foreign workers, as well as other changes.

However, the strategy was not static – it was amended and changed with consideration of the requirements of time. As one goal was achieved, new ones were set. The analysis of the current measures allows one to say that many measures are aimed precisely at halting the reduction of the working-age population. The website of the Japanese government openly declares: “The greatest structural issue facing the Japanese economy is the aging of society and shrinking of the population. However, we see this challenge as an opportunity.”¹⁶

On the one hand, the solution to this problem lies in increasing productivity. That is why now Japan is abandoning such inefficient practices as overtime work, removes the difference in pay for regular and irregular workers, abandons the system of lifetime employment and stimulates re-employment of middle-aged and elderly workers, as well as women quitting their childcare leaves. Two more key tasks are the stimulation of commerce and investment and the creation of favorable conditions for doing business.

¹⁶ The Government of Japan. Abenomics. <https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/>

Due to this, the creation of the so-called innovative Society 5.0, which provides for the mobility of human resources, knowledge, and capital without any barriers, has become one of the goals of the new Abenomics. It is expected that informatization and robotics will make it possible to create equal opportunities for all, as well as facilitate the creation of the environment to realize the potential of every person. "In Society 5.0, technology will help to remove physical, administrative, and social barriers for the self-realization of a person and the development of technology, and this, in turn, will lead to sustainable social and economic growth," claims Onoda Hiroyuki, the CEO of Mitsubishi Electric (RUS), in his interview with the Forbes magazine.¹⁷

Nevertheless, aware that Japan will not be able to halt the decrease of the working-age male population and provide for economic growth only with the help of this group, the government is "opening doors for a more diverse and more flexible workforce" – women, foreign workers, and elderly people. As of March 2020 (that is, immediately before the COVID-19 pandemic, which engulfed Japan and most other countries of the world), compared to 2012, the number of employed persons had increased by 4.4 million people (out of them, 3.3 million are women), the employment of elderly persons over 65 had increased by 5.4 percent, while unemployment had decreased from 4.3 to 2.4 percent. The number of foreign workers had increased from 680 thousand to 1.4 million people. There is no doubt that the increase of the number of foreign workers can be explained by the growing popularity of Japan as an immigration destination due to the sensible policy of the government, which includes measures taken both within the country and abroad.

The primary source of attracting foreigners lies in increasing their interest in Japan by means of the activities of Japanese organizations

¹⁷ «Общество 5.0»: японские технологии для цифровой трансформации российской экономики [Society 5.0: Japanese technology for digital transformation of Russia's economy]. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.ru/partnerskie-materialy/367837-obshchestvo-50-yaponskie-tehnologii-dlya-cifrovoy-transformatsii>

abroad and the popularization of Japanese culture and achievements. This is what the Cool Japan strategy is aimed at, as it focuses on the global popularization of the Japanese language, Japanese culture and its products, such as anime, manga, video games, Japanese cuisine, traditional culture, Japanese fashion, robots, and other goods. Since 2013, in addition to humanitarian contents, the project started focusing on the economic goal of promoting the development and export of products made by Japanese creative businesses. The Cool Japan strategy is realized by Japan's diplomatic missions abroad, the Japan House, the Japan Foundation, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), the Japan Food Product Overseas Promotion Center (JFOODO), and others.

Despite the lack of accumulated data on the relation between the realization of the Cool Japan program and the growth of interest in Japan on the part of foreigners, since 2012, Japan managed to achieve substantial progress. In 2018, 3.85 million people were studying the Japanese language in more than 18,600 educational institutions globally, while the number of Japanese language teachers grew by 20.3 percent.¹⁸ The data published by the Statistics Bureau of Japan show the growth of short-term visits to Japan from 197,000 (out of them, 139,000 were tourists) in 2012 to 601,000 (502,000 were tourists) in 2019.¹⁹ Even more illustrative is the number of entries into Japan: in 2012, 9.1 million people entered Japan with different purposes (out of them, 7.5 were first-time visitors), while, in 2018, 30.1 million people entered Japan (with 27.5 million being first-time visitors). In the same 2018, foreign tourists spent in Japan 4.5 trillion yen, or more than 40 billion dollars by the current exchange rate, which is a tremendous source of income for the Japanese economy and a stimulus for the development of retail business.

¹⁸ No. of Japanese language institutions soars in Asia: survey. Kyodo News. <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2019/10/5a68e414f248-no-of-japanese-language-institutions-soars-in-asia-survey.html>

¹⁹ The number of foreigners in the country with a "short-term stay" residence status at the time of the census.

This was in accordance with Abe's plans to turn the country into a "tourism superpower". In 2015, the Prime Minister set a national goal to bring the number of foreign guests coming to the country to 30 million people a year, to 40 million people in 2020, and to 60 million people in 2030 [The Japan Times 2019]. To do this, visa procedures were simplified, low-cost airlines flying not only to Tokyo, but also to other potentially attractive cities were developed, transport and IT infrastructure was improved, old resort towns were renovated, while new ones are being developed, opportunities for cash-free travel are introduced. The government was also going to lift some restrictions on using private apartments as hotels, solve the problems of training translator guides, lack of tour busses, lack of information in foreign languages, etc. Even though inbound tourism collapsed because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all of these trends are likely to continue after this crisis is over.

The growing number of foreign workers (both employees of Japanese companies and investors) is also the result of the efforts of the Japanese government to attract them. A significant advantage from the point of view of international investors is Japan's macroeconomic and financial stability, as well as access to the world market – the Japanese network of free trade zones covers 85.5 percent of world trade and 86.3 percent of global GDP.²⁰ In 2019, Japan occupied the 6th place out of 141 in the World Economic Forum competitiveness ranking, which takes into account economic growth, infrastructure development, efficiency of governance, and efficiency of business [WEF 2019]. On the everyday level, according to the Global Peace Index, Japan is one of the countries most suitable and safe for life – in 2019, the country occupied the 9th place out of 163 [IEP 2019]. The rating is based on 23 indicators, including respect for human rights, the risk of terrorism, the number of police officers, relations with neighboring countries, and others. The website of the Government of Japan published the information that, according to the Monocle's Quality of Life Survey, Tokyo occupies the second place after Zurich

²⁰ Talk to JETRO First about business in Japan. JETRO. https://www.jetro.go.jp/en/invest/reports/pdf/talktojetro_en.pdf

among the cities most comfortable for life [Monocle 2019]. The rating considers such indicators as the level of crime/safety, climate, condition of environment, quality of architecture, infrastructure development, conditions for doing business, quality of medical services, and even tolerance of local population. As foreign population is increasingly concentrated in the three largest urban agglomerations of Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, the government has also started to encourage them to work in less populated areas, some of which are in acute need of highly qualified, medium-qualified, and low-qualified workers due to the trends of internal migration.

On the other hand, the Japanese government, while urging foreigners to come to Japan to rest or work, has at multiple occasions stated that the measures taken to simplify their entry and stay do not constitute immigration policy. Prime Minister Abe said several times that the country invited foreign workers to alleviate the acute deficit of workforce and denied the prospect of these foreign workers “transforming” into long-term migrants [Murakami 2018]. This fuels the discussions about whether the liberalization of Japan’s migration legislation is actually taking place or not. On the one hand, new, less strict rules are being introduced and the number of foreigners is growing, but, on the other hand, the government staunchly denies this fact.

One of the reasons for the government trying to mention the “change of immigration policy” as seldom as possible and, generally speaking, does not recognize the fact of immigration itself is the cautious or even openly hostile attitude of Japan’s population towards foreigners. The overwhelming majority of the population, who are unfamiliar or only superficially, sometimes just indirectly familiar with foreigners, the *gaijin* are potential competitors in the labor market, criminals, or just people violating the harmony of Japanese society. For example, Nishimura Yasutoshi, a Cabinet member responsible for the Government’s policy in the field of foreign labor resources, said in his interview with the Financial Times: “We don’t use the word ‘immigration’. There is still a strong insular mentality. Still, (it) would be a big change for Japan.”

At the same time, many, including the former head of the Tokyo Immigration Bureau Sakanaka Hidenori, believe that the changes and the new measures represent a *de facto* shift to an immigration policy.²¹ Moreover, it is obvious that all the new measures, initiatives, and goals discussed in this article are aimed at a certain category of migrants. In essence, no one was left without attention – the measures taken under Abe, and especially in the last six years, concerned highly qualified specialists, students, low-qualified workers, workers of medium qualification, as well as illegal immigrants. Sasaki Shirō, secretary general of one of Japan's large labor unions, explains the government's position in the following way: "Abe's definition of an immigrant is someone who lives in Japan long-term, with family. But by international standards, the trainees are immigrants. In this sense we can say that Japan is already an immigrant society."

Therefore, the first step towards fully using the opportunities and solving the problems that arise as large numbers of migrants are attracted to Japan is to recognize the fact of immigration to Japan. As the Japanese government refuses to conduct immigration policy in its public statements, it prepares itself three pitfalls. First, this sort of rhetoric strengthens distrust on the part of foreigners and makes them choose other directions for immigration, therefore preventing the government from reaching the set goals of increasing the number of migrants of different categories and tackling the problem of demographic decline. Second, these statements complicate the work of immigration services and other organizations, making it impossible to conduct full-fledged legal regulation in the fields of protecting the migrants' rights and creating equal opportunities in the socio-economic field. Third, this misinforms Japanese citizens, who observe the growing number of foreigners in their country but refuse to accept them in their "closed" (as the government claims) society.

²¹ Japan to loosen strict immigration rules amid labour shortage. Aljazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/japan-loosen-strict-immigration-rules-labour-shortage-181102031450029.html>

Generally speaking, based on the above, one can conclude that attracting foreign specialists already became one of the key elements of the third arrow of Abenomics, namely, structural reforms – at least, before harsh travel restrictions were imposed due to the global coronavirus pandemic. Because of this, the government aimed to create the environment favorable for foreigners and spreads information about the benefits of living, studying, and working in Japan. Therefore, in the light of changes in the world and Japan itself, the Japanese migration legislation is actually becoming more liberal, which is also testified by the fact of the amendments to the Immigration Control Act, which became effective since April 1, 2019. Despite all this, there remained strict attitude about the issue of accepting large numbers of foreigners, which is caused by the necessity to provide public safety within the country and maintain a high level of socio-economic welfare, as well as the fear to displease the public. For the current strategy to be successful, after the situation with international travel is “back to normal”, the government will have to find the “golden mean” – the balance between giving foreigners an opportunity to be full-fledged and useful members of Japanese society and the desire to preserve the uniqueness of the Japanese culture.

* * *

A study of the Abe government’s migration policy leads to the conclusion that Japan has come to realize the need to open to the world and cooperate with other countries in attracting the necessary labor resources. Since 2012, the Abe cabinet took a large number of measures aimed at promoting migration, as well as at protecting foreigners’ right and creating more favorable conditions for their life and work in Japan.

Currently, the issue of inbound migration is temporarily overshadowed by the COVID-19 global pandemic and the travel restrictions caused by it, but it will likely become relevant again once this unprecedented crisis is over. The consequences of liberalizing migration legislation can manifest in various areas and be both good and bad. On the one hand, attracting foreigners will help to meet several goals: tackling demographic decline, increasing domestic consumption,

developing Japan's regions, creating and introducing innovations, which will enable sustainable economic growth. Because of this, one can say that the future success of Abenomics under Prime Minister Suga and his successors largely depends upon the government's skillful immigration policy. On the other hand, there are certain problems barring the achievement of the government's goals in the field of immigration – the remaining language barrier, the complexity of administrative procedures, the issue of public services, primarily education and healthcare, being accessible to foreigners, the cautious attitude of the Japanese public.

Due to this, one of the key problems Japan is facing in the era of globalization is the search for a balance between giving foreigners an opportunity to be full-fledged members of Japanese society, provided they meet certain requirements, and the desire to preserve the uniqueness of the Japanese culture. What is required is further improvement and efficient implementation of migration policy which clearly regulates migration processes so as to provide conflict-free and happy coexistence of the local population with foreigners, as well as future economic, political, cultural, and social thriving of the country.

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SHIPILOVA Maria Andreevna – Lecturer of the Department of Japanese, Korean, Mongolian and Indonesian Languages of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University).

119454, Russia, Moscow, Vernadskogo Prospect, 76
E-mail: immeari13@gmail.com

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Historical Memory and Its Influence on Relations between Tokyo and Taipei under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016)¹

V. A. Perminova

Abstract. Taiwan, a former colony of Japan (1895–1945), for a number of different factors still remains the only region in the world that does not place emphasis on the negative sides of a rather long period of Japanese colonial rule. Problems of the historical past do not directly affect the development of traditionally close relations between Japan and Taiwan, but they play an important role in forming the “Taiwanese identity” and are closely related to the current issues of the foreign and domestic policies of the Republic of China. The ongoing feud between Mainland China and Taiwan, coupled with the current international political situation, also has an effect on the assessment by the Taiwanese of their colonial past and the policies of the Japanese Empire in the first half of the 20th century, and the perception of contemporary Japan in Taiwan.

The article discusses the approaches of Taiwanese authorities to problems of the historical past under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016) – a period when the Kuomintang built up equally good relations with Japan and China on the basis of the new conception of “Taiwanese identity”. Making efforts to reconcile the pro-unification and pro-independence parties, the president

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tried to form in Taiwanese society a balanced approach to the understanding of the Japanese and Chinese periods of Taiwan's history, as well as the role of Japan in the development of the modern Republic of China. Calling himself "the best friend of Japan", Ma Ying-jeou continued to strengthen ties between Tokyo and Taipei, and at the same time took a hard-line stance on the territorial dispute with Japan – the issue of sovereignty over the Diaoyudao (釣魚島)/Senkaku islands (or Diaoyutai islands 釣魚臺 as they are called in Taiwan), which appeared again on the agenda of Japan-Taiwan relations. However, the issues of the historical past during the Ma Ying-jeou era did not hamper the development of cooperation between Tokyo and Taipei, and, in 2008-2016, the image of Japan in Taiwan remained constantly positive.

Keywords: Taiwan, Japan, Republic of China, Diaoyudao, Senkaku, problems of the historical past, foreign affairs.

Introduction

Issues of the historical past associated with the expansion of the Japanese Empire in Asia in the first half of the 20th century are still relevant in the relations of Japan with its neighbours – its former colonies and the countries that underwent military occupation during World War II. First of all, this refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of Korea – the contradictions with these countries over the interpretation of Japan's military past have been on for the last few decades. At the same time, Taiwan, which was Japan's colony for 50 years (1895–1945), still remains the only region in the world that does not place emphasis on the negative sides of a rather long period of Japanese colonial rule due to a number of various factors. Moreover, the perception of the Japanese in Taiwan's society was positive throughout the post-war period and still is today, which markedly contrasts with the predominantly negative image

of Japan in contemporary Korea, also a former colony of the Japanese Empire, not to mention the clearly negative perception of the Japanese in the PRC.

The main discussions over the interpretations of Japanese presence in Taiwan and the results of World War II are, as a rule, limited to a narrow range of issues – they include the demand that Japan should admit its guilt before the Taiwanese women who were sent to military brothels during the war years to “comfort” Japanese soldiers (the so-called “comfort women”, *weianfu* 慰安婦), the demand for monetary compensation for those women, and also the contestation of the sovereignty over the islands of Diaoyudao (釣魚島)/Senkaku (or Diaoyutai 釣魚臺 as they are called in Taiwan). It is important to point out that all these issues are related not to the entire period of Japanese rule but to the war time (the *weianfu* issue) or to the interpretation of the results of the war (the territorial dispute). Discussions in society and the media about aspects of the colonial policy as such on the island mainly took place in the 1990s and the early 2000s during the discussions about compensation for “comfort women”, which, according to many researchers, were highly politicized and often moved to the level of interparty confrontation, mostly between the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

The shaping of collective memory about the Japanese presence in Taiwan was prompted by both domestic and foreign policy factors. Undoubtedly, the international situation in the mid-20th century, the division of the world into two opposing camps and the persisting threat of the island’s annexation to Communist China primarily affected the building of Japan-Taiwan relations after 1945 and also the formation of collective memory about the Japanese period in society. At the same time, the antagonism between the mainland and the island part of China, which, during the first few decades after the war, was just a part of the diplomatic agenda of Taiwan’s relations with the outside world, gradually moved to the domestic political discourse with the beginning of the island’s democratization in the 1990s and provided the grounds for the revaluation of its own colonial past.

Contrasting Taiwan to mainland China in the context of defending liberal and democratic values (under President Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 in 1988–2000) and even striving to acquire political independence (under the administration of Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 in 2000–2008) also presumed the opposition of Taiwan's society to the Chinese. The basis for this was the so-called "Taiwan-centric" approach to understanding the island's history, which focused on the uniqueness of Taiwan's history, culture, language, and ethnic make-up (all the elements that make "Taiwanese identity"), often through great underestimation or denial of the influence of mainland Chinese culture and history [He Yinan 2014, pp. 475–476]. In this respect, the elements of Japanese tradition brought to the island in the first half of the 20th century and the new system of values provided an additional argument to confirm Taiwan's uniqueness and special identity of the local people.

This trend was somewhat subdued during the rule of Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), a member of the Kuomintang party, who made an attempt to build friendly relations with both Japan and the PRC on the basis of the new conception of "Taiwanese identity" (the main element of which was now Chinese traditional culture). It is important to note that, making efforts to reconcile the pro-unification and pro-independence parties, the president tried to form in Taiwanese society a balanced approach to the understanding of the Japanese and Chinese periods of Taiwanese history, as well as the problems of the historical past and the role of Japan in the development of the modern Republic of China.

