In Japan, there are many regional legends and traditions associated with water, fish, and fantastic creatures inhabiting the sea. These legends go back many centuries; the first mentions of large fish are found already in the first Japanese poetic anthology Man’yōshū (8^th century) and in the mythological and chronicle text Nihon Shoki (720). In different provinces, legends and traditions vary, some motifs are interpreted differently by folklorists, however. Evidently, we can talk about a single body of related texts, united not only by plots where the main characters are whales, dolphins, etc., but also by accompanying actions: matsuri festivals in honor of fish and fishing, ritual performance of magical texts, dancing, songs, cooking, making amulets, etc. The symbolism that unites the theme of fish and fishing in Chinese and Japanese culture is also obvious: wealth and prosperity, which is reflected not only in written monuments, but also in works of art. Whales, for example, are associated with numerous legends, traditions, and mythological motifs of local significance, ideas about these mammals as deities of the sea, to whom Shinto shrines are dedicated. Images of fish were part of offerings to the bride’s family due to the auspicious meaning of the item. It is noteworthy that the legends about the sea included famous literary and legendary characters and episodes from famous works of Japanese history and literature, such as Kojiki, Nihon Shoki, Man’yōshū, Heike Monogatari.

The article is devoted to identification of similarities and differences in the historical memory of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany after World War II. These issues are a relevant topic for research in the face of the enduring influence of historical grievances on Japan’s relations with its former victims, in contrast to similar relations of Germany. As a theoretical framework, the paper uses O. Malinova’s approach, which interprets historical memory as a product of social construction and a variation of symbolic politics. In addition, the author uses the classification of historical memory proposed by Matteo Dian. In the scope of the study, the author examines the impact of occupation policies on the further development of historical memory in the two countries. The paper compares the original content of the main narratives of historical memory in each country, the main mnemonic actors promoting them, and the evolution of these narratives from the end of the war to the present day. The author also highlights the reasons for the differences in the content and evolution of the narratives in Japan and the FRG.
The author concludes that, despite a certain similarity of the occupation policy in the two countries, as well as the formation of two traditions (conservative and left-progressive) in each country’s historical memory, its content and evolution are substantially different. In the FRG, the conservative tradition initially included the narratives of self-victimhood and amnesia, while the progressive tradition included the narrative of contrition; over the years, however, the traditions have evolved from polarization to a consensus around contrition and elements of self-victimhood. In Japan, the conservative tradition initially included glorification of the past in addition to self-victimhood, i.e., it was more revisionist, while the progressive tradition focused on self-victimhood rather than contrition. Over time, the traditions in Japan shifted from a consensus around self-victimhood to a sharp polarization: progressives moved to a contrition narrative, while revisionists gained ground among conservatives.

In the modern world, primarily in developed countries, education has become the main factor of intergenerational social mobility. Sociologists judge the degree of openness or rigidity of the social structure by whether the influence of “birth circumstances” on access to education increases or, conversely, softens. Although higher education has become widespread in Japan by now, this does not mean that the degree of social inequality in this area has decreased. Structuring children’s chances of access to higher education along the lines dividing society into different social strata begins here at the stage of schooling – first, in lower secondary school, and then in upper secondary school.
The inequality of chances that forms at the stage of school education affects the choice of university rank and directions of specialization by children and their parents, employment opportunities in the future, determining, in fact, the entire life path of a person. Based on the works of famous Japanese sociologists and the data of Japanese statistics, the author shows that the Japanese education system plays a dual role. On the one hand, it provides a chance to break away from one’s social roots and move up the social ladder to an increasing number of young people. On the other hand, it preserves and reproduces social inequality.
According to calculations by Japanese sociologists, indicators of relative social mobility, reflecting the ratio of chances to access higher education for people from different backgrounds, were remarkably stable throughout the post-war period. On the one hand, this does not confirm the widely accepted thesis about the growing inequality in education in the last two or three decades. On the other hand, it allows us to assert that both before and now Japanese society is a kakusa shakai, or a gap society. However, the increase of the share of second-generation university degree holders in the structure of Japanese university graduates suggests that the scale of the influence of the factor of social inequality in education will gradually decrease.