Problem of Diaoyudao/Senkaku in Relations between Japan and Taiwan under President Ma Ying-jeou

Ma Ying-jeou's victory in the 2008 election meant a return of power to the Kuomintang after the DPP's eight-year rule. From that moment, Taiwan's foreign policy was characterized by significant restraint in its relations with mainland China and the desire to avoid

conflict situations in order to build mutually beneficial cooperation. Whereas in the previous years, in their policies, the authorities preferred either the Chinese direction (focusing on close ties with the PRC under the Kuomintang rule in the 1950s–1980s), or the Japanese direction (consolidating cooperation with Tokyo under presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian), Ma Ying-jeou held on the golden mean, striving to develop equally good relations with both countries. Against the background of the previous 20 years, when the policy of the Republic of China was clearly anti-Chinese (and pro-Japanese), as a results of which the Taipei–Beijing relations aggravated significantly, the political course of Ma Ying-jeou was a “cease-fire” in the confrontation of the ROC and the PRC. During the presidency of Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, the authorities adhered to the course to win independence for Taiwan, strive for democracy, and oppose the PRC. In turn, Ma Ying-jeou embarked on the policy of compliance with the 1992 Consensus (the agreement providing for recognition by both parties of the unity and uniqueness of China: “China and Taiwan are not separate states”), which presumed a return of Japan-Taiwan relations to a fully unofficial format.

In the eyes of Japanese politicians, Ma Ying-jeou’s coming to power signified a change from “friendly relations with Japan” to “friendly relations with the PRC”. The new President of the ROC, who had previously been the Mayor of Taipei, was believed by Tokyo to belong, on the whole, to politicians who were rather hostile than friendly to Japan. Even before his election, Ma Ying-jeou criticized Chen Shui-bian’s excessively soft stand on the disputed islands of Diaoyudao/Senkaku and called to resume negotiations on the ownership of these territories. In addition, he bitterly criticized Japan’s war crimes in China and, with regard to the past events, stated that one “need to forgive, but not to forget” the woes which the Chinese people experienced [Jia Chaowei 2011, p. 102–103; Gordeeva 2012, p. 45].

Almost immediately after Ma Ying-jeou took office, there happened several events which demonstrated some a distancing of Taipei from Tokyo:

- During his inauguration speech in May 2008, the ROC President, speaking of the priority areas of Taiwan's foreign policy, mentioned only the USA, saying nothing about Japan. This was seen as Taipei's lack of attention to bilateral relations.²
- Resignation of Hsu Shih-kai (許世楷), head of Taiwan's office in Japan; moreover, from late May to July this position was unoccupied, which was also viewed by the Japanese side as a sign of disrespectful attitude from Taiwan [Jia Chaowei 2011, pp. 101–103].
- An incident of a Taiwan fishing ship colliding with a Japanese patrol boat off the islands of Diaoyudao/Senkaku.

During the rule of Ma Ying-jeou, the ROC, for the first time in many years, reaffirmed its claims to the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands, a group of eight islands in the East China Sea, the sovereignty over which, in addition to Taiwan, is contested by Japan and the PRC. The ROC's claims to these territories are based on the same arguments that are cited by the PRC in its favour: in the Qing era, the islands were part of the Chinese province of Taiwan. Later, following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, they passed to the Japanese Empire as part of that province and remained attached to Taiwan, which Japan abandoned as a result of World War II. Due to the fact that, under the terms of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the status of Taiwan remained uncertain, the ROC considers the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands to be its territory, while the PRC claims it to be its own, along with Taiwan and other adjacent smaller islands.

The ROC first announced that it had the right to exploit offshore oil reserves in the area of these islands in 1969, soon after hydrocarbon deposits were discovered there. In 1970, the Taiwanese authorities announced that the islands belonged to the ROC. In 1971, during the preparation of the agreement on the transfer of the Ryukyu islands (along with the Senkaku islands) to the jurisdiction of Japan by the US

² Ma Ying-jeou zong tong jiu zhi yan shuo quan wen [Ma Ying-jeou inaugural speech, full text]. Reuters. May 20, 2008. <https://www.reuters.com/article/idCNnCT018060720080520>

administration, the ROC authorities opposed the agreement, considering the inclusion of Diaoyudao into the Japanese prefecture of Okinawa illegal [Kireeva 2013, p. 4–5]. From that moment, Taiwan, just like the PRC, began to contest the sovereignty over the Diaoyudao islands.

In the early 1970s, after the prolongation of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1970 and the return of Okinawa to Japan under the 1971 Treaty, there emerged the “Defend the Diaoyu Islands Movement” (*baodiao* 保釣/保釣愛國運動), a patriotic movement to protect Chinese sovereignty over these territories, with activists in mainland China, Macao, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, as well as the Chinese expat community abroad. Members of the *baodiao* movement regularly held protests, approaching the disputed territories on boats and fishing vessels, often making attempts to land on the shore.³

One of such incidents was the sinking of a ship of the *baodiao* movement on June 10, 2008, when a ROC fishing vessel *Lian he hao* (聯合號) collided with a Japanese patrol boat off the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands. The incident sank the Taiwanese vessel; its 16 crew members were saved by Japanese coast guards and brought to the island of Ishigaki for interrogation; the captain was detained. The Taiwanese authorities responded in a rather tough manner – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an official statement of four points to the effect that the Diaoyudao islands were part of the ROC territory; the ROC invariably defended its sovereignty over these territories; the Taiwanese authorities declared resolute protests over the detainment of the vessel, the damage inflicted on it, and the captain’s arrest; the ROC demanded that Japan release the captain, make apologies, and recompense for the damage; Taiwan intended to consolidate the combat capability of its customs patrol.⁴ The next day after the publication of the statement, the Japanese

³ Later, members of the movement began to join anti-Japanese protests in China and abroad, which were not directly associated with the territorial dispute.

⁴ Zheng dui ri ben hai shang bao an ting xun luo jian zhuan chen wo guo hai diao chuan lian he hao shi jian wai jiao bu zhang ou hong lian zhao jian ri ben

side released the captain of the fishing boat and apologized for the incident. At the same time, on June 14, Tokyo also published a statement laying the blame for the incident on the crew of the Taiwanese vessel and, in turn, demanded compensation. The ROC responded by recalling its official representative from Tokyo [He Yinan 2014, p. 495].

This was the first instance in 20 years that the ROC officially declared its principled position on the issue of the islands' ownership. The incident with the sinking of the Taiwanese boat caused an eruption of protests led by *baodiao* activists. On June 15, 2008, participants of the movement simultaneously put to sea on boats from ports of Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the PRC (from the city of Xiamen) and, as an act of protest, sailed off the Diaoyudao islands (a Taiwanese boat went round the islands). An important feature of the act was that the Taiwanese side, which formally participated in it, tried to distance itself as much as possible from the other activists: its boat sailed accompanied by a frigate on the same day but at a different time; only Taiwanese citizens could be on board the ship; in addition, the ROC government stated that Taiwan defended its sovereignty over the islands and the rights of Taiwanese fishermen who had for centuries fished in the area of these islands. There were no incidents during the act, but later Tokyo condemned Taipei for the invasion of Japan's territorial waters [He Yinan 2014, pp. 494–495].

Taipei's rather tough reaction to the incident with the fishing boat was not so much an indication that the ROC was drastically reviewing its attitude towards Japan, but rather a desire to show that the Kuomintang was much more decisive than the DPP in upholding Taiwan's interests

jiao liu xie hui dai biao chi tian wei biao da yan zheng kang yi [Minister of Foreign Affairs Ou Honglian voiced vigorous protest to deputy of Interchange Association Ikeda Tadashi for incident of Taiwanese fishing boat "lian he hao" shipwreck after collision with Japanese coastal patrol interdiction craft]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China. June 12, 2008. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content_M_2.aspx?n=8742DCE7A2A28761&sms=491DoE5BF5F4BC36&s=312E81BE37A69132

on the international scene. What made the ROC's position regarding the ownership of the disputed islands particularly clear was Taiwan's reluctance to show a united front with the PRC and to counterpose the ROC against Japan, being at the same time in "one camp" with the mainland. Beijing's traditional pressure on the Taiwan government to join anti-Japanese acts at the moments when Japan-China relations were aggravated due to the issues of the historical past led invariably to the ROC distancing itself from the mainland and declaring its "own dispute with the PRC" [Gordeeva 2015, pp. 109–110].

At the same time, the heightening of tensions in Japan-Taiwan relations was not supported by the general public in the ROC: the president was criticized for overly strict measures towards Tokyo and deliberate deterioration of bilateral relations. However, Ma Ying-jeou did not intend to abandon close trade and economic ties with Japan. The president stated that he was the "best friend" of that country and made significant efforts to strengthen bilateral ties. Describing Japan-Taiwan relations as "special partnership", the ROC president contributed to maintaining contacts between Tokyo and Taipei in various fields, despite their non-official status. After the tensions caused by the incident in June 2008 faded away, in 2009, the ROC authorities put forward a number of initiatives to strengthen Japan-Taiwan interaction – Minister of Foreign Affairs Francisco Ou (Ou Hung-lian, 歐鴻鍊) put together a program for developing bilateral relations in five main areas: economic and trade cooperation, cultural exchanges, youth policy and student exchanges, development of the tourism sector, and a dialogue between Japanese and Taiwanese scientific research centers.

As a result, in 2010–2012, the sides signed a number of documents concerning trade, economic and industrial cooperation, interaction in the patent sphere, an agreement on "open skies", investment protection, and a set of agreements in the humanitarian area [Jia Chaowei 2011, pp. 106–107]. Tokyo and Taipei helped each other after natural disasters – in 2009, after a powerful typhoon in Taiwan, Japan sent essential goods to Taipei and rendered material assistance; in 2011, Taiwan actively helped Japan to overcome the consequences of the

tsunami and the accident at the nuclear power station (the ROC sent 560 tons of relief consignments and transferred over 18 billion yen) [Gordeeva 2015, pp. 89–90].

Strategically, Ma Ying-jeou considered further strengthening of the Japan-US alliance based on the Security Treaty to be the best guarantee of security in the region, though he did not speed up Taiwan's active involvement in the Treaty. Contacts between the Taiwanese and the Japanese authorities continued at a fairly high level – in 2010–2012, the ROC was visited by Japan's former Prime Ministers Aso Tarō, Abe Shinzō and Mori Yoshirō, and, during the APEC summit in 2012, Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko met the ROC's former Vice President Lien Chan (連戰). By the number of concluded agreements and meetings, 2011 was called the year when bilateral relations reached their acme by Taiwan's Foreign Ministry [He Yinan 2014, p. 495].

The growing animosity between Tokyo and Beijing in 2010–2012 over the ownership of the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands practically did not affect the nature of the same territorial dispute between Tokyo and Taipei, as the position of Taiwan was invariable: the ROC insisted on its sovereignty over the islands, since it was its obligation “to protect the rights of Taiwanese fishermen who have for centuries fished in the area of the Diaoyudao islands”. In addition, Taiwan intended to resolve the issue of the islands “in accordance with its own national interests”.⁵ In 2010–2012, Taiwanese participants in the *baodiao* movement carried out several acts of protest on boats and fishing vessels, approaching the islands, sometimes trying to land on them and announcing through

⁵ Ri ben jiao liu xie hui li shi zhang jin jing zheng bai hui wai jiao bu bu zhang yang jin tian shuo ming ri ben zheng fu “guo you hua” diao yu tai lie yu zheng ce [The head of the Interchange Association Imai Tadashi commented the Japanese policy of “nationalization” of Dioyutai islands while meeting with Minister for Foreign Affairs of Taiwan Yang Jintian]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). September 25, 2012. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content_M_2.aspx?n=8742DCE7A2A28761&sms=491D0E5BF5F4BC36&s=7ACE3D5DDE29D6DA

loud-speakers that the Diaoyudao islands belonged to the Republic of China. In turn, Japan Coast Guard boats made the Taiwanese ships turn back and did not allow the activists to land on the shore. In those cases, Tokyo usually made oral statements on the unacceptability of violation of Japan's sovereignty over the islands by Taiwan. In August 2012, Ma Ying-jeou tried to relax the tensions by proposing the *East China Sea Peace Initiative*, which provided for resolving the territorial dispute through peaceful means, refraining from taking any antagonistic actions, and establishing a code of conduct in the East China Sea. However, for some political reasons, the initiative did not go any further.⁶

It should be noted that protest acts, as a rule, took place after the exacerbation of relations between Tokyo and Beijing. For instance, after the incident when the Chinese fishing boat collided with the Japanese Coast Guard ships on September 7, 2010, Taiwanese boats also approached the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands on September 13. After Japan nationalized the disputed territories on September 11, 2012, Taiwanese activists of the *baodiao* movement conducted their protest act on September 25: 50 ships with the *baodiao* slogans (fishing boats with superscriptions "Diaoyudao islands are Taiwanese"), accompanied by 10 patrol boats, entered the 12-mile water area around the islands.⁷ The act was quite peaceful – the Taiwanese ships did not meet with any opposition from the Japanese Coast Guard boats, though at times they

⁶ Ma zong tong ti chu "dong hai he ping chang yi" hu yu xiang guan ge fang he ping chu li diao yu tai lie yu zheng yi [President Ma proposes the East China Sea Peace Initiative, calls on all parties concerned to resolve Diaoyutai dispute peacefully]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (Taiwan). August 5, 2012. https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content_M_2.aspx?n=8742DCE7A2A28761&sms=491D0E5BF5F4BC36&s=12E507923C25C262

⁷ Tai wan bao diao chuan jin ru diao yu dao hai yu, xiang ri han hua: zhe shi tai wan ling tu [Taiwanese *baodiao* boat entered water area of Diaoyudao islands, claimed to Japanese: this is territory of Taiwan]. Teng xun xin wen. September 25, 2012. <https://news.qq.com/a/20120925/000802.htm>

were quite close to each other.⁸ On the day of the protest act, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement explaining again the ROC position on the issue of the islands' ownership.⁹

With regard to the nationalization of the islands, the ROC government, as before, did not show "a united front" with Beijing against Tokyo. Taiwan explained its position by the fact that the ROC and the PRC had their own unsettled conflict over the sovereignty issue. However, this did not prevent Beijing from saying in the media that mainland China and Taiwan jointly opposed Tokyo's attempts to challenge sovereignty over the islands.¹⁰ Another instance of *baodiao* ships approaching the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands occurred on January 24, 2013, when a Taiwanese fishing boat *Quan jia fu hao* (全家福號) came up to the islands to a distance of 28 miles, after which Japanese Coast Guard boats used water cannons to make it turn and go back.¹¹ The same boat was known due to the fact that when earlier, in July 2012, it approached the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands to a distance of 1.6 miles, the crew did not let the Japanese patrol officers board the boat for inspection.¹²

To settle the issue of the right of Taiwanese ships to fish in the area of the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands, Japan repeatedly proposed that the ROC

⁸ Ri fang cheng duo sou tai wan bao diao chuan jin ru diao yu dao 12 hai li hai yu [Japan says several Taiwanese *baodiao* boats entered 12-mile water area of Diaoyudao islands]. Huan qiu. September 25, 2012. <https://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJxc3W>

⁹ The head of the Interchange Association... 2012.

¹⁰ Tai wan bao diao chuan jin ru diao yu dao hai yu [Taiwanese *baodiao* boats entered water area of Diaoyudao islands]. Xin lang xin wen. July 5, 2012. <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-07-05/081024715562.shtml>

¹¹ Tai wan bao diao chuan jin ru diao yu dao lian jie hai yu [Taiwanese *baodiao* boats entered water area of Diaoyudao islands]. Xin lang xin wen. January 24, 2013. <http://news.sina.com.cn/w/2013-01-24/112726113070.shtml>

¹² Tai wan bao diao chuan jin ru diao yu dao hai yu [Taiwanese *baodiao* boats entered water area of Diaoyudao islands]. Xin lang xin wen. July 5, 2012. <http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2012-07-05/081024715562.shtml>

should be given special conditions for fisheries in the area. As a rule, the Taiwanese authorities turned down these proposals under the pretext that the ROC insisted on its sovereignty over the islands and, consequently, had every right to fish off the islands. However, on April 10, 2013, the Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement was signed. Under the Agreement, Taiwan was free to fish in the area adjacent to the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands (on a sea space of about 4.5 thousand km²); but the ROC ships were forbidden from entering the 12-mile territorial zone. To settle the issues of joint development of marine territories adjacent to the islands, a Japan-Taiwan fishing commission was set up. The ROC insisted that the agreement indicated that it did not affect the issue of sovereignty over the islands [Gordeeva 2015, p. 110]. Taiwan's position regarding the ownership of the islands was as follows: "defend sovereignty, postpone the territorial dispute for the future, strive for peace, promote joint development of the countries", "work together on the development of the region's marine resources" [Nippon.com 2013].

The Japan-Taiwan Fisheries Agreement, which substantially released the tensions between Tokyo and Taipei over the disputed territories, caused strict condemnation on the part of the PRC. The annoying factor for Beijing was not only that Taiwan refused for a while to challenge Japan with regard to the ownership of the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands, but the very fact of Japan-Taiwan negotiations. Although the negotiations were held under the auspices of unofficial offices and were positioned as unofficial, yet the ones taking part in them were representatives of official departments (including the Foreign Ministry) of Japan [Gordeeva 2015, p. 110].

“Chinese Factor” in Relations between Tokyo and Taipei and its Influence on Historical Memory in Taiwan

Building relations of mutually beneficial cooperation with Tokyo, Ma Ying-jeou pursued a policy of consolidating economic ties with mainland China; in this case, the sides did not have to choose between

the two equally important partners, being able to develop with each other very close economic cooperation, while bidding by certain restrictions in the political sphere. Maintaining contacts with Japanese conservative politicians, the Taiwanese president, however, distanced himself from Japanese supporters of the ROC independence. Starting from 2008, Taiwan acted according to Ma Ying-jeou's principle of "maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait": "no unification, no independence, no use of force" (不統, 不獨, 不武).¹³ In 2008–2016, the ROC and the PRC signed a number of agreements, the most important of which were the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA, 2010) and the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (2013). These agreements opened the doors of the Taiwanese economy for Chinese investment, middle and big business and significantly promoted tourist exchanges.

In the context of reorientation of Taiwan's foreign policy from the Japan-US direction towards more balanced relationships with the PRC while maintaining close ties with its strategic allies, Ma Ying-jeou also took a more "centrist" stand with regard to Taiwanese identity, a problem that, in the previous decades, had been inseparably connected with the ROC's domestic and foreign policies. The president focused on the Chinese component of the national identity of the islanders, which showed in broader study of Chinese history and culture by younger Taiwanese people. By reminding the people of their Chinese ancestry, the authorities tried to eliminate the basis for the idea of Taiwan's independence, which was based on the historical and cultural uniqueness of the island. During the rule of Ma Ying-jeou, it was popular to consider oneself both Chinese and Taiwanese (over 50 percent of the population); at least, the proportion of those who considered themselves only Taiwanese substantially decreased compared to the percentage before 2008 [He Yinan 2014, pp. 491–492].

While, in the 1990s and early 2000s, the ROC's officials attended festive events in the Japanese mission on the occasion of the Japanese emperor's birthday, which showed a high value of relations with Japan

¹³ Ma Ying-jeou... 2008.

for Taipei and the desire to demonstrate multiculturalism in Taiwanese tradition, Ma Ying-jeou, who attended the ceremonies of remembrance of the Yellow Emperor (*Huangdi* 皇帝), the legendary forefather of the Chinese, showed commitment to traditional Chinese values.¹⁴

The ROC's authorities re-raised the question of the Taiwanese people's resistance to the colonial administration and the connection of this resistance with the anti-Japanese struggle of all the Chinese in 1937–1945. In 2011, Taipei opened a memorial commemorating the victory in the anti-Japan war and Taiwan's "glorious revival" (抗日戰爭勝利暨臺灣光復紀念碑) and acknowledging the contribution of the island to the struggle against the Japanese invaders.¹⁵ In 2015, Ma Ying-jeou proposed an initiative to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II and the anniversary of Taiwan's victory over Japan; however this proposal evoked an ambiguous reaction in society – in particular, the ROC's former President Lee Teng-hui, who opposed the idea, arguing that, unlike mainland China, Taiwan had not been at war with the Japanese Empire [Hoppens 2018, p. 55].

On the whole, the Japanese rule was assessed rather neutrally in history textbooks, though the term "occupation" was returned to the text; the oppression and discrimination of the islanders was mentioned again, and much attention was devoted to the successes of the colonial administration, the modernization and enlightenment of Taiwan [He Yinan

¹⁴ Chong jing min zu: ma ying jiu zhu chi zhong shu yao ji huang di ling dian li [Worshipping the ancestor of Chinese nation: Ma Ying-jeou attended grand ceremony for ancestor worship of Yellow Emperor Huang-di]. Huan qiu. April 1, 2016. <https://taiwan.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJU4V>

¹⁵ The memorial was scheduled to be installed back in 1995 on the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II; but since some sections of society resisted, it was installed only in 1999; and, by the decision of the Legislative Yuan, no inscription was made on the monument under the pretext that the history of the anti-Japan resistance was too controversial to be clearly interpreted. In 2011, a commemorative inscription was made and the memorial was re-opened.

2014, p. 491]. To confirm that the Taiwanese remember and appreciate the efforts of the colonial masters to improve the island, in 2011, another monument was unveiled in Tainan – one to the well-known Japanese engineer Hatta Yoichi (八田與一), who led the works to organize water supply, to build water reservoirs, irrigation systems, drainage and sewage systems in Taipei.¹⁶

The invariably good attitude of the Taiwanese to the Japanese, which the islanders showed throughout the entire postwar period irrespective of the current political situation, was confirmed by sociological surveys under Ma Ying-jeou as well. Moreover, the reciprocal favourable feelings of the Japanese towards the Taiwanese increased substantially during the aggravation of relations between Beijing and Tokyo in 2010–2012. The number of those who had amicable feelings for the ROC people was even bigger than during the period of particularly close Japan-Taiwan ties under President Chen Shui-bian (about 70 percent of the Japanese felt sympathy for the ROC people). 52 percent of the Taiwanese found Japan the most attractive country (“their favourite country”) and said that they wanted to go there as tourists: 44 percent and over 60 percent expressed a feeling of closeness to Japan [Gordeeva 2015, pp. 91–92]. At the same time, many believed that, in the future, Taiwan should develop closer relations with the PRC and not with Japan, as it was previously [He Yinan 2014, p. 492]. These facts speak to the effect that the Taiwanese wanted to maintain good relations with mainland China not because they felt antipathy to Japan or felt “more Chinese than Taiwanese”, but rather

¹⁶ In April 2017, the statue was decapitated by advocates of Taiwan’s unification with the PRC, but in one month the monument was restored and unveiled ceremonially in the presence of Hatta Yoichi’s descendants. This incident caused an ambiguous reaction in society; after the incident with the monument of Hatta Yoichi, some statues of Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek were decapitated and thrown paint over. See: Tai nan “ba tian yu yi tong xiang” zao kan tou [Tainan “Bronze statue of Hatta Yoichi” was decapitated]. Huaxia.com. April 19, 2017. <http://www.huaxia.com/jjtw/jjtd/jrtw/04/5283355.html>

because they did not want the situation in the Taiwan Strait to aggravate. Let us point out again that, in this case, some improvement in the attitude of the ROC people towards mainland China did not affect in any way the traditionally high indicators of Japan's image in Taiwan.

As the ties with mainland China were strengthening, Ma Ying-jeou, who had a reputation of a pro-China politician even earlier, was increasingly perceived by society as a proxy for the PRC interests in Taiwan. This trend became more distinct after he was elected president for the second term in January 2012 and especially after the growth of Chinese influence on Taiwan with Xi Jinping coming to power in March 2013. The population of the island was wary of the increased economic dependence on the mainland and the rapidly growing number of Chinese tourists who literally flooded the ROC. The agreements signed with the PRC (on economic cooperation and trade in services) opened the way for it gaining wide access to the island's economy, which was not sufficiently balanced by the preferences that Taiwanese businesses had in mainland China. The content of the Cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (2013) was developed, in fact, behind closed doors, depriving the general public of the possibility to discuss the Agreement, and later the procedure for its consideration in the Legislative Yuan was also violated. Taiwanese society responded with protest – after the Agreement was ratified in March 2014, the discontent turned into a student demonstration (“Sunflower Movement”), the participants of which seized the parliament building. The Umbrella Movement, a political movement in Hong Kong against Beijing's intention to control elections to local government bodies which followed these events, and the unwillingness of the central Chinese authorities to make any concessions were an additional argument against the rapprochement between the ROC and the mainland.

A significant drop in the approval ratings of Ma Ying-jeou by the end of his second presidential term led, as expected, to renewed popularity of the idea of Taiwanese identity on the anti-Chinese basis, the Taiwanese people's greater fellow feelings for Japan, and society's inclination to support the DPP in the coming election. Although in 2008–2016 the issues of the historical past did not impede Japan-Taiwan cooperation,

with the population being disappointed with the President's pro-China policies, his more balanced approach towards the interpretation of the issues of the past ceased to suit the public. Criticism of Ma Ying-jeou was not confined to domestic policy aspects and the "Chinese factor"; his principled position on the territorial dispute with Japan also caused discontent. This concerned not only the incidents when Taiwanese boats intruded in the area of the Diaoyudao/Senkaku islands, but also the dispute between Taiwan and Japan, which emerged early in 2016, over the designation of the Okinotori coral atoll, located in the territorial waters of Japan. Taipei declared that this atoll was not an island, as Tokyo believed, but a rock, which removes the possibility to measure the exclusive economic zone from its border (this is also the position of the PRC) [Hoppens 2018, p. 55]. As for the issue of "comfort women", during the rule of Ma Ying-jeou it was not on the agenda of Japan-Taiwan relations. Although the president expressed his support for these women, the question of compensation to the former *weianfu* did not go anywhere, and this subject was not played up either by the government or by public organizations [Suzuki 2011, p. 244].

Conclusion

Usually, in Taiwan, the assessment of the colonial rule and Japan's actions during World War II was one of the aspects of the discussion on the ways of the development of the ROC, its status, and prospects for strengthening ties with its nearest neighbours, primarily the PRC, the USA, and Japan. On the domestic agenda, the issues of the historical past appeared, as a rule, in the context of other issues relating to national identity, reinterpretation of the island's history and the search for models of future development of society and the state in Taiwan. Since the authorities often used the issues of the past to increase their own approval rating inside the country, these issues, being clearly politicized, became significantly less attractive for the general public, which perceived them as an element of the interparty confrontation. As a rule, supporters

of closer relations with the PRC (particularly, the Kuomintang) focused on the negative aspects of the colonial rule more often, whereas advocates of independent Taiwan (for example, the DPP) usually pointed to the modernization of the island under the control of the Japanese, contrasting it with the “white terror” of the Chinese administration in the first post-war decades. In this respect, Ma Ying-jeou’s “golden mean” policy was an attempt to reconcile the two dissenting camps, convincing the inhabitants of the island that they could be simultaneously Taiwanese and Chinese; the two sides of the single national identity ceased to be mutually exclusive and were not set against each other any more, unlike the 1990s and the early 2000s.

It is important to note that, in the 2010s, an important factor to the shaping of the ROC’s foreign and domestic policies was the increasing role of mainland China, which began to more actively claim leadership both in the region and in the world. The PRC’s principled position on the disputed territorial issues, Beijing’s closer attention to the Taiwan question, and significant aggravation of Japan-China relations in 2010–2013, in fact, prompted the ROC to consolidate ties with the US-Japan alliance and to categorically reject the imposed economic integration with the mainland; as a result, this led to stronger pro-Japanese sentiment in society and Taiwan’s desire to be “closer” to Japan than China.

In this context, in order to keep the balance between the PRC and Japan, the Taiwanese government sought to maintain sufficiently good relations with each country, to defend the ROC’s interests in the territorial dispute while rejecting express support from Japan or China in periods of exacerbation of their relations [He Yinan 2014, pp. 497–498].¹⁷ However, as practice showed, it turned out to be quite difficult for the ROC to follow this course in full measure. According to some researchers, it was increasingly difficult for Taiwan to maneuver between such heavyweight

¹⁷ According to some researchers, Ma Ying-jeou’s policy of balance results from the fact that, in the system of PRC-Japan-ROC, relations Taiwan is the weakest apex of this asymmetrical triangle, which is found not in the centre but in the periphery of main international processes [Chen Mumin 2013].

players as the PRC and Japan as their bilateral relations deteriorated in the early 2010s, since Taiwan was “squeezed” by contradictions between Beijing and Tokyo, with each side expecting Taiwan to support it, and not the other side, in times of crisis.

The same dependence can be observed in the Taiwanese people’s definition of their national identity: in times of conflicts between Beijing and Tokyo, as a rule, under the pressure of the Chinese authorities, the people of the ROC began to harbor kinder feelings for Japan, to recall the positive aspects of the colonial period, and to think about their belonging to a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community, which, as it was developing on the basis of democratic values, was moving further and further away from the mainland. Thus, the historical memory of the Japanese presence in Taiwan, the assessment of the colonial past and the role of Japan in forming the contemporary ROC, which invariably influence the shaping of the phenomenon of “Taiwanese identity”, prove to be inseparably connected with the most important problems of Taiwan’s domestic and foreign policies.

The DPP’s confident victory in the 2016 election (and then in 2020), which meant a return to power of advocates of stronger ties of the ROC with the USA and Japan, confirmed the intention of Taiwanese society to distance itself from Communist China and move further along the path of democratic development with the support from its main strategic allies. After the new President representing the DPP, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文), took office, Japan-Taiwan relations, as expected, gained great momentum, while the issues of the historical past were even more muted against the background of consolidated ties with Tokyo, which are so important for Taipei.

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PERMINOVA Vera Aleksandrovna – PhD (History), Researcher, Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS; Associate professor, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation.

107031, Russia, Moscow, Rozhdestvenka street 12.

E-mail: verger177@yandex.ru.

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Illegal Border Crossing: The Experience of Edo Period Travelers

A. A. Dudko

Abstract. Travel diaries of the Edo period contain records about border posts and descriptions of illegal border crossing. Travelers resorted to paying bribes, changing clothes, and going around border posts if they did not have a *tegata* document, or for other reasons. For example, Kobayashi Kuzufuru (1793–1880) in his diary *Gochi Mōde* describes how he and his wife, with the help of a guide, went around the Sekigawa border post twice because his wife did not have a *tegata*. Furukawa Koshoken (1726–1807) writes in his work *Saiyū Zakki* (1783) how, in order to travel the Satsuma province, he pretended to be a pilgrim. Sakata Kisen'ō mentions in his diary of a journey from Edo to Izu, *Izu-no Kuni Futokoro Nikki* (1835), that he asked his friend who worked at the Hakone border post to let him through without making him wait in line. Diaries by female authors do not contain detailed descriptions of going around border posts, but they do mention hardships suffered during checks at border posts and the expenses caused by this. Despite the fact that one needs to consider the documents and diaries preserved at border posts, as well as documents of court proceedings in order to create the full picture of border crossings, the travel diaries of the Edo period give the general idea of the difficulties of travel and of how the travelers dealt with them.

Keywords: travel diaries, Edo period, border posts, *sekishonuke*, *sekishoyaburi*.

In the Edo period, more than 2,500 travel diaries were written, and many of them have not been transcribed yet.¹ The ones already introduced in scholarly circulation differ in their contents, style, and form. There are diaries with literary qualities typical of medieval travel diaries: a great role of *utamakura*, large amount of poetry, numerous references to *monogatari* tales (mainly *Genji Monogatari* and *Ise Monogatari*) and poetic anthologies. At the same time, there are many diaries which are travel records almost without any poetic component, created solely to describe the travel; they were written to be latter presented to the immediate circle of the author. The present article will focus on diaries of private travels (therefore, descriptions of *sankin kōtai* official trips are excluded) which mention illegal border crossings. It is worth noting that, among the diaries containing such mentions, the overwhelming majority are preserved as manuscripts, as printed editions were subject to strict censorship. One should also take into consideration the fact that one can obtain information about border crossings not only from travel diaries, but also from official documents, diaries, and records made at border posts,² as well as court acts and other documents. To create a full picture of an Edo period traveler crossing a border, one has to consider all the above-mentioned sources, but this article focuses exclusively on travel diaries.

One can most frequently find descriptions of illegal border crossings in the handwritten travel diaries of the 19th century. At the same time, it is not the case that, in the last third of the Edo period, it became easier to break the law and therefore the number of people secretly going around

¹ Itasaka Yoko, one of the best known students of travel diaries, counts ca. 2,500 diaries among those known and recorded in document databases, but believes that there are much more of them among the primary sources that have not been described and studied yet [Itasaka 2010, p. 4].

² Records and documents from the border posts of Hakone, Imagire, Hisui, etc., have been preserved, and they are included in respective collections. For example, there exists a collection of documents of the Hakone border post [Hakone Sekisho Kenkyūkai (ed.) 1973].

border posts increased. First, compared to the first half of the Edo period, there are more diaries preserved from the 19th century.³ Second, many of the diaries mentioning illegal border crossings, are only preserved as manuscripts, as the authors did not expect the text to go beyond the close circle of their friends and were not afraid to describe the border crossing in detail. At the same time, in the 17th – 18th centuries, the most numerous among the diaries preserved are printed books, which were subject to censorship [Fukai 1995, p. 174].

There are two expressions denoting an illegal border crossing: *sekisho nuke* 関所抜け and *sekisho yaburi* 関所破り, which usually mean going around a border post without presenting the necessary documents. Travel diaries mention the following three methods of illegal border crossing: a bribe (or other arrangement with a border post official), deception by means of changing clothes, and going around the border post (with or without a guide). Illegal border crossing was punished with execution by crucifixion, and, in the case of a forced offence, for example, in the case of a woman having been kidnapped, she was excluded from the house register and deprived of all rights, forced to work all her life where ordered [Kanamori 2002, p. 184].

There were several reasons for the travelers wanting to evade border posts. The primary one was the lack of necessary documents. In the Edo period, to cross a border, one needed a *tegata* 手形 document, which is often called an Edo passport. There were several types thereof, one of the most universal being *ōrai tegata* 往来手形, providing for crossing the borders to the destination point and back, as well as help in the case of difficulties arising during the trip.⁴ *Tegata* were issued to men as well

³ From the ca. 2,500 known diaries, about 200 have been transcribed and described. A large share of them are diaries from the 19th century. The edition [Tsumoto (ed.) 2007] contains 48 diaries. Analyzing the diaries of travels from the Tōhoku region to Kansai, Takahashi Yoichi concludes that the peak of diary writing happened in the 1840s. [Takahashi 2016, p. 61].