This study examines the strategic role of sake as an instrument of cultural diplomacy within the framework of trade relations between Japan and Europe, using a theoretical approach that combines the concepts of soft power, gastrodiplomacy, and nation branding. Sake, as a traditional Japanese fermented beverage rooted in the spiritual and social practices of society, has undergone a reorientation of its function from domestic consumption to a symbol of national cultural identity promoted internationally. Through the Cool Japan policy, the Japanese government actively positions sake as a key element in public diplomacy, linking cultural heritage with export trade strategies.
The implementation of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) since 2018, which includes geographical indication (GI) protection, provides additional legitimacy for the authenticity of sake in the European market. Promotional strategies involving culinary festivals, cross-industry collaborations, and product narratives emphasizing aesthetic value, origins, and traditional production techniques have successfully enhanced European public perception of sake and, more broadly, of Japan. Export data shows significant growth, with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany contributing the most, indicating the success of this approach in expanding market penetration. However, this dynamic is not without criticism, including the commodification of cultural values, exclusion of small producers, and the risk of reducing the spiritual meaning of sake in a commercialized context.
Therefore, this study emphasizes the importance of cultural diplomacy that not only highlights visual appeal and market narratives but also commits to preserving values and the participation of local cultural communities. In conclusion, sake diplomacy offers an intriguing model for the integration of culture and economy in international relations, demonstrating that cultural products can serve as an effective means to build cross-national relations rooted in empathy, experience, and appreciation for the uniqueness of traditions.

The article presents a comparative study of the sanctions policy of Japan and the Republic of Korea towards Russia after February 2022 and the assessment of the impact of their sanctions on the development of Russian-Japanese and Russian-South Korean cooperation in the Russian Far East. Based on the results of the study of the economic ties of Russia, Japan, and South Korea (in the areas of trade, investment, finance, tourism, and transport) and their interaction in the educational and cultural-humanitarian spheres under sanctions restrictions, the authors come to the conclusion that the sanctions policy of Japan and South Korea towards Russia has a common basis due to their belonging to the “collective West,” and the anti-Russian measures they take are aimed at weakening the industrial and technological potential of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, like most of their Western partners, Japan and South Korea are not ready to impose such sanctions that could cause significant damage to their own economic and strategic interests. There are important differences in the sanctions approaches of Japan and South Korea – Japan pursues a much tougher policy towards Russia, not only limiting exports to Russia, but also imposing a ban on imports of a number of goods from Russia. South Korea is much more willing to maintain ties with Russia and its Far Eastern territories, despite the unfavorable political situation, which is expressed, in particular, in the ongoing oficial contacts between Primorsky Krai and Vladivostok and a number of provinces and municipalities of the Republic of Korea. The authors suggest that ties between the Russian Far East and South Korea can be quickly restored once the situation around Ukraine is resolved, while the prospects for restoring relations with Japan look much less certain.

The article revisits the policies of Abe Shinzo, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, and places them in the context of the current trend of civilizations advancing as a major factor in international affairs. We briefly examine the development of the influential concept of a “civilizational state,” today most often exemplified by China, and suggest that this concept can be used to elucidate Abe’s vision of Japanese polity and its position on the global arena. Based on the review of the relevant scholarly literature, we argue that Japan’s traditional selfidentification as a mediator between Asia and the West also conforms to the idea of a civilizational state.
We highlight that the key factor influencing the international situation over Abe’s second administration (2012–2020) was the rise of China in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which exposed the West’s relative economic decline. In these circumstances, Japan attempted to assume a position of a mediator between the two poles of power, a position that we relate to Abe’s political aspirations such as his quest for Japan’s greater political autonomy and his appeal both to Asian identity and universal values. In certain respects, this tendency continues after Abe’s resignation in 2020 as well, though whether current and future leaders of Japan will continue with his general approach is a complicated question.
We conclude by arguing for urgency of the discussion of the political ideas that mediate between the universal and the local values and identities – a task for which Abe’s legacy appears to us to be particularly relevant.

The article presents an overview of the collective monograph “Japanese Culture in the West” ed. by Katasonova, E. L. and Dolin, A. A (Moscow: Institute of Oriental Studies of RAS, 2024. 544 p. ISBN: 978-5-907846-81-4). The monograph, for the first time in the history of Russian Oriental studies, presents a comprehensive interdisciplinary analysis of the spread and influence of Japanese culture on the countries of Europe and America in the 19^th – 21^st centuries. The reviewer notes that analyzing the experience of “exporting Japanese culture” makes it possible to develop a methodology for transcultural processes, broaden the concepts of cultural authenticity and identity, and propose an alternative to binary models of cultural interaction.