⁴ *Ōrai tegata* were the most useful type, but there were also *tegata* for a single border post, as well as *tegata* which were not a paper document, but a small

as women by their place of residence: in villages, by the village head or the head of the largest local temple, in cities – by district heads, in Edo – by the *bakufu rusui* 幕府留守居 [Kanamori 2002, p. 149]. In the *tegata* passport, one could most frequently find the following information: the name and the place of residence of the holder, the accompanying persons, the means of travel and the belongings taken on the trip, the destination, the reason for the trip. In the end of the document, there was the name and the position of the issuer and, in some cases, the signature or the stamp of the holder (it had to be repeated or presented at the border post). Men could obtain a *tegata* more easily than women, while men usually did not have to present one [Kanamori 2002, p. 149], while a woman could not pass a border post without a document.⁵ Besides the abovementioned information, the *tegata* issued to women could also contain the description of appearance, so that, during the check at the border post (*onna aratame* 女改め) it could also be confirmed. There were cases when women had their hair cut during the check if its length did not match that stated in the *tegata*. The *onna aratame* check was conducted by female officials of the border post. During it, the female travelers had their hair undone and were either thoroughly searched or had to undress. After that, the women were asked several questions to determine whether they had really received the *tegata* by themselves from the local authorities [Kanamori 2002, p. 143].

The difficulties of obtaining a *tegata* and thorough checks at border posts, which were tiring and humiliating for female travelers, were

wooden tablet – these were issued to farmers who had to regularly cross a border for working purposes. For more detail about *tegata* see [Shibata 2016].

⁵ There were cases when a woman could pass a border post without a thorough examination of the document. Imano Nobuo writes: “Only those who headed towards Kyoto were subject to thorough checks, but those who were going to enter Edo could pass a border post without a *tegata*. This applied to women as well. ...as for the women heading for Edo, it was enough to hear from the man accompanying them (women did not travel alone) their name and destination, but there were no other examinations. [Imano 1986, p. 125].

the main reasons for women evading border posts. A male traveler accompanied by a woman also often tried to avoid checks and opted for illegal ways to cross a border.

A detailed account of crossing a border, during which the travelers chose to go around due to the absence of necessary documents, is contained in the *Gochi Mōde* 五智まうで diary, written by a *haikai* poet Kobayashi Kuzufuru 小林葛古 (1793–1880). He was traveling from his native Shinano (now the Nagano Prefecture) to Echigo (now the Niigata Prefecture) in order to visit the Gochikokubunji Temple 五智国分寺 (also known as Echigokokubunji 越後国分寺) together with his wife in 1832. On the way to Echigo, the spouses faced the Sekigawa border post. The author describes its crossing in the following way.

18th day of the Fourth Moon, the Day of the Wooden Sheep. Clear.

There is one *ri* from Nojiri to Sekigawa. According to the instructions of the innkeeper, we got up with the chickens, ate rice with *chazuke* tea. As the innkeeper was extremely nice, we gave him a hundred *mon* tip, and he did not charge us for the cup of sake and the candle that we had asked for at night, and he also said that he would give twelve *mon* from the tip to the guide, and lent us a lamp. <...> The guide went ahead of us. Until Sekigawa, the road went downhill, and there were lots of stones under our feet. In the Kumasaka village, we extinguished the lamp, and when we were crossing the bridge towards the border post, we went without using our canes, not to mention that we were not talking. To the right of the gate there was a fence door, passing through which we went out towards some fields. One could not see well in the dark, but we noticed eight or nine people, most likely from Sekigawa, who were probably collecting fees from the guides. From there, we passed behind the houses, reached the center of the Sekigawa inn without stopping,

and, overjoyed, gave the guide sixteen *mon* for sake.
[Yaba (ed.) 1984, pp. 227-228].

That is, Kuzufuru and his wife made an arrangement about the guide with the innkeeper the day before, left before dawn and, following the guide, crossed the bridge towards the Sekigawa border post as quietly as possible, after which they went around it, thus entering the village behind the post. There, Kuzufuru noticed local residents who were looking for travelers with guides like himself – to charge them money for silence. The residents of villages near border posts had to report strangers crossing the border illegally under pain of death [Kanamori 2002, p. 184].

On his way back, Kuzufuru uses the services of a guide again to pass Sekigawa.

22nd day of the Fourth Moon, Day of the Earth Boar.
Clear, rain after noon.

As before, we stayed at Akakura. There was forty-eight *cho* to Sekigawa, so we intended to leave in the evening and stay for the night in Sekigawa, but we met four maids from Eshū⁶ and one man, who advised us to band together and go together on the Suginozawa road to Kashiwabara following the directions of a guide. We asked the innkeeper for a guide, gave him thirty-two *mon*, left the inn at half past six and, with the whole group, reached the Suginozawa road. This road leads from Akakura past the Suginozawa village and across the Sekigawa river to the Takazawa village, which is in Shinshū,⁷ and this village is a branch of Nojiri. <...> We crossed the Sekigawa river using a pedestrian bridge. It was just a shaking log leading to the opposite bank, so I gave my hand to the maids and helped them to cross

⁶ Eshū 越州 – the lands of the provinces Echigo 越後 and Echizen 越前.

⁷ Shinshū 信州 – the Shinano Province 信濃.

it. One cannot describe in words how dangerous it was. And there the guide left us near the bridge and went back. I thought that he would lead us to Kashiwabara, so I was very surprised. [Yaba (ed.) 1984, p. 231].

First, Kuzufuru and his wife, having met the same travelers as themselves, decided to take one guide for them all. But the guide led them to the Sekigawa river and left them there. Then, Kuzufuru and his wife had to look for another guide.

Having crossed the river, we reached the Takazawa village, which is in Shinshū. Here and there one could see houses. We did not know where to go, so we started asking around, but the people did not let us anywhere and only told us to go back the way we had come there. While we were pleading to guide us, more people came from the fields, and they also did not let us in anywhere. As far as we understood, usually all those passing along this road were reprimanded. We were told that many were passing Akakura to see the opening of the Zenkōji holy site⁸, and because of that few people stayed at Nojiri or Sekigawa. Therefore, the rope bridge from Nojiri had been cut and strict orders had been given to not let anyone pass. Takazawa is a branch of Nojiri, so it was difficult to make an excuse that the order had not reached there. Of course, that was so, but going back to Akakura was no easy matter either, so we thought a little about how to trick our way through and we asked to show the way to the Akagawa village. The person whom we asked was afraid of being noticed and said: “Go ahead, and I will follow you, and this is how I will guide you”, and so we reached Niken’ya, after which we went

⁸ Zenkōji 善光寺 – one of the most famous temples in Shinano.

across the fields and meadows, passed through groves. We were sneaking, drawing our *kasa* straw hats lower, we somehow covered some odd one *ri* and reached the Akagawa village. This is how we made our way there and back again. The guide taught us: “If they start asking you questions, tell them that you spent the night in Sekigawa and crossed through Oodani”. And, indeed, in Akagawa we were asked: “Along what road did you cross?”, and we answered as we had been taught without getting caught. We gave the guide a hundred *mon*. [Yaba (ed.), 1984, pp. 231-232].

Men had an easier time crossing a border than women: at many border posts, the *tegata* document was not required, and it was not necessary to go through a search. But some provinces were difficult to get into. For example, Furukawa Koshoken 古川古松軒 (1726–1807) writes in his diary *Saiyūzakki* 西遊雜記 (1783) how he had to resort to a trick when crossing a border post leading to the Satsuma Province.

When you enter the lands of the Satsuma lord, at the border post, you have your luggage checked, and also, you are not let to pass if you do not have whole three golden *bu*⁹ – this is called money for a show (*misegane*). I believe this is done out of caution: if a traveler suddenly dies from illness or falls ill, he will not force his native province to spend money on him. As I have once heard that a regular traveler could not simply visit all corners of this province, I temporarily dressed as

⁹ *Kaneko sanbu* 金子三分 – three *bu* golden coins. Sato Ken'ichi suggests to assume that a golden *ryo* is 75,000 yen, and then one *bu* is about 20,000 yen, while three *bu* are 60,000 [Sato 2005, p. 53]. Even if there is a mistake in the calculations, the takeaway is that, in order to enter the Satsuma lands, one had to have a substantial sum of money.

a *rokujūrokubu*¹⁰ pilgrim, and this is why, at the border post, the guards let me through without saying anything. But, at the same time, having checked my permission to pass and return,¹¹ they issued me the permissions described below, which had to be shown in all villages to their heads and elders, so that they could make records about the month, day, and hour when I stopped there and let me pass through.

Further, Koshoken copies the contents of his *ōrai tegata* and the records made by local officials when he stayed in various villages. Upon finding out that he would not be permitted to travel freely, Koshoken decides to dress as a pilgrim and crosses the border without any problem. Dressing as monks and pilgrims to pass a border post freely was a rather frequent practice. The most well-known example from literature is a scene from the *Tale of Yoshitsune*, which eventually became a *kabuki* play and was extremely popular in the Edo period – *Kanjinchō* 勧進帳. There, Minamoto-no Yoshitsune, accompanied by Benkei and other followers, pass a border post after dressing as monks. Not only men changed clothes. There are known cases of attempts to take girls and women through border posts without documents after dressing them in male clothes [Kanamori 2002, p. 184].

A thorough inspection of women during a border crossing took time. If there were several women, the travelers who arrived at the post after them had to wait for a long time. Records about this are contained in the *Izu no Kuni Futokoro Nikki* diary (1853), written by Sakata Kisen'o¹². The

¹⁰ The *rokujūrokubu* 六十六部の修験者 pilgrims visited sixty-six temples (one in each province) and, in each of these, left a “Lotus Sutra” copied by them.

¹¹ *Ōrai no shōmon* 往来の証文, in this case, what is meant is an *ōrai tegata*.

¹² The title of the diary, the name of the author and the date of composition are quoted from [Plutschow 2006, p. 26]. Unfortunately, the author could not find this diary in the original version, so the title of the diary and the name of the author are not given in Japanese.

diary and a translation of a record from it are provided in a monograph on Edo period travel diaries by Herbert Plutschow [Plutschow 2006, p. 26]: Kisen'ō intends to cross the Hakone border post, but sees a crowd in front of it. It turns out that the line was formed because it took the border officials a long time to examine women. Kisen'ō had a friend named Nomura working at the border post, who made an arrangement with the head of the border post and helped Kisen'ō and his fellow travelers to cross the border without waiting in line and without a search.

There are many mentions of border posts in travel diaries, and some of them are very detailed. It is worth noting that men mention border posts less frequently and often do not describe crossing them at all, while women lament about the border posts and the inconveniences caused by them throughout their entire diaries [Itasaka 2002, p. 99]. Border posts were seen as one of the main obstacles in a travel. In female diaries, it is already in the foreword that authors lament their destiny, mentioning the difficulties at border posts. In the beginning of *Kōshimichi no ki* 庚子道の記 (*Kanoemichi no ki*, 1720), authored by *shirabyōshi* Takejo 武女 (years of life unknown), one can find the following: “In old manuscripts, it is written that women do not cross borders” (*onna wa sakai o koezu to koso furuki fumi ni mo ie*)¹³, and, in the diary by Tanaka Ai 田中愛 (1781-1834), titled *Michi no ki* 道の記 (1827), this phrase turned into: “old manuscripts say that women do not enter border posts” (*onna wa seki o izu to furuki fumi ni wa iedo*)¹⁴. In *Tōkai kikō* 東海紀行 (1681), a female diary probably best known for its description of border crossing, Inoue Tsū (井上通) writes:

We stopped at Arai. We showed the document we had received in Naniwa, in which, for a description of a girl wearing a kimono with cuts on the sides,¹⁵ the word

¹³ 女は境を越えずとこそ古き書にもいへ [Furuya (ed.) 1979, vol. 3., p. 205].

¹⁴ 女は関を出ずと古き文にはいへど [Maeda (ed.) 2001, p. 180].

¹⁵ *Waki akitaru o* – or *wakiake* 脇あけ – a word for a kimono with long sleeves, *furisode*, which was used in the Edo period [Furuya (ed.) 1979, vol. 3, p. 296].

“girl” had to be used, but, out of ignorance, there was just “woman” written there. And so, because it was just “woman” written there, they did not let us through, and we returned to the inn with empty hands. [Furuya (ed.) 1979, vol. 1., p. 296].

As a result, Tsū and her companions had to wait for six days near the border post, until a messenger returned from Naniwa (Osaka) with a corrected document.

In *Tabi no inochige* 旅の命毛 (1805), a diary by Saigū Ayako 三枝斐子 (1759-?) full of sadness due to the hardships and lack of freedom during the travel, there is the following mention of a border post: “When the firebird bowed towards the west, we passed the border post. The border post officials were endlessly droning about how women had to behave”. [Furuya (ed.) 1979, vol. 3., p. 371].

Therefore, it is no surprise that female travelers did their best to avoid border posts. In the *Various Records about the Road to the Ise Shrine* (*Sangū dōchū sho yōki* 参宮道中諸用記, 1862)¹⁶, a collection of travel records by Konno Oito 今野於以登 (years of life unknown), which sometimes resembles a book of expenses, there are many mentions of expenses on guides who helped to go around border posts. For example: “forty *mon* – the Sekigawa border post, a fee for a guide for women”, or a record about the above-mentioned Nojiri: “thirty six *mon* – from Nojiri, at night, Sekigawa, a fee for a guide”. [Shiba 2005, p. 235] Oito does not describe going around border posts in detail, but a diary by Kiyokawa Hachirō 清川八郎 (1830-1863), *Saiyūsō* 西遊草 (1855), describing a travel to Ise, contains a record about girls who were so scared by stories of examinations at a border post that they decided to pay for going around it:

¹⁶ Kanamori Atsuko writes in detail about the diary and about women crossing the border illegally in [Kanamori 2001].

At night, we were visited by a man who also stayed at our inn. He was accompanying thirteen girls, who were heading from Katagai, which is in Echigo, on a pilgrimage to Zenkōji. He brought some sweets famous in Katagai. “The people here are heartless and evil, the hawkers are talking out of the top of their heads, and now the girls are afraid of everything. I cannot calm them down by myself. Could you please help me tomorrow and walk with us at least for one day”, he asked politely, and I answered: “No big deal, don’t worry”, and agreed to accompany them. For the girls, it was their first travel, and that is why, having heard the hawkers’ tales, they were scared to goosebumps. That’s what tales are for – you laugh at them and you forget them, but the girls were not yet used to travels, and I became sorry for them. [Koyamatsu (ed.) 1969, p. 39].

Travel diaries, especially those that were written not for print, but for the family and friends of the author, often contain mentions and, less frequently, detailed descriptions of border crossings. They also describe other difficulties occurring along the way, interesting situations that happened to travelers, things and customs that were curious to the authors. Edo period travel diaries can be seen not only as a source of information about the trip and not only as literary work if the diary contains a poetic component, but they can also be used to study the culture of the Edo period.

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DUDKO Anastasiya Andreevna – master's degree programme, Kyoto University.

E-mail: stacypanther@gmail.com

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The Description of the Ainu and the Japanese by Gavriil Davydov (1807)¹

O. V. Klimova

Abstract. In 1802, upon the orders of the Russian-American Company, Ensign Davydov and Lieutenant Khvostov were sent to deliver food supplies to the Russian colonies in America. In 1804, the Company repeatedly ordered these two officers to make the voyage to America. Before their departure, they met Rezanov, who arrived to Kamchatka after his unsuccessful mission to Japan, where he was supposed to establish trade relations. Due to this failure and the attempt to save Russian colonies and expand the territory of the Russian Empire, Rezanov decided to start trading with the local inhabitants of the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin. This study will examine the information about the Japanese, their settlements in the Kuril Islands, and the local inhabitants of the Kuril Islands – the Ainu. This research is based on the unique historical document *The Journal of the Voyage of an American Company Tender Avos' in 1807, under the Command of Ensign Davydov*, which gives a detailed description of the Japanese, the Ainu, their settlements and compares them to the Russian ones.

Keywords: Khvostov, Davydov, Sakhalin expedition, Russo-Japanese relations, Ainu, Japanese, Kuril Islands.

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*The Journal of the Voyage of an American Company Tender Avos' in 1807, under the Command of Ensign Davydov*² contains unique information about the lifestyle of the Ainu and the Japanese, as well as their settlements in the Kuril Islands in the beginning of the 19th century. However, to be able to fully understand the information this journal contains, the instructions from Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov (1764-1807) to Nikolai Aleksandrovich Khvosotov (1776-1809) and the ones from Khvostov to Gavriil Ivanovich Davydov (1784?-1809) should be carefully analyzed. This is necessary to understand the motives of Ensign Davydov's actions. The analysis of the archive documents revealed interesting information, according to which it became clear that, from July 1806, the moment the Expedition to Sakhalin and Kuril Islands was planned, till April 1807, when two ships *Yunona* and *Avos'* departed for their second expedition, Davydov received four instructions.

The first instruction G. I. Davydov received from lieutenant Khvostov on July 25, 1806 before their departure from the port of Novoarkhangelsk. It prescribed the inspection of the 16th Kuril island and "to be as kind as possible to the Ainu".³ The instructions concerning the Japanese were very vague and it was only mentioned that if "our forces would be more than enough, [we should] perform the act you know about, according to the plan of his EXCELLENCY. I will provide you with further instructions soon".⁴

"On this day I received an order from his EXCELLENCY Nikolai Petrovich Rezanov, that Tender *Avos'* under your command is assigned to the secret Expedition to carry out Country's matter under the authority of HIS Excellency. However, as the administration of the maritime part is entrusted to me, I will briefly explain to you my thoughts [...]. Direct your

² Otdel Rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29.

³ RGAVMF F.166 Op.1 L. 9-10.

⁴ Ibid.

course towards the 16th Kuril Island, then, from there, to carry out the plan of the Expedition, you should depart to the Aniwa bay of the Sakhalin Island and then from there to the port of Okhotsk [...]. Try to be as kind as possible to the Sakhalins, for which purpose I am sending you small errands as gifts [for them]. After three or four days, if we still haven't arrived but your forces are more than enough, you should perform the act you know about according to his EXCELLENCY's plan."⁵

Later, on August 8, 1806, Rezanov composes the secret instruction about the voyage to the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin and sends it to lieutenant Khvostov. "I will describe in detail in a separate paragraph how to treat the Japanese and the Kurils"⁶, notes Rezanov.

The instruction is divided into two parts: the first one, which consists of four paragraphs, raises the exploratory side of the question such as: "the review of the 18th Kuril Island Urup"⁷, "the 16th Kuril Island", and Sakhalin. N. P. Rezanov emphasizes that the purpose of these actions is to achieve "a profitable trade with Japan"⁸. It should be noted that he identifies Sakhalin as an "important subject of the plan".⁹ He finds it so "important" that dedicates nine out of eleven guidelines of his instruction to this island!

Let us observe the part of the instruction which relates directly to the Ainu and the Japanese.

1. To enter Aniwa bay [...]
2. The Japanese who will be on board of your ships should be strictly watched, but do not upset them [...] all of them should be delivered to Novo-Arkhangelsk.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ RGAVMF. F. 212., Op. 11. D. 2944. L. 38-41. Certified copy.

⁷ RGAVMF. F. 212., Op. 11. D. 2944. L. 38-41.

⁸ RGAVMF. F. 212., Op. 11. D. 2944. L. 38-41. Certified copy.

⁹ Ibid.

3. If your forces allow you to disembark, try to be kind to the Sakhalins, explain them that they belong to such a monarch under whose protection they can feel safe [...], exchange goods with them, to be able to learn about their trade.

4. Concerning the Sakhalins and the Japanese, wherever you meet them try to be kind to the first ones and make harm to the last ones by destroying their ships, but try to retain civilized attitude everywhere. [...]

5. Try to learn from the Japanese exactly on which Kuril Islands they have their settlements, what animals they get, what goods they exchange them for, where they trade for fur, what kind of animals and in what quantity they sell, the number of their ships in different seasons and the route of their voyages, the location of their settlements in the Kuril Islands and good bays. To make the process of obtaining the information easier I enclose the vocabulary of Japanese language and the small one of the Sakhalin language. I assign you to multiply the last one with a new number of words, properly record their pronunciation and deliver them back.¹⁰

On the same day, August 8, 1806, Davydov receives the second instruction from Lieutenant Khvostov, in which it was prescribed to review the 16th and the 18th Kuril Islands, “bury the bottle with the note that would say the year, the name of the ship, and the name of the captain”¹¹ and head towards the southern point of the Sakhalin. Davydov was supposed to give gifts to the Sakhalins and try to exchange goods with local inhabitants. As for the Japanese, the instruction basically said “not to get involved in any kind of action with them”.¹²

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 D. 4671 L. 18-18 ob.

¹² Ibid.

«If you do not see my ship before the mentioned date, head to the place where the Japanese trading post is located but do not interact with the Japanese before the 27th day of this month, however, if by any chance I am not able to unite with you by this date, then commensurate with the forces of your ship that is entrusted to you, and start to carry out the instruction of HIS EXCELLENCY, in case of which, for these four-days time, I am sending you some goods to give as gifts and try to do the trade exchange with the Sakhalins».¹³

The difference in speed of the ship *Yunona* under the command of Khvostov with Rezanov onboard and *Avos'* under the command of Davydov was so big that Rezanov who “had to be in St-Petersburg”,¹⁴ was forced to agree for the ships “to part their ways”. *Yunona* and *Avos'* separated their routes near the Aleutian Islands. Davydov, following Rezanov’s instructions, which he received from Khvostov, took his course towards the Kuril Islands, while Khvostov with Rezanov headed towards Okhotsk.

However, on September 15, 1806, upon their arrival to the port of Okhotsk, Rezanov received news from St-Petersburg that made him completely change his plan of the expedition and inconsistently cancel everything that had been planned before. “The foremast fracture, the headwinds that were following us through the whole journey, and late autumn is forcing you to head to America”¹⁵, writes Rezanov. He orders Khvostov to immediately depart for America and cancels all his previous instructions, while asking him “if the time allows you to enter the Aniwa bay and give gifts to the Sakhalins”.¹⁶ It is interesting to note that, although Rezanov makes a drastic change in his plan, he

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 D. 4671. L. 13.

¹⁵ RGAVMF F. 212 Op. 11 ed.hr. 2944. L. 42. Certified copy.

¹⁶ Ibid.

still mentions the inhabitants of the Sakhalin, making it clear that they were supposed to play a key role in the establishment of the necessary trade. The first time Davydov saw this instruction was only before departure for the second expedition to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands in 1807.

His next, third, instruction Ensign Davydov received from Lieutenant Khvostov on April 6, 1807, six months after both officers met in the port of Petropavlovsk, where on November 8, 1806 Khvostov arrived after his first expedition to Sakhalin. In this document, Lieutenant Khvostov describes the results of the expedition and explains the future course of action.

“It was ordered to destroy the settlements [of the Japanese] ... on Sakhalin and squeeze them out of everywhere we meet [...] Exterminate their trade posts on Sakhalin [...] if the Russians do not free the completely suppressed islanders from the Japanese yoke, the Ainu will become their victims. They were telling me this with tears in their eyes, even the Japanese who were there confirmed their words. Second campaign to Sakhalin will bring us benefit; we will get a rich reward and will free the islanders from the Japanese tyranny. It is our duty to accept the island of Sakhalin under the patronage of the Russian Monarch. [...]

We will exterminate the rest of the establishments in Aniwa and of course will capture a few ships that come to Sakhalin in the beginning of May. This way we will keep the Japanese from revenge to the islanders, assure this Power that the Russians do not want to see their colonies stretching down North and that we are always capable to harm them.”¹⁷

¹⁷ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 Delo 4671 L. 23.

Therefore, Ensign Davydov had to accomplish several tasks, among which he had to take revenge on the Japanese and protect the local inhabitants, the Ainu. It should be noted that the style of writing of the instruction dated back to 1806 is completely different from the one that was written a year later, in 1807. Before his first voyage to Sakhalin in 1806, Khvostov prescribes Davydov to avoid any kind of action against the Japanese, while in the 1807 instruction he orders to destroy trade posts and exterminate the rest of the Japanese settlements. The Japanese are called tyrants, from the yoke of which the Ainu had to be protected and set free.

The fourth instruction with the detailed description of the plan of the second expedition to Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands was received by Ensign Davydov from Lieutenant Khvostov on April 30, 1807. Here is the main part, where Khvostov orders Davydov to treat the Japanese “as enemies”,¹⁸ while the local inhabitants should be recognized as “Russian nationals”.

«Head towards the Sakhalin Island to the Krilion Point, after observing it go down to the Aniwa Bay. Stay there for a day, try to be kind with local inhabitants and out of curiosity learn their way of goods exchange, for which I am sending you several cameos, sewn shirts, scissors, cloth and other trifles; also five silver medals on the Vladimir ribbon, which I am asking you to give to the elders of the sixteenth and eighteenth islands and Sakhalin, together with the medal you should give them a paper that would declare their citizenship of the Russian Empire ... with the name of the captain and the ship on it.¹⁹ After one day, if am not able to unite with you at the Aniwa [Bay], but your forces will be enough and you will see that the storehouses are full of goods,

¹⁸ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 Delo 4671 L. 24.

¹⁹ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 Delo 4671 L. 210b.

then with the help of God start everything that is prescribed in the instruction from His excellency. If the storehouses are empty, cargo is still onboard of vessels, and your forces do not allow you to start the prescribed actions, then quietly wait for me, especially if you see two or more ships. In this case do not anchor, try tacking at the entrance of the bay, if by any chance you meet the Japanese or they attack you keep human attitude while treating them as enemies”.²⁰

It should be noted that ensign Davydov had his doubts concerning the legitimacy of these actions. This can be seen from the report that Davydov sent to the naval minister of the Russian Empire Pavel Vasilievich Chichagov (1767-1849) on April 29, 1807 – before his departure from Petropavlovsk. Davydov calls this expedition a questionable undertaking and notes that he is afraid to make the situation “worse than it is by joining this undertaking as well as refusing to act on it which would mean the demonstration of disobedience”, so he decides to “throw himself at the mercy of a chance”.²¹ While being in deep doubt, Davydov departs for the second expedition and from April 15 starts writing his *Journal*, where he records all detailed information about the Japanese and the local inhabitants – the Ainu.

Ensign Davydov's *Journal* covers the events that took place from the April 15 till June 1, 1807. Detailed description of the second expedition starts on April 15, 1807, with Davydov's words saying “finally an almost uneventful winter in Kamchatka has come to an end, on the 15th the ship was ready to depart, but the ice was covering more than a half of the Aniwa Bay”,²² which did not allow the ships to leave the bay and start executing the plan of the second expedition. However, the description of the voyage itself starts on May 4, 1807, when *Yunona* and *Avos'*, after

²⁰ RGAVMF F. 166 Op. 1 D. 4671. L. 24.

²¹ RGAVMF F. 212 Op. 11 D. 2944. L. 34-35. Original.

²² Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV.430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 2.

a few unsuccessful attempts, had finally succeeded in getting out of the still frozen bay.

The first meeting of Davydov and the Japanese took place two weeks later, on May 19, 1807. It is quite interesting that Davydov, who was ordered to “exterminate settlements” of the Japanese and “treat them as enemies”, notes that he was generously received by the Japanese, which threw him off his original plan and stopped him from “unfriendly” behaviour.

“Around 9 o'clock I went ashore, where I was greeted by two Japanese with their traditional manner by falling down on their knees and asking to enter their house. There they treated me with rice (sorochinskoe millet) and boiled borsch, excellent smoked fish, beans marinated together with millet, malt and salt (this dish is quite salty but the Japanese assured that it is excellent when properly cooked and served with fresh fish), after that they gave me Tabaco. Such reception (which was, of course, as anyone can guess, done mainly out of fear), if being honest, made me refuse any hateful act.”²³

In spite of that, Davydov could not avoid a caustic remark regarding the attitude of the Japanese towards the Ainu. On the pages of his “Journal”, he leaves a remark saying that “this settlement was mainly established to salt fish, and all the job was done by the Kuril people, while a small number of the Japanese were supervising them”.²⁴ The very first meeting of Ensign Davydov with local inhabitants, whom he calls “Kurilians”, took place here as well.

“An unusually big number of Kurilians were shaved in a Japanese manner and, when I told them that this

²³ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 5 ob.

²⁴ Ibid.

custom was not nice, the Kurilians told me that “it was very bad indeed, but the Japanese are forcing them to do it”. I told them that the Iturup Island belongs not to Japan but only to the local inhabitants and that they should expel the Japanese from here. Even if the Russians live here, they will not demand anything from you as the Japanese do nowadays. As a proof, I gave them gifts.”²⁵

Thus, Davydov follows Rezanov’s instruction from August 8, 1806, in one of the paragraphs of which it was instructed to assure the Ainu “that they belong to such a Monarch under whose protection they should always be safe”.

It should be noted that the main distinguishing feature of *Ensign Davydov’s Journal* is that it contains a large number of descriptions of everyday life, characteristic features and customs of both the Japanese and the Ainu. This kind of information is practically never mentioned on the pages of the studies researching the events of the early 19th century, when the emergence of the Russian-Japanese relations took place, immediately followed by first conflicts between the two countries, which were fighting for their own hegemony in Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. While describing the Japanese settlement, Davydov notes that he was amazed by the absolute cleanliness of dwellings, warehouses for storing timber and food supplies, as well as the whole territory of the settlement.

“This settlement was mainly established to salt the fish, all the job was carried out by the Kuril people, while a small number of the Japanese were supervising them. Two storehouses were made of grass and poles, they were stuffed with salted and dried fish and fish oil in barrels and sealed tubs; there were two more but they were closed and I didn’t want to check what was inside.

²⁵ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 5 ob.

There were around 15 Kuril Yurts near the settlement, but there were almost no people, which made me think that everybody was working somewhere at another place. There was quite a big river with a fine bridge over it. There were lots of harvested wood, well-cleaned wooden boards, which I think was not made only by the Japanese living here. – Their house is quite simple but the cleanliness is extraordinary, instead of glass there was paper that looked like it was soaked with oil, floor was covered with quite clean sacking mats, and there was a kitchen in the middle.”²⁶

Despite the comments that Davydov made about the Kurils and the Japanese, saying that only the former were working while the latter were simply watching and supervising them, the overall tone of the description remains positive, even somewhat laudatory. On the May 24, 1807 Davydov reached the next settlement that was located at Shana Bay on Iturup Island. This one impressed him with its cleanliness and the way it was suited for comfortable living even more than the previous one.

“Japanese dwellings were located not in separate houses but [in buildings that] looked more like outbuildings, which were separated from each other by sliding boards that were so firmly set that, at first sight, it seemed that you reached the last wall, but if you move it aside you could see a space divided into several quite clean rooms with grass mats on the floor. Each outbuilding had its own kitchen, where the water was delivered through pipes, the access to water one could get simply by turning the taps that were made in the walls. Basically, everything possible was made for

²⁶ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 5 ob.-6.

an easy living, and was extremely clean. A part of the building was surrounded by a high earthen wall in a shape of the fortress, on each side of the river, people walked in and out of the gates dug up to half of its height from the bottom. The gates were locked with thick wooden doors with specially dug up side gate next to them.²⁷

The mountain above the houses was so steep that it was impossible to climb, so the Japanese dug wide zigzag roads through it and made it easy to climb; you could see hard work and fondness for cleanliness that were so typical for the Japanese. All walkways were lined and made of sand or small stones. There were two gardens. The earthen berm was evenly covered with sod, riverbank was decorated and together with the arched bridge opened a very picturesque view.”²⁸

Ensign Davydov is comparing Russian settlements, that were far from being clean and tidy, with Japanese ones and notes that the Japanese “choose the best possible location, build proper dwellings, and they are living an abundant lifestyle, if not one better then back home. – You can hardly compare our settlements in America with theirs.”²⁹ He also correctly points out that the Japanese settlements resembled more “a prosperous colony than a poor fishing establishment”.³⁰

It should be noted that this was the settlement where an armed conflict took place between the Japanese and the Russians and this note was made after the former were forced to retreat. Describing the Japanese settlement, Davydov could not help but comment on the defensive structures. “These fortresses could protect them only from the Kurils, as

²⁷ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 14.

²⁸ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 14 ob.

²⁹ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 23 ob.

³⁰ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 11.

a single gun set up on top of a mountain above the houses could easily chase all people out of it,” writes Davydov and immediately notes that “the Japanese forgot that disposition is not enough, you should be able to defend”.³¹ Davydov attributes this peculiarity of the Japanese military state to the fact that Japan was not involved in war for many years, and, as a result, the entire population of this empire have not participated in any battle and have never heard a single gunshot.

«What kind of defence tactics can you expect from the people who have almost never heard a gunshot. It is a well-known fact that nobody, but soldiers can have guns in Japan, even though they are mostly used as a decoration, as almost none of them can actually use it. At least that is what we have been told by the Japanese that were onboard of our ships. They were trembling every time they heard a cannon shot that we sometimes used for signals, however, after a while they seemed not to be bothered by it at all». ³²

Arms that are described by Davydov – armour, spears, cannons – did not find positive feedback on the pages of the *Journal*. Guns deserved some honourable words, but, as the author of the *Journal* notices, the Japanese did not know how to use them. According to Davydov, some of the weapons were in such a poor state that could only be used only for torture.

Armours and lobster-tailed pot helmets of the Japanese were made of steel, were quite thin, varnished and very clean; they made spears and bayonet slip away, but bullet can go through them from quite a far away distance. Rifles with fuses are nicely and beautifully made, reach far away aims, but the Japanese cannot use

³¹ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19 ob.

³² Ibid.

them. It is said that, in Japan, there are only cannons that were left behind by the Portuguese, but, as we found two of them on the Iturup, they cannot be in the middle of the Empire. Balls for large cannons are made of lead, coated with clay and covered with paper, for the small ones, as I mentioned before, balls are made of lead with clay inside of them. The large cannon looked like a Licorne. – Japanese spears are set on long flexible poles, covered with black varnish, with gold plated handles. – Moreover, there are a few types of weapons that are not known to the Europeans and that could only be used for torturing people.³³

The description of imperfect and outdated military weapons that the Japanese used often goes hand in hand with the description of their character in his journal. He mentions the courage “of this terrible, according to some description, People”³⁴ and their indifference to their own lives, which, in his opinion, “constitutes the main feature of their character”.³⁵ It is interesting how Davydov describes the Japanese coastguard on the pages of his *Journal*.

The sea bank near the settlement and its side facing it were also covered with separate and sewed together white and blue pieces of clothes that were hanging on the rope. We found two unspecified types of weapon behind them which were used to fire at my ship... there was an unfinished barrel of Saga (Japanese drink) next to these weapons, which they were surely enough sipping on to get some courage.³⁶

³³ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 15.

³⁴ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 13 ob.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 11.

We can find numerous remarks about Japanese being very fond of sake in this *Journal*. Thus, describing the settlement in Shana, Davydov writes that they found a separate building which was fully used to produce this beverage. He also emphasizes that the main activity of the Japanese was supervising the Ainu, smoking tobacco, and drinking sake. “A huge warehouse was full of devices to produce sake, while a huge volume of this sake shows either a big number of inhabitants, or the depravity of the Japanese”³⁷, concludes Davydov.

As a result of the analysis of the *Journal*, one very interesting and quite obvious fact became clear: the Japanese did not build any defensive structures because they did not have the need to protect their settlements – at least that is how it used to be before the arrival of Khvostov on *Yunona* and Davydov on *Avos*. That is the reason, as Davydov also noted, why all the weapons that he could find with Khvostov could only be used to scare the Ainu and keep them under their control. The coastal guard was also not capable of defending the territory from the enemy. In the beginning of the 19th century, the Japanese enjoyed their peaceful existence on the Kuril Islands, smoking tobacco, and drinking sake. Their only duty was to supervise the local inhabitants and send goods back to Japan. It should be noted that, despite Davydov’s criticism of the Japanese military organization and allegations of their cruel treatment of the Ainu, one can find unexpectedly flattering compliments on Japanese cuisine.

Ensign Davydov notes that “what they eat is completely different from the European [cuisine]”³⁸ and stresses that “the wheat that is cooked by the Japanese has a better look and taste, and can be served even to Europeans”³⁹.

“As fish is the main reason for the creation and continuous growth of the Japanese settlements in the North, I should tell you how it is cooked. They use

³⁷ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 13 ob.

³⁸ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19.

³⁹ Ibid.

a lot of salt when they salt it, and not in barrels but in warehouses laying them in rows, after which they load it in the same order in ships. This fish is so salty that we could eat it only after soaking it in fresh water for several days, which made it not very convenient to eat onboard the ships. However, the Japanese like it salty, not only the fish, but most part of their food supplies are cooked with a huge amount of salt. Plums and other fruits, as well as radish and other food are extremely salted; sometimes it is pickled with salt and malt. All in all, their cuisine is absolutely different compared to the European one. On the other side, they eat wheat boiled in fresh water in a special way; our people were not able to reach the same level of such cooking. Wheat which is cooked by the Japanese has the best look and taste; even the Europeans can eat it.

The Japanese salt herrings in barrels only to eat them right there on the spot and do not transport it to Nippon; although herrings that are delivered there are already slightly salted, they are smoked afterwards and tied-up in bundles. Moreover, they dry big fish (like salmon), put them into the sacks which are left after the wheat and send it to Nippon, not for food but for fertilization of land to grow Sorochnikov wheat. – There are plenty of fish supplies at Matsumae, locals send it to Nippon in exchange for necessary goods.”⁴⁰.

Besides descriptions of the Japanese, one can find very interesting notes about everyday life and customs of the Ainu on the pages of Davydov's *Journal*. For example, Davydov writes: “The Japanese call local inhabitants of Matsumae, Sakhalin, and Southern Kuril – the Ainu, the same way they name themselves. I think that this word belongs to the

⁴⁰ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 18-19.

original language of this people, which is almost similar everywhere”.⁴¹ What draws attention is the confidence of Davydov who writes that the Ainu language and its dialects are very similar. As a result of the analysis of the archival documents, it was possible to identify one very interesting and, up to now, little known fact: Davydov composed the Ainu language dictionary, where he indicated different dialects, and gave translation of these words into German and Russian languages. In this way, Davydov fulfilled yet another of Rezanov’s instruction from August 8, 1806, which prescribed to continue working on the “Sakhalin” language dictionary and “multiply it with a new number of words, properly recording their pronunciation”.⁴²

It is very likely that Davydov was using exactly this dictionary to obtain necessary information about the Ainu’s lifestyle, the routes of their movement from one island to another and about their trade partners. “Ainu move from one island to another for trade, they travel from Matsumae to Urup to buy sea otters and eagle feathers. Beavers they sell to the Japanese, who send them to Nangasaki for trade exchange with the Chinese,”⁴³ notes Davydov. It is interesting how he is trying to get information about the locals’ lifestyle and origins, even about the way the Ainu hunt, for which they mainly used arrows.

“The Ainu use eagle feathers for arrows. On most of the Matsumae island (except Atkis) and in Aniwa Bay, there are not so many birds of such kind, they mainly can be found on nearby Kuril Islands, especially Kunashir Island. There are two kinds of eagles, although they look alike. One kind has 12 feathers in its tail, and the arrow that is made with this kind of

⁴¹ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19-19 ob.

⁴² RGAVMF. F. 212., Op. 11. D. 2944. L. 38-41. Certified copy.

⁴³ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19-19 ob.

feathers flies straight even against the wind; the other kind has 14 feathers in its tail and is considered to be the worst [quality].”⁴⁴

On the pages of his *Journal*, Davydov makes a note saying that the Ainu were mainly used by the Japanese to do fishing, and that they “find it more profitable to use locals for fishing and not for hunting purposes”.⁴⁵

According to Davydov, local inhabitants, as well as the Japanese, were very fond of alcoholic drinks. “The Ainu love alcohol drinks, there were around 300 barrels [with alcohol] only in Aniwa Bay; each barrel contains from $3\frac{1}{2}$ up to 5 buckets; moreover, the Japanese produce it in big volumes right there on the spot,” notes Davydov. He also leaves a critical comment saying that the Japanese “consider themselves absolute sovereigns, for whom even the slightest work is shameful”, ruthlessly exploit poor Ainu, “smoke tobacco and drink Saga”.⁴⁶

“Everywhere they established settlements for fishing, the Japanese use the Ainu for all kinds of work, keep them as slaves in the state of extreme fear; force them even to accept their customs, shave their heads in a Japanese manner, and so on. All the above being said, one can conclude that the Ainu can not be fond of the Japanese; but [they] can not dare to do anything but obey. The Japanese gather young Ainu from all of the villages to their settlements to make them do all kind of work and do fishing, for which, however, the Japanese pay them with goods according to the previously decided rate”.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19-19 ob.

⁴⁵ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19 ob.

⁴⁶ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 20 ob.

⁴⁷ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q.IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 20.

Ensign Davydov strictly follows Rezanov's instructions according to which it was necessary to find out the information about "the kinds of animal fur they get, what they exchange them for, how they sell fur, in what quantity, and what kind of fur can be sold the most".⁴⁸

«The bear fur is very good quality, the same is with otters; as for the sable furs I did not see any good ones. The Japanese say that the ones that are from the middle part of Sakhalin are the same quality as the ones from Kamchatka; the ones that I saw on Iturup were not worth buying [...].

The Ainu move from one island to another for trade, they travel from Matsumae to Urup to buy sea otters and eagle feathers. They sell beavers to the Japanese, who send them to Nangasaki for trade exchange with the Chinese. They do not use any kind of fur in Japan at all [...]. A small amount of sable, otter, and bear furs that the Japanese collect here is sent to Nangasaki».⁴⁹

Moreover, Davydov could get precious information concerning the number of inhabitants and settlements on the Kuril Islands. For instance, he writes that "there is a small number of inhabitants on the northern Kuril Islands, while the number is larger on the southern islands; however, this number is still low compared to the vast territory they occupy."⁵⁰

Ensign Davydov is not only delivering necessary information that he was ordered to collect, but he analyses it and makes conclusions. For example, he notes that "for trusted trade relations with Japan, we need a harbor that would be located in that area",⁵¹ however, he could not help but admit the fact that he could not find a suitable one for

⁴⁸ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 19 ob.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 22 ob.

⁵¹ Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L. 18.

these purposes. Davydov assumes that there should have been a certain necessity and obvious reason for “the Japanese to occupy this land”. Moreover, he makes a plan “to oppress this proud Empire”,⁵² stressing the fact that “fisheries on these islands are very important to this Empire, and not having them would be strongly felt”.⁵³ These words are completely consistent with Rezanov’s instruction, according to which “the harm should be made not to the people but to the government”, while the expedition was supposed to open “new possibilities for our motherland”. That is the postulate that ensign Davydov follows through all his journey, describing everyday life, customs, settlements, and ways of trade of the Japanese and the Ainu on the pages of his journal.

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⁵² Otdel rukopisei RNB. Q. IV. 430. Inv. 6017. № 29. L.16.

⁵³ Ibid.

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KLIMOVA Olga Vadimovna – Associate professor, PhD (History), Department of Asian and African studies, Higher School of Economics National Research University, Saint Petersburg.

190121, Russia, St. Petersburg, Soyuza Pechatnikov Street 16, room 409
E-mail: oklimova@hse.ru

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Military Japanese Studies in the Russian Far East in the Early 20th Century¹

V. G. Datsyshen

Abstract. The article is devoted to the problems of the formation and development of military Japanese studies in the early 20th century. Its relevance is related to the fact that current problems of the Russian-Japanese relations are rooted in the political confrontation and numerous wars and armed conflicts between the two countries which erupted in the first half of the 20th century. The military have joined Japanese studies since its establishment in Russian higher education. Officers of the units of the Russian army stationed in the Far East studied Japanese and Japan together with university students – in the early 20th century the ratio of military and non-military students was almost 50:50. The first military specialists in Japanese studies either gave priority to research and education over military service, or successfully combined both.

Joint training of officers and university students had a great impact on all aspects of life and work of the Oriental Institute, while causing criticism from both senior faculty managers and the high-ranked Russian military. Despite great success in the officers' training at the Oriental Institute, the initial system of Japanese studies training was reformed, though its principles and traditions were preserved until the 1917 revolution. The article was written on the basis of archival and published documents of the Oriental Institute, with the use

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of academic works of the first Russian officers specializing in Japanese studies. The historical experience of the Japanese studies education and research is interesting and relevant for today's Russian-Japanese relations.

Keywords: Japanese studies, Amur Military District, Oriental Institute, officers specializing in Japanese studies.

Current Russian-Japanese relations are based on the historical experience, with the first years of the 20th century being the most significant period. The relations between the two countries were in many respects defined by the state of Japanese studies in Russia. The Russian-Japanese confrontation and preparation for the future war took rise after the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895. In this situation, military researchers became more active while officers and even lower ranks turned to majoring in Japanese studies more and more frequently. The article is devoted to the very important, yet poorly studied page of the Japanese studies history in Russia – the formation and development of military Japanese studies. Military Japanese studies are understood as education in Japanese studies for the Russian army and familiarization of Russian officers, specialists in Japanese studies, with Japan and its culture. The territorial framework includes the Far East of Russia, united into the Amur Military District, as well as the Russian Kwantung Region.

First Steps of Military Japanese Studies

Russian-Japanese relations soared to new heights, requiring a considerable number of experts on Japan, after the Amur region had become part of Russia in the middle of the 19th century. There were no educational standards of Japanese studies in the country, and the public justly pointed out a possible lack of experts with the knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese languages. Russian military researchers paid

heed to Japan, but their works were based on translations from Western languages. Several Russian military researchers visited Japan in the second half of the 19th century. For example, Lt. Colonel M. I. Venyukov conducted his research predominantly through French informers. Lt. Colonel A. M. Butakov, a clerk in the executive office of the Military Academic Board, wrote about the Japanese army [Butakov 1883].

The Japanese language was optionally taught in the Saint Petersburg University in the second half of the 19th century, but it was definitely insufficient for training a significant number of Russian specialists in Japanese studies. This problem could not be solved either by the self-education of enthusiasts who mastered the Japanese language and culture at home and in other countries including Japan. New specialists in Japanese studies were to be stationed in military units of the Amur Military District due to the aggravation of international relations in the Far East and the imminence of a Russian-Japanese military conflict in the struggle for China. The starting point for the Russian-Japanese confrontation was Japan's victory over China in 1895. The capture by Russia of the southern part of Liaodong (Kwantung Region) in 1897-1898 and occupation of Manchuria in 1900 further worsened Russian-Japanese relations.

The need for military Japanese studies was reflected in the late 19th century events when the General-Governor of the Amur Region supported the initiative of relying on Japanese studies enthusiasts. His order for the Amur Military District units of December 15, 1895 read: "The Acting Commander of the district units, finding it quite useful and desirable to spread the knowledge of the Chinese and Japanese languages among the military officers, has found it possible to use the funds... to provide bonuses for the profound learning of the above-mentioned Oriental languages".² It was planned to provide two bonuses, 500 rubles each, for the Chinese and Japanese languages. In September 1896, the Amur Military District Chief of Staff informed P. F. Unterberger, Military Commander of the Amur Region, that a commission headed

² RSHA EF. F. 1. I. 1. C. 1499. S. 2

by the Vladivostok Chief of Staff would be set up in January 1897 for the purpose of examining officers who studied Chinese and Japanese and awarding them with bonuses”.³ Yet, the competition failed to take place on the appointed dates as no one with a good command of Japanese had been found in Vladivostok. The competition was not rescinded; it was put off until the start of the navigation.

Setting up the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok and Military Japanese Studies

The training of military specialists in Japanese studies in the Far East started only after the Oriental Institute had been set up in Vladivostok. The institute opened in 1899. The *Oriental Institute Provisions* read, specifically, as follows: “5. The institute curriculum is four years and, starting from the second training period, is divided into four departments: Sino-Japanese, Sino-Korean, Sino-Mongolian, and Sino-Manchurian. <...> 7. Special subjects of study at the institute are: 1) at the Sino-Japanese department – the Japanese language as well as survey of the political structure, business, and commerce of modern Japan <...> 8. Students study the relevant subjects and are sent to neighboring Oriental states to perfect the studied languages during their vacation as determined by the Conference of the Institute...” [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, pp. 8–9]. That is how a systematic training of specialists in Japanese studies began in Russia in 1899. As Japanese researcher Ikuta Michiko justly mentioned, “the Japanese language as a major subject appeared in Russia for the first time in Vladivostok” [Ikuta 2014, p. 72].

The Oriental Institute, opened in 1899, became the first and only educational establishment in Russia training specialists in military Japanese studies. A note to one of the points in the *Oriental Institute Provisions* said: “Appointed by the Amur District General-Governor,

³ RSHA EF . F. 1. I. 1. C. 1499. S. 1.

four officers are enrolled as attendees of the institute each year. They study the disciplines indicated by the General-Governor and are subjected to relevant tests along with the students of the institute. The officers stationed within the institute walls are to obey all administrative instructions” [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, p. 12].

The year of 1899 saw the first future specialists in Japanese studies enrolling to the Oriental Institute; among them was the first student who later became an outstanding specialist in Japanese studies and a diplomat – Reserve Warrant Officer Pavel Yurievich (Georgievich) Vaskevich, as well as L. A. Bogoslovsky and A. S. Kobelev. The first attendee officer going to be a specialist in Japanese studies enrolled a year later. In 1900, Staff Captain Alexander Bursky, a future expert in Japanese studies, was among those five “from the Amur District assigned to attend lectures” at the Oriental Institute [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, p. 35].

In the summer of 1901, the Headquarters of the Kwantung Region dispatched ten officers to the Oriental Institute, three of which later started learning Japanese. In August 1901, the order to the Amur Military District units assigned Vasily Melentievich Mendrin, a Junior Cossack Captain of the 1st Chita Regiment of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army, to the Oriental Institute.⁴ Having received the order, he left Southern Manchuria for Vladivostok as per travel order issued by the Military Department of the Kwantung Region Headquarters. In the same year, A. P. Boloban and Junior Cossack Captain M. M. Rumyantsev were assigned to the Oriental Institute. Andrey Pavlovich Boloban, born in 1878, came from the Cossacks and received secondary education in the non-classical school.⁵ Mikhail Mikhailovich Rumyantsev, a Junior Cossack Captain of the Verkhneudinsk Regiment of the Trans-Baikal Cossack Army and a nobleman by birth, had received military education in the 1st Pavlovsk Military School.⁶

⁴ Amur Territory State Archive (ATSA). F.P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 49.

⁵ ATSA. F.-P-115. I. 1. C. 5. S. 37.

⁶ ATSA.F.P-115. I. 1. C. 5. S. 69

On December 6, 1902, the War Ministry issued the following order: “Due to the need for studying the Far East it has been decreed by the imperially consolidated provisions of the Military Council to have educated officers with the knowledge of local languages in the Amur Military District and Kwantung Region units, ...”.⁷ The document containing 13 paragraphs read that the number of attendee officers was increased to ten. They were admitted without entrance exams and studied for four years, though they were not exempt from the end-of-year examinations. Two officers from the Kwantung region and Amur Military district were dispatched to the Institute; the candidates from other districts were selected by the Commander of the Amur Military District after exams in English and French. The military agency allotted 60 rubles to each officer for lectures, 120 rubles for learning aids, 200 rubles for scientific expeditions, and 100 rubles a month as an allowance during an officer’s stay abroad [Datsyshen 2000, p. 77].

In 1903, the Kwantung Region Army Commander decreed to enroll the 28-year-old Junior Captain of the East-Siberian Rifle Regiment Vasily Vasilyevich Blonsky as an attendee of the Oriental Institute.⁸ In the same year, Ilya Efimovich Ivanov, a Captain of the 1st East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, was accepted as an attendee of the Sino-Japanese department [Buyakov 1999, pp. 97–116]. The enrollment continued after the war with Japan had started. For example, on July 24, 1904, Nikolai Vladimirovich Osipov, a graduate of the Moscow Military School and Junior Captain of the 121st East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, enrolled as an attendee of the Oriental Institute; later, on July 25, 1904, the Amur Military District Governor General decreed to enroll Alexander Ioannikievich Kravtsov, Captain of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, as an attendee of the Oriental Institute.⁹ On September 14, 1904, Stepan Fyodorovich Ryabchich, a graduate of the Kiev Infantry Military School and a Captain of the 34th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, enrolled as an attendee of the

⁷ Novy Kray. 24.01.1903.

⁸ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 5. S. 38.

⁹ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 2. C. 13. S. 50.

Oriental Institute¹⁰; on May 21, 1905, Junior Captain of the 9th East-Siberian Regiment Nikolai Nikolayevich Stromilov, a graduate of the Pavlovsk Military School, was enrolled as well.

Attendee officers as well as students had to overcome great difficulties in mastering Japanese studies. For example, Junior Captain A. A. Bursky failed to “pass the statutory tests” for the third year and had to repeat the course. Nevertheless, he became a specialist in Japanese studies as well as a translator and intelligence officer. His younger classmates went further and became famous in the academic world. Officers V. M. Mendrin, A. P. Boloban, and M. M. Rumyantsev who enrolled in the Oriental Institute in 1901 took their rightful place in the history of Japanese studies in Russia.

Attendee officers did not only study on the institute premises: they were sent to China and Japan on study trips. M. M. Rumyantsev happened to go to Japan as early as after the end of the first year. The letter written by E. G. Spalvin, an Oriental Institute Professor, on August 5, 1902, and addressed to the A. P. Izvolsky, Head of the Russian Diplomatic Mission in Tokyo, said: “... Junior Officer Mikhail Rumyantsev, assigned to the Institute by the Kwantung Region Headquarters and transferred to the second academic year, although he has not yet studied the Japanese language, is in Nagasaki and its vicinities as it is understood” [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, p. 208]. E. G. Spalvin wrote in August 1902: “The War Ministry sent Junior Captain Alexander Bursky from the Amur Military District, an attendee of the III year of the Sino-Japanese department, to attend lectures in Tokyo” [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, p. 208]. The document of the Oriental Institute Conference said: “It appears that Mr. Mendrin and Mr. Boloban, attached to the Oriental Institute in 1901 as full-time attendee officers, were moved to senior years of the institute after passing transition exams following their enrollment into the Sino-Japanese department in the second year of study; they annually made summer trips – arranged by the Institute – to the Far

¹⁰ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 2. C. 13. S. 67.

Eastern countries: in 1902 they were sent to China, and in 1903 – to Japan”.¹¹

During their practical work, the attendee officers not only improved their spoken language skills, they did scholarly translations as well. The documents of the Oriental Institute ascertain: “The following works were presented as a result of these trips: Mr. Mendrin presented his translation of Japanese fairy-tales of the animal epos from the collection *Nihon mukashi banashi* and translation of V. G. Aston’s English-language work *The History of Japanese Literature* /fully published in the XI and XII volumes of the *Oriental Institute News* and issued as a separate book/, he also worked upon the monumental research of Japanese colloquial language grammar. Mr. Boloban proved himself to be a good translator through his vast translations from the English and Japanese languages; among other things, he presented the following works: *An Outline of Chinese Philosophy*, *Diary of the Trip to Japan in 1903*, *A Short Review of Japanese Schools*, *Hanashika – Japanese popular story tellers*, and *A Japanese Military Officer’s Opinion of the Russian Military Discipline* /published in No. 637 of *Razvedchik* on September 22, 1903/ and translation of an English-language work about Japan...”.¹² Professor Spalvin referred to Mendrin as the “most gifted and superb of all my students” in his foreword to one of Mendrin’s papers.¹³

A. P. Boloban, another specialist in Japanese studies, wrote about his practical training: “In 1902 (May-August), I was dispatched on a study trip to China; I came back in September and presented my work *Chinese Philosophy*. In 1902-1903, I was in my second year. I spent the summer months of 1903 on a study trip to Japan (Tokyo, Osaka); I returned from Japan in September and presented my work: *Education in Japan*, *A Diary of a Trip to Japan*, *Discipline in the Russian Army*, translation from Japanese (military journal *Gunjikai*) and *Unknown Japan*”.¹⁴

¹¹ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 25.

¹² ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 25–25.

¹³ ATSA F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 38.

¹⁴ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 49.

Works produced by the officers who were experts in Japanese studies were published not only by the Oriental Institute publishing house, but also in the *Razvedchik* magazine. For example, in 1903, this magazine published A. P. Boloban's above-mentioned article *Discipline in the Russian Army*. It was a translation of the article written by Major Tanaka Giichi, who was attached to the Russian army for eighteen months [Boloban 1903, pp. 815–817]. The *Razvedchik* also published a review of V. M. Mendrin's work – the essay *Japanese Folk Fairy-Tales* [Yaponskiye narodnyye skazki... 1903, p. 273].

The officers' achievements in learning the Japanese language are testified by the excerpt from the letter written by the Oriental Institute Director to the Vladivostok Fortress Head of Staff: "As for the translator, the Oriental Institute recommends Captain Mendrin as the most knowledgeable in the Japanese written language of business acts".¹⁵ The first experience of the officers' training at the Oriental Institute proved to be successful and War Ministry Order No.441 on Attendee Officers at the Oriental Institute announced: "Ten officers of all types of arms are allowed (2 officers from the Kwantung Army and 8 officers – from the armies of other districts) to attend lectures on the Chinese, Japanese... languages in the Vladivostok Oriental Institute" [Iz istorii vostokovedeniya ... 2000, p. 42].

Specialists in Japanese Studies during the Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War interrupted successful learning and academic work of officers specializing in Japanese studies. On January 31, 1904, the attendees of the Oriental Institute were dispatched to their units. It should be noted that not only attendees, but students of the Oriental Institute as well were dispatched to the active army. In particular, student Anatoly Nikolayevich Zankovsky was attached to the

¹⁵ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 11.

Vladivostok cruiser squadron as a Japanese-language interpreter; he participated in all the squadron operations on cruiser *Rossiya*. In all, 11 Japanese-language interpreters were engaged at the front, eight of which were dispatched by the Oriental Institute [Ikuta 2014, p. 53].

Attendees Blonsky, Mendrin, Nikolaev, and Spysin were sent under the Mukden Military Commissar's command by the order of the Far East Governor. On this occasion, a liturgy was performed at the Oriental Institute Church on February 1, 1904. Junior Captain A. A. Bursky, an attendee of the first admission, was attached to the reconnaissance department of the Manchurian Army Field Headquarters since March 22, 1904.

Cossack Captain V. M. Mendrin served first in the Mukden, and, later, in the Girin Military Commissariats. According to his report, his service and activities during the war looked as follows: "... I translated the regulations of the field service... conducted reconnaissance of the armies led by Chinese Generals Yuan Shikai and Ma ... conducted reconnaissance of the enemy personally and through spies ... conducted reconnaissance of enemy forces by surveys, reading of documents, and through spies... I translated 1/3 of the captured files of the Japanese Reserve Rifle Regiment under Sendenpu ... conducted reconnaissance in the cavalry vanguard".¹⁶ V. M. Mendrin also noted that, during the war, he "had compiled an essay on the appearance and development of Chinese security units in the Mukden province since the time Russians entered the Mukden province and left it – the entire essay is based on official documents"; it seems to have been lost by the Commissariat during the retreat from Mukden".¹⁷ Captain V. V. Blonsky was "one of the organizers in preparing the army logistics of reconnaissance and work with agents behind the enemy lines" [Podalko 1999, p. 80].

The importance of the Oriental Institute's students and attendees for the Russian Army during the Russo-Japanese War was appreciated by V. A. Oranovsky, Major General of the General Staff: "Strictly speaking,

¹⁶ ATSA. F. P-115 .I. 1. C. 692. S. 49-49r.

¹⁷ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 48 r.

the attendees of the latter – officers and students – were the only reliable and intelligent translators” [Podalko 1999, p. 79]. V. M. Mendrin received four combat orders and several other awards for his personal participation in battles, reconnaissance and partisan raids in the Manchurian territory. In August 1905, he was dispatched to the Vladivostok fortress under its Commander’s command “due to the siege imminence”. Lieutenant of the 29th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment A. P. Boloban was awarded four combat orders for his participation in the military operations in Manchuria. Attendee I. E. Ivanov, company commander of the 1st East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, was awarded six orders.

Military Japanese Studies after the Russo-Japanese War

In early 1906, Cossack Captain V. M. Mendrin and Lieutenant A. P. Boloban were excluded from the Oriental Institute and sent to their military units. The teaching staff of the Oriental Institute did not agree with the loss of promising specialists in Japanese studies. The documents stated: “When discussing the order in question, the Conference of the Institute held it as its duty to ascertain that with the expulsion of Mr. Mendrin and Mr. Boloban from the Institute... the Oriental Institute lost two most successful of its alumni who, not only through their diligence, capabilities, and hard work testified to the excellent mastering of academic disciplines, but who, due to the knowledge acquired at the Institute, proved to be quite efficient during the military operations. These circumstances inspired the Conference with full confidence that these attendees of the Institute, who are to complete the full institute course shortly, could become part of a very small number of educated Russian orientalist”.¹⁸ The Oriental Institute Director’s petition of April 21, 1906, to the Force Commander in the Far East said: “Confirming its regret in respect of Mr. Mendrin and Mr. Boloban being detached

¹⁸ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 25.

from the Institute, the Conference decided: to petition for retaining these students in the institute in view of the upcoming completion of the full institute curriculum”.¹⁹

After the Russo-Japanese War ended, the officers who had been attendees of the Oriental Institute began to transfer to the army reserve and join the Oriental Institute as students. A. P. Boloban became a reservist in 1906 and was enrolled as a student of the Sino-Japanese department of the Oriental Institute.²⁰ V. M. Mendrin wanted to join the reserve as well; in October 1906, he petitioned: “Retiring from the military service, I ask for your permission to be enrolled as a student of the Oriental Institute and be allowed to hold graduation exams with my course mates”.²¹ His first attempt to leave the military service for Japanese studies failed and he graduated the institute when he was still in the military. In the summer of 1907, V. M. Mendrin petitioned “to be left... in the Institute to prepare for teaching Japanese literature; I ask you to petition about transferring me from the military to the civil service...”.²² The young officer, an expert in Japanese studies, wrote that if it were impossible to be transferred from the military to the civil service, he was ready to retire. In 1908, young Lieutenant Colonel V. M. Mendrin finally managed to be dismissed from service “for family reasons”.

In February 1907, V. M. Mendrin and A. P. Boloban passed graduation exams successfully. Captain Mendrin was the only graduate of the course who was awarded a gold medal. As to M. M. Rummyantsev, he did not become an expert in Japanese studies. As the *Excerpt from the Minutes of the Oriental Institute Conference Meeting* stated, he “completed a full course of subjects in the Institute being exempt from... studying a special language”,²³ while his diploma was in Sinology. V. M. Mendrin was recognized as the most successful and promising

¹⁹ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 52

²⁰ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 5. S. 37.

²¹ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 2.

²² ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 692. S. 14.

²³ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 5. S. 69.

of the 1907 graduates. The *Report on the Oriental Institute Status and Performance in 1908* said: “V. M. Mendrin, who graduated the Institute with honors, remained at the Institute, with the agreement of the Public Education Minister communicated by the Amur District School Inspector as of January 4, 1908, to get prepared for the rank of Professor at the Japanese Literature Department for two years, since January 1, 1908; dispatched to Japan...” [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 10]. The two-year trip proved to be insufficient, and V. M. Mendrin turned to the Oriental Institute superintendents with a request to prolong the period of preparation for Professor’s rank. Professor E. G. Spalvin confirmed the progress of V. M. Mendrin’s studies in Japan and petitioned for the trip prolongation until January 1, 1911. [Vostochniy Institut 1909c, p. 90].

In 1908, three students and five officers graduated from the Sino-Japanese department of the Oriental Institute: Captain of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment A. I. Kravtsov, Junior Captain of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment N. V. Osipov, Captain of the 34th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment S. F. Ryabchich, Staff Captain of the 9th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment N. N. Stromilov, and Staff Captain of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment V. V. Blonsky.

Professor E. G. Spalvin’s report about V. V. Blonsky’s work said: “Staff Captain Blonsky, a 4th year attendee of the Sino-Japanese department, presented a full translation of memoirs by Japanese Lieutenant Sakurai about the Port Arthur battle named *Nikudan*, literally: *Flesh Cannon Balls*. These memoirs, which have been republished in Japan 48 times,... provide quite a real picture of the Port Arthur fighting...The members of the Conference have already familiarized themselves with Staff Captain Blonsky’s translation through the printed impressions in the *Far Eastern Military News*. Staff Captain Blonsky managed not only to relay the general flavor of the memoirs – he also kept as close to the text as possible. The translator worthily comes out victor in the battle with difficult Japanese constructions and word formations, always feeling the meaning and relaying it in good Russian... The presented translation is, we may say, the first significant translation from Japanese into Russian done by a very competent person and done successfully in many respects.

Given all the above-said and believing that by his translation Staff Captain Blonsky made a significant contribution into Russian translations of Oriental literature and gave the Russian public a very interesting material to form opinions about the Japanese people..." [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 156].

The Russo-Japanese war gave rise to a contradictory situation. Attendee officers showed a high level of competence and proved to be indispensable for the Russian Army in the Far East. However, many officers were so deeply plunged into learning that they wanted to devote their life to Japanese studies and commit themselves to science and education rather than to the military service. The problem could be solved through an increase in the number of attendee officers. The annual admission of officers to the Oriental Institute was increased to 20 people. Thus, eventually, the Oriental Institute admitted over a hundred officers for the first ten years of its history; most of them studied the Japanese language. In addition, immediately after the Russo-Japanese war, interpreter schools were opened for officers and soldiers right in military units.

Schools of the Japanese and Chinese languages for officers and lower ranks were opened after the war in some units garrisoned in the Amur Military District. It should be noted that some experience in setting up Chinese language schools for lower ranks had already been gained by that time. A. N. Zankovsky, a student of the Oriental Institute, was among the Japanese language teachers. This specialist in Japanese studies, who had combat experience in the war with Japan, taught Japanese language to officers and lower ranks of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment training team in 1906-1908. The training team of this regiment was stationed in the Vladivostok fortress, and forty lower ranks from this regiment were admitted into the Japanese language group; they took their exams in May.

The letter of the "Commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 11th East-Siberian Rifle... Regiment supervising the training team" of August 14, 1908 said that the former Commander of the regiment "Colonel Yablochkin, having realized – through his combat experience – the

powerful advantage of the enemy's language command not only for the unit, but also for particular riflemen, decided to introduce Japanese and Chinese language learning to the regiment training team, with the right provided to officers willing to learn one of the said languages to attend the department of the training team where the language chosen is taught. The objective was to teach each lower rank to ask questions related to the movement, military operations, composition of forces, war outfit, ammunition, names of different allowance and subsistence stores, cost, weight, measures, etc., essential in the warfare".²⁴

The Oriental Institute remained a major center for the training of military orientalists after the Russo-Japanese War. In 1907, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov was admitted to the second year: he had undergone the first year in 1903/1904. Staff Captain Ekgardt, an attendee of the Sino-Japanese department, was transferred to the third year of study. Future specialists in Japanese studies – Staff Captain Pozdeev, Captain Lisynov, Lieutenant Tshepushelov, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, Second Lieutenant Spandeg and Lieutenant Baron Rozen – were enrolled into the Oriental Institute as assigned and supernumerary attendees in 1907. The *Report of the Oriental Institute Status and Performance in 1908* said that there were 89 attendee officers in all four years of study, 34 – in the second year, and 20 officers each in the first and third years each. It should be noted that there were more attendee officers in the Oriental Institute than students at that time. Seventeen more "outside attendees", some of which were also officers, must be added to this number [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 10]. The report further stated: "79 officers out of 83 are full-time attendees by the appointment of the Amur Governor General, while four officers – supernumerary attendees – are from the Independent Corps of the Zaamursky Military District Border Guards" [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 14].

Each course of the Oriental Institute had two groups and one of them consisted of officers. Specialization was determined in the second year of study. For example, in 1908, the following officers

²⁴ ATSA. F. P-115. I. 1. C. 378. S. 47

were enrolled in the second year of the Sino-Japanese department: Captain Lisynov, Staff Captain Pozdeev, Lieutenant Baron Rozen, Second Lieutenant Spandeg, Lieutenant Tshenushelov; Junior Cossack Captain Zakharevsky, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, Commander of a hundred soldiers (*sotnik*) Lion, Staff Captain Sipailo-Rudnitsky, Captain Speshnev, Staff Captain Shalfeev and Staff Cavalry Captain Lozdovsky became third-year attendees. [Vostochniy Institut 1909b, pp. 85–86]. The documents of the Oriental Institute prove the fact that officers studied better than ordinary students did – six students were expelled in one academic year, and only two officers. [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, c. 12]. The *Report of the Oriental Institute Status and Performance in 1908* said: “The promotion and final exams showed the following results: a) 37 of 78 students were promoted to the next year...10 completed the course...b) 65 attendee officers of 88 were promoted to the following years of study... 15 completed the course... [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 14]. Professor E. G. Spalvin conducted specialized classes for officers where they studied the Japanese army. Much attention was paid to the history of Japan during these classes.

The Sino-Japanese department of the Oriental Institute was far from being the most numerous but it drew special attention. The *Report of the Oriental Institute Status and Performance in 1908* said: “A special interest for learning shown by the Institute attendees – as a natural consequence of the Russo-Japanese war – resulted in strengthening the teaching staff of the Sino-Japanese department by one more qualified lector of the Japanese language; this circumstance enables to ensure correct and successful system of practical classes at this department. In the spring semester of the accounting year, by Professor E. G. Spalvin’s instruction and under his close guidance, part of the practical training was devoted to lecturers’ regular readings and talks in Japanese...” [Vostochniy Institut 1909b, p. 19]. Everyone studied only Chinese in the first year, while, in later years, Japanese learning students had four hours of practice in Chinese and Japanese, as well as two hours of English each week in addition to lectures.

It took some time to resume regular study trips to Japan. For example, the minutes of the Oriental Institute Conference of October 24, 1907, said: “it has been decided, considering the exceptionally unfavorable conditions Lieutenant May experienced in Japan this summer, which deprived him of an opportunity to improve his knowledge in the Japanese language and to be moved to the fourth year, to approve his appeal to undergo the third-year curriculum again [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 26]. The next year, the situation with study trips to Japan completely normalized.

The tradition of presenting academic translations by specialists in Japanese studies after their study trips was preserved in the first post-war years. After the 1908 summer practical training, the officers presented the following works: “Captain Aivaz-Oglu. – a) a translation of the Japanese comedy by Mr. Ozaki Tokutaro... *Koi-No-Yamai* (*Love Sickness*), b) translation of the Japanese work by Takeda Oto and Kimura Shoshu *Shonen Gadan. Nihon Bushoden* (Illustrated Stories for the Youth – Biographies of Japanese Warriors)”... Staff Captain Ivanov – Translation of the Japanese military gymnastics statutes with the attached list of words used in the statutes. Staff Captain Leontiev. – Translation of Japanese philosophical studies by Mr. Uchimura Kanzo: *Yorozu Tengen* (*A Bit of Everything*) ... Lieutenant May – a) translation from Japanese of the *Project for Improvement of the Infantry Manual* (*Hohei Soten Kaisei ban*) with the attached collection of military terms and commands used in this Manual and b) translation from Japanese of the *Field Research of the Amur Coast and Kamchatka* by Vice-Consul Suzuki: *Report*... Lieutenant Spiridovich. – Translation from Japanese of the first nine chapters of Mr. Tsuboi Zenshiro’s opus *Tsuzoku Meiji Rekishi* (*The Popular History of the Meiji Era*)... [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, pp. 30–31]. The second year attendee officers presented the following papers: Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov. Translation of two Japanese stories: a) *Murotodzak* (*Muroto’s Thought*), works by Kawaguchi Mokusuke, and b) *Yamagoshi* (*Mountain Passage*), works by Kawai Kotori ... Sotnik Lion. – Translation of the Japanese story *Botchan* (*Little Boy*), works by Natsume Soseki... Captain Speshnev. – a) Translation

from Japanese of the 1st book (*On the War Emergence*) from *Shonen Nichirono Senshi* (*The History of the Russo-Japanese War for the Youth*, works by Iwaya Sazanami, and b) *Bushido in the Past and Present* (a compilation article)” [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 33].

The Oriental Institute Conference awarded the scholarly papers by Stepan Georgievich Leontiev, Staff Captain of the 1st Eastern-Siberian Mountain Artillery Division, a gold medal, Vladimir Nikolayevich Aivaz-Oglu, Captain of the 3rd Vladivostok Fortress Artillery Regiment, received a silver medal, while the works by Lev Iosifovich Leon and Lieutenant of the 3rd East-Siberian Rifle Regiment Oskar-Valentin Frantsievich May were marked with an honorary mention [Vostochniy Institut 1909b, pp. 91–92]. The works by Ivan Vasilyevich Ivanov, Staff Captain of the 10th East-Siberian Rifle Regiment, Sergei Vasilyevich Spiridovich, Lieutenant of the 2nd East-Siberian Rifle Artillery Brigade, and Captain Nikolai Alexeevich Speshnev were recognized as satisfactory; it is only the paper by Lieutenant Colonel Ilya Efimovich Ivanov that was returned to the author for improvement. In 1909, I. E. Ivanov published a small book *During the Study Trip to Japan in 1908*, and later, his book *In Japanese Private Spaces and Public Places (From the Traveler’s Notebook)* came out in Moscow in 1911.

In the summer of 1909, attendee officers Captain Lisynkov, Lieutenant Rozen, Junior Cossack Captain Zakharevsky, Staff Captain Shalfeev, Staff Cavalry Captain Lozdovsky, Staff Cavalry Captain Shidlovsky-Khilkevich, and Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov were dispatched to Tokyo. Several other officers – Pozdeev, Spandeg, Tshepushelov, Lion, Sikaylo-Rudnitsky, and Speshnev – were sent on a study trip to other Japanese cities.

Despite the achievements made by the Oriental Institute’s attendee officers in studying Japan and learning the Japanese language, the end of the Russo-Japanese War raised an issue of reforming the education in Japanese studies for military men. The first to accentuate the problem were the Oriental Institute’s professors, and that was reflected in the minutes of the Oriental Institute Conference of September 6, 1907. The *Institute Director’s presentation to the Amur Governor General of July 25* and the *Governor General’s subsequent proposal of July 8* said: “a) the evident

necessity of reconsidering the current provisions of the Oriental Institute raises a very important and urgent issue – final regulation of the officer course at the Oriental Institute” [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 5]. The Oriental Institute professors believed that a large share of the “military element in the Institute showed with ample evidence the unfeasibility of co-educating students and officers; the reason, in their opinion was, “worldview discrepancy or even opposition, difference of age and level of maturity” [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 6]. Most probably, the Oriental Institute Conference made this decision due to conflicts between students and officers. An attendee officer ripped off a revolutionary leaflet, and students decided to close the Institute [Datsyshen 2000, p. 80].

Yet the main argument of the Oriental Institute’s professors was different. The document said: “The most important, however, is that the objectives of Oriental education for students and officers – from the government’s point of view – seem to be quite different, which makes it necessary to develop different curricula for the two categories” [Vostochniy Institut 1909a, p. 6].

For the purpose of changing the existing system of training for military specialists in Japanese studies, the Oriental Institute leadership suggested “setting up special courses for officers at the Oriental Institute, limiting the officers’ time of study in the institute by three years, and the curriculum – by learning written and oral Oriental languages, English, geography and ethnography, history and culture of Far Eastern countries. The courses are to be divided into departments according to the language studied: Chinese... Japanese, and Japanese-Korean. Purely military sciences may be added to the above subjects of study” [Vostochniy Institut 1909 a, p. 7].

The need to reform the training of military specialists in Japanese studies was enhanced by the fact that the army still lacked experts. The article *New Procedures for Officers Learning Oriental Languages* published in the *Razvedchik* magazine in 1910 [A. D. 1910, pp. 230–231] mentioned the lack of educational establishments: “The recent war with Japan showed, quite apparently, the need to have among the troops officers with the knowledge of Oriental languages to serve as interpreters.

At the present time, the War Ministry has the following institutions for training these officers: 1) The course of Oriental languages instituted for officers at the 1st Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2) Oriental Institute in Vladivostok where officers are allowed to attend lectures... 3) Preparatory School of Oriental Languages in Tashkent. In addition, there are two military scholars in the Urga School of Translators and Interpreters, and one scholar – in a similar school in Kuldzha” [A. D. 1910, p. 230].

The commission set up at the General Headquarters in late 1908 “concluded that the poor situation with Oriental languages learning should be explained mainly by the lack of a defined system and clear goal...” [A. D. 1910, p. 231]. The problem might have arisen because many officers did not want to remain military interpreters or intelligence officers – they devoted their lives to studying Japanese history and literature. The revolutionary events in Russia, directly touching upon the life of the Oriental Institute, played their role as well.

The commission set up at the General Headquarters decided: “to suspend the further admission of officers into the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok and admission to the Course of Oriental Languages pending the implementation of the planned measure...” [A. D. 1910, p. 231]. The material on this issue published in the *Razvedchik* magazine said: “The commission agreed unanimously that for the army... it is necessary to have two categories of officers knowing these languages: the 1st category should include field “officers-interpreters” having a good command of the language and satisfying the army needs in reconnaissance, communication with local inhabitants, etc. The second category should include a particular contingent of officers who do not only know the language but who also thoroughly studied particular areas of the Far and Near East – geography, history, religion, laws, customs, partially literature, etc.” [A. D. 1910, p. 230].

The *Razvedchik* reported: “In keeping with the reasons defined by the commission it compiled a draft procedure on officers’ learning oriental languages... I. The basic principle shall be, first, that the main factor of officers’ training in learning languages shall be their personal

independent action... II. Officers wishing to study oriental languages shall undergo a preliminary 6-8 month course of a special preparatory school instituted at the District Headquarters. III. Upon graduation from the school officers are dispatched abroad for 2 years..." [A. D. 1910, p. 230]. The reformers suggested opening four preparatory schools, one of which – at the Amur Military District Headquarters, where it was planned to admit annually "5 officers after they have passed the instituted exam" [A. D. 1910, p. 231].

The year of 1910 saw the adoption of the *Provisions for Officers Learning Oriental Languages*. Pursuant to it the District Preparatory School of Translators at the Oriental Institute was set up. The annual student admission rate was 12 officers. The last admission was made in 1913; the world war that had broken out not only halted the process of admitting students to the preparatory school but also made the attendees interrupt their learning. Less than 20 people graduated from the preparatory school at the Oriental Institute.

The educational reforms in military Japanese studies complicated education for officers but did not make it inaccessible. The path to Japanese studies covered by Vasily Nikolayevich Krylov may serve as an example. In 1909, V. N. Krylov, Lieutenant of the 8th Squadron of the Zaimurysky District Border Guards, passed exams for the elementary knowledge of the Japanese language and was enrolled into the second year of the Oriental Institute, Sino-Japanese department, as an extranumerary attendee. He completed a shortened program and graduated from the institute in 1912, without a certificate; but later, in 1913, he graduated from the District Preparatory School of Translators at the Oriental Institute. A. E. Kulanov states: "As Krylov, who had already become a Staff Cavalry Captain back in 1910, did not receive a diploma, the Preparatory School Certificate served as a document of his professional education" [Kulanov 2014, p. 196].

The Fate and Fortunes of Specialists in Japanese Studies upon Oriental Institute Graduation

The fate and fortunes of officer specialist in Japanese studies were different. M. G. Popov, a participant of the Russo-Japanese War, was enrolled as a full-time attendee of the Oriental Institute in 1906 but soon was expelled for underachievement. In 1909, he enrolled again but as an extern attendee at his own expense; in 1912, he graduated from the Sino-Japanese department as a first class graduate and was promoted to the rank of Staff Captain [Buyakov 2014, pp. 134–148]. L. I. Lion, a Cossack Captain of the Amur Cossacks Regiment, graduated from the Sino-Japanese department of the Oriental Institute and was shortly sent under the control of the Russian military agent in Japan; in 1914, he got ill and soon died [Buyakov 1999, p. 101]. In 1912, Lieutenant S. V. Medzevich enrolled in the Japanese department of the District Preparatory school affiliated with the Oriental Institute. After the World War I began, he was dispatched to his unit and was killed in battle in 1915.

Many specialists in Japanese studies went to serve in Manchuria; they continued their scholarly work there, but specialized in studying this region with Chinese becoming their major working language. For example, A. P. Boloban worked at the Chinese Eastern Railway after graduation from the Oriental Institute. In 1908, he initiated founding the Association of Russian Orientalists; later he was a founder of the Russian-Japanese Society in Harbin. Yet he gave up Japanese studies and took to researching Manchuria, publishing several major research papers on the subject.

There were more famous public figures and politicians than specialists in Japanese studies among the District Preparatory School graduates. Well remembered is the outstanding but short life of Alexey Nikolayevich Lutskoy, the first Chairman of the Irkutsk Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, who was killed in 1920 in Vladivostok. Nevertheless, there were famous specialists in Japanese studies among the District School students, such as Staff Captain K. A. Kharnsky. His first paper on Japanese studies, the

article *Agriculture in Japan*, was published in the *Bulletin of Finances, Industry, and Commerce* in 1906. In the 1920s, after a long interval, K. A. Kharnsky returned to Japanese studies.

As for military specialists in Japanese studies who made the greatest achievements, the one worthy of mention is, first and foremost, V. M. Mendrin. He was admitted as a full-time lecturer of the Oriental Institute and was preparing to become department head; he wrote and published a textbook of the Japanese language. The years of 1910-1916 were very fruitful in his academic career. Throughout 1910-1914, his multi-volume textbook *Sorobun. Analysis of the Japanese Epistolary Style* was being published. V. M. Mendrin translated and issued six out of 22 volumes of the *National History of Japan (Nihon Gaishi)* by Confucian scholar Rai San'yō (1780-1832). He wrote a foreword and supplied the text with vast historical and linguistic comments. His last major paper was published on the eve of the 1917 revolution [Mendrin 1916].

The revolution made it difficult for V. M. Mendrin to continue his fruitful work. In 1918, he was elected Principal of the Higher Political School that had split off from his alma mater, the Oriental Institute in Vladivostok. Cossack Captain V. M. Mendrin, who had been summoned from reserve during World War I, was offered to occupy the post of Ataman of the Ussuriysk Cossacks Army, but he chose to serve in the sphere of education. V. M. Mendrin died in 1920 and was buried in Vladivostok. All his manuscripts and archives were lost.

A great contribution to Japanese studies in Russia was made by V. N. Krylov, a military specialist in Japanese studies. In the first few years after receiving education in Japanese studies, he published a series of very significant papers. The year of 1914 saw the publication in Harbin of his four works, all being of the “military academic character”: *Japanese Cavalry Issues. Directory for Modern Organization of Cavalry in Japan with General Data of Japanese Army Attached* (Harbin, 1914), *Map of Korea with Japanese Proper Names* (Harbin, 1914), *Dictionary of Japanese Geographical Names in Korea, of the Current Chosen General- Governorship. With a Map Edited by Major*

General of the General Staff Volodchenko (Harbin, 1914), *Summary of the Japanese Army. Geographical and Statistical Data on Japan Attached. Edited by Major General of the General Staff Volodchenko* (1914) [Kulanov 2014, p. 196]. In 1918, Cavalry Captain Krylov published his book *Japanese Army Issues in Alphabetical Order. Handbook of the Modern Structure of the Japanese Armed Forces*. The list of sources in different languages underlying this research occupied half of the page in the text. As to the texts in Japanese, the author wrote: “The following Japanese works have served as aides: the book *Ground Army (Rikugun)* by Major General Kameoka, *New Textbook for Infantry Soldiers* (Shin-hohei-suchi) compiled by Captain Okazaki, and *General Review of the Army (Guntai-taikan)* – a book compiled by Colonel Goshi, and, finally, Japanese military statutes and instructions for training troops, as well as Japanese periodicals. General statistical data related to Japan are taken from the 32nd *Statistical Yearbook of the Japanese Empire Compiled by the Statistical Bureau Affiliated with the Cabinet of Ministers (Nihon-teikoku Dai San Jū Ni Tō Keinenkan)* and *Yearbook of the Kokumin-Simbun Newspaper (Kokumin-nenkan)*. Issued in Taisei 7th year (1917)” [Krylov 1918, p. IV]. During the Civil War, Lieutenant Captain V. N. Krylov, who had served in the White Army in the Trans-Baikal Region, continued his fruitful Japanese studies, taught the Japanese language, issued dictionaries and translations, and, after the Bolsheviks’ victory, he remained in emigration in Manchuria where he was involved in active scholarly research.

The revolution and the Civil War struck a serious blow to the Japanese studies in Russia. Most of the specialists in Japanese studies remained to live and work in Japan and Manchuria. Officers K. A. Kharnsky, N. A. Speshnev, and other specialists in Japanese studies, who sided with the Bolsheviks, were engaged in information and propaganda work for several years. In the 1920-30s, the graduates of the Oriental Institute who remained in the Soviet Union, including some military specialists in Japanese studies, created new Soviet university-based Japanese studies in the Far East. Yet the political repressions in the 1930s did away with not only military, but with the entire Russian Far Eastern Japanese

studies. The specialists in Japanese studies who worked in Vladivostok as well as the émigrés who returned from Manchuria, such as V. N. Krylov, were physically exterminated. Their unpublished papers and archives were lost, while most works by military specialists in Japanese studies were forgotten nearly until the late 20th century.

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DATSYSHEN Vladimir Grigoriyevich – Doctor of Sciences (History),
Professor. Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical University

660049, Russia, Krasnoyarsk, Ady Lebedevoi street, 82

E-mail: dazishen@mail.ru

ORCID: 0000-0001-6471-8327

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Association of Japanologists of Russia
Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences
12, Rozhdestvenka Street, Moscow, 107031

E-mail: japanassoc@gmail.com
Web sites: www.japanstudies.ru
www.japanreview.ru